She said she would live with her husband anywhere but that one house, and the Family Court looked only at the fact that she had left

Justices Sujit Narayan Prasad and Pradeep Kumar Srivastava set aside a decree of restitution of conjugal rights as perverse, holding that the test of reasonableness was never applied to her defence.

A husband sued his wife for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 281 of Mulla's Mohammedan Law, asking for a decree directing her to live with him, discharge her marital obligations and cohabit with him as his legally married wife. The Principal Judge, Family Court, Hazaribagh, allowed the suit on 24 January 2025, with the decree sealed and signed on 12 February 2025. On 13 October 2026 the Jharkhand High Court set that judgment and decree aside as perverse.

What the husband pleaded

The marriage was solemnised on 5 March 2020 at the wife's father's house according to Muslim rites, after which she came to her matrimonial home at Edalhatu, Morabadi, in Ranchi. The husband's case was that he had taken no dowry; that he had been living in his aunt's house at Edalhatu for twenty-five years, his own parents living at Aligarh in Uttar Pradesh; and that two days after the marriage his wife began quarrelling with him and his family, telling her father on the telephone that she did not want to live there and using filthy language about his parents.

He pleaded a sequence of departures and returns. On 8 March 2020 her elder brother and others came to Ranchi for Chauthi and took her to Hazaribagh; he brought her back, but after a few days she pressed to return and went back. He went to his in-laws' house on 17 April 2020 to bring her back; on 22 April 2020 she slapped him and used abusive language in the presence of her in-laws. On 10 May 2020 he brought her back to Ranchi, and after some time she began ill-treating him and his family. On 6 June 2020 her father came and took her, with all her articles, to her brother-in-law's house at Bariyatu. A daughter was born on 18 January 2021, during which period he visited and bore all the expenses of the birth. She returned on 26 July 2021, and on her insistence he left his aunt's house and the couple began living in a rented house in Sattar Colony, Bariyatu, where she again behaved badly and said she would lodge a false case against him. Since 26 July 2022 she has been living at her parents' home, he pleaded, without any plausible reason and through the misguidance of her parents. He said he wanted to keep his wife and minor child with full love and dignity and to meet all their needs.

The matter was referred to the Mediation Centre, Ranchi, and mediation was unsuccessful. The wife filed her written statement on 20 December 2023. She accepted the date and place of the marriage, that she went to her matrimonial home at Edalhatu, that her husband had lived in his aunt's house there for twenty-five years and that she had come to that house after the marriage, and she accepted that her brother came for Chauthi on 8 March 2020. She denied that he had taken no dowry, claiming that her parents had given cash, jewellery and other valuable gifts worth about ₹10,00,000. She denied quarrelling two days after the marriage, denied telling her father she did not want to live there, and denied using abusive language about his parents.

The defence the Court said was ignored

The grounds of appeal set out the defence that the Family Court was faulted for not examining. The appellant said she is always ready to reside with her husband in any other house where his brother-in-law is not residing. She said she is a respectable woman and does not want to live in the house of her husband's aunt because she did not feel safe there, on account of the bad intention of her husband's brother-in-law. She denied that he had come to bring her back on 17 April 2020 or that she slapped him on 22 April 2020.

And she made the statutory point. Under Section 281, the essential fact a husband is required to establish is that his wife has “without a lawful cause refused to cohabit with him”; here, she said, the wife has lawful cause to refuse. She had not withdrawn herself from the society of her husband without reasonable cause.

The husband's answer was that he had performed his full obligations of conjugal life, had given respect to everyone including his in-laws, had taken no dowry, and that she had withdrawn without reasonable cause through the misguidance of her parents — and that the Family Court, having considered the material, had found desertion without reasonable excuse.

What was common ground

A good deal of the history was not in dispute, which is what makes the gap in the Family Court's reasoning visible. Both sides agreed the marriage was solemnised on 5 March 2020 at her father's house according to Muslim rites, that she then went to the matrimonial home at Edalhatu, and that the husband had been living in his aunt's house there for twenty-five years while his own parents were in Aligarh. She accepted that her brother came to Ranchi for Chauthi on 8 March 2020 and took her to Hazaribagh, and said the husband brought her back the following day. The birth of a daughter on 18 January 2021 was not in dispute, nor the move to a rented house at Bariyatu after she returned on 26 July 2021, nor that she has been at her parents' home since 26 July 2022.

What was in dispute was why. On the husband's account she quarrelled from the second day, used filthy language about his parents, slapped him in front of her own relations, ill-treated his family, and finally left through the misguidance of her parents — no reason at all, in other words, that the law would recognise. On her account there was a reason, and it was specific: she did not feel safe in his aunt's house because of the conduct of his brother-in-law, and she was willing to live with her husband in any other house where that man was not residing. She also denied his central incidents, including that he had come on 17 April 2020 to fetch her and that she slapped him on 22 April 2020.

The scope of a first appeal

Before reaching the merits the Bench set out what a first appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 permits. Sub-section (1) provides that an appeal lies from every judgment or order of a Family Court, other than an interlocutory order, to the High Court “both on facts and on law”; the section is therefore parallel to Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Relying on Jagdish Singh v. Madhuri Devi, the Court recorded that an appeal is a continuation of the suit and a rehearing of the main matter, and that the appellate court can reappraise, reappreciate and review the entire evidence, oral as well as documentary, and come to its own conclusion, with power to affirm, reverse or modify.

What “perverse” means

The judgment then does something uncommon: it defines its operative word out of the dictionaries, quoting five. The Concise Oxford Dictionary — showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable. Longman — deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, for the legal sense — of a verdict, against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. Webster's — purposely deviating from accepted or expected behaviour or opinion. And Stroud's Judicial Dictionary — “A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence.”

From those the Court drew its working test: “perverse” means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record, or are against the law, or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity.

Applying it

On careful scrutiny the Court held that the Family Court had failed to appreciate the entire gamut of the case. The Court below confined its reasoning merely to the aspect of the wife's withdrawal from the society of her husband, without adequately considering her specific plea regarding apprehension for her safety, honour and dignity, as well as her willingness to reside with her husband in alternative accommodation.

That is the whole of the defect. In a suit where the husband must prove refusal to cohabit “without a lawful cause”, a court which finds only that the wife left, and never asks whether her reason for leaving was a lawful or reasonable one, has not decided the case the statute poses. The Court held that the learned Family Judge, in allowing the husband's prayer, had not properly appreciated the factual aspect and had passed the order of restitution of conjugal rights without applying the test of reasonableness. The impugned judgment and decree accordingly fall within the fold of perversity as defined, since the Family Court ignored vital aspects of the wife's defence and thereby rendered a finding that cannot be sustained in law. It could not be said that its findings were based on evidence or had been reached with due deliberation on the entire factual position and proper appreciation of the evidence led by both parties.

The appeal succeeded. The judgment dated 24 January 2025 and the decree sealed and signed on 12 February 2025 were quashed and set aside, and the appeal was allowed and disposed of, with pending interlocutory applications disposed of.

The Court confined the effect of its decision carefully. The findings recorded are limited to the husband's claim for restitution of conjugal rights, and are not to be construed as a determination of any independent claim relating to maintenance, custody of the minor child, return of matrimonial articles, or any other relief that may be available to either party in accordance with law. Mr Aman Kumar appeared for the appellant; Md. Faruque Ansari, Ms Shabana Parween and Mr Vishal Kr. Gupta for the respondent.