Jharkhand HC Registers PIL Challenging 2018 JPSC Disability Certificate Format as Ultra Vires the 2016 Disabilities Act

The Jharkhand High Court's Division Bench admitted a PIL questioning whether a 2018 JPSC resolution on disability certificate formats conflicts with the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, and consolidated a related individual writ petition before itself.

The Division Bench of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi, comprising Chief Justice M. S. Sonak and Justice Rajesh Shankar, on 22 January 2026 directed that W.P. (Filing) No. 13772 of 2025 be registered as a Public Interest Litigation. The petition challenges Resolution No. 2249 dated 3 April 2018 issued by the Jharkhand Public Service Commission (JPSC), which prescribes a particular format for disability certificates in selection processes. The petitioner contends that the 2018 resolution is rooted in the older Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, and fails to account for two additional disability categories introduced by the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016. The bench also pulled up the petitioner's individual writ petition from the Single Judge and consolidated both matters before the Division Bench.

The Dispute Before the Division Bench

The petitioner, Vaishnavi, had separately filed W.P. (S) No. 5668 of 2025 before a learned Single Judge. That petition challenges a concluded JPSC selection process in which she was not selected because she did not furnish a disability certificate in the format prescribed by the notification dated 3 April 2018.

The present petition — W.P. (Filing) No. 13772 of 2025 — takes a wider aim. It does not attack the concluded selection. Instead, it challenges the 2018 resolution itself, arguing that the format it mandates governs ongoing and future selection processes and is incompatible with the 2016 Act and the rules framed under it.

Mr. Sanjoy Piprawall, appearing for the JPSC, raised a threshold objection: PILs are not ordinarily entertained in service matters or in challenges to the validity of statutory provisions. He also pointed out that the petitioner had already approached the court in her individual capacity through the earlier writ petition, making a PIL unnecessary.

Mr. Atulaya Shresth, counsel for the petitioner, countered that the two petitions address distinct questions. The individual writ concerns the concluded selection; the PIL concerns the legality of the 2018 resolution for all future processes. He argued that candidates with disabilities cannot easily pursue such systemic issues on their own, making the PIL route appropriate.

Why the Bench Agreed to Treat the Petition as a PIL

The Division Bench acknowledged the general rule against entertaining PILs in service matters or in challenges to statutory provisions. It did not depart from that rule lightly. Two considerations weighed in favour of admission.

First, the bench drew a distinction between challenging the vires of a statute and challenging a resolution alleged to be ultra vires a statute. What is under attack here is Resolution No. 2249 dated 3 April 2018, not a legislative provision. The bench treated this as a meaningful difference.

Second, the subject matter concerns the rights of persons with disabilities, a class that the bench said must be addressed with “enhanced sensitivity.” The bench observed that clarity on whether the 2018 resolution is consistent with the 2016 Act would help persons with disabilities understand their position, regardless of which way the matter is decided.

On the question of the petitioner's personal stake, the bench was direct. Vaishnavi stands to benefit if the PIL succeeds, since she belongs to the class of persons with disabilities affected by the resolution. The bench held that this incidental benefit does not disqualify her from maintaining the PIL. Persons with disabilities cannot always easily approach courts, and the petitioner was not found to be acting with any oblique motive.

The bench also flagged the risk of conflicting verdicts if the individual writ before the Single Judge and the PIL before the Division Bench were to proceed separately. Both matters turn on the validity and scope of the same 2018 resolution. Deciding them together before the Division Bench eliminates that risk.

The 2018 Resolution and the 2016 Act

The petitioner's case rests on a gap between two legislative regimes. The Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 was the governing law when the JPSC framed its disability certificate format. The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 subsequently expanded the recognised categories of disability, adding two categories not covered by the 1995 Act.

The petitioner's argument, as placed before the bench, is that the 2018 resolution — framed after the 2016 Act came into force — still reflects the older framework and does not accommodate the two additional disability categories introduced by the 2016 Act. If that is established, the resolution would be inconsistent with the 2016 Act and the rules made under it.

The bench has not ruled on the merits of this argument. It has only decided that the question is fit to be examined as a PIL.

Outcome

The Division Bench directed the registration of W.P. (Filing) No. 13772 of 2025 as a Public Interest Litigation. It further directed that W.P. (S) No. 5668 of 2025, pending before the learned Single Judge, be called up and disposed of together with the PIL by the Division Bench.

Respondents were directed to file and serve their responses by 13 February 2026. The petitioner was given time until 20 February 2026 to file a rejoinder. Both matters are listed before the Division Bench on 25 February 2026.