She asked for the divorce and nothing else — the Court grants it and tells her the children can still claim
A Division Bench of Justices Sujit Narayan Prasad and Sanjay Prasad sets aside a Family Court decree, dissolves the marriage on the wife's own suit, and records that her not seeking maintenance reflects her bona fides.
The same Division Bench that fixed twenty lakh rupees of permanent alimony in another Jamshedpur appeal on the same day decided this one, in which nobody asked for any money at all. A woman in her mid-thirties, who works as a nurse in a private hospital and supports two children, had sued for dissolution of her marriage. The Additional Family Court refused her in February 2026. On 9 October 2026 the High Court set that refusal aside, dissolved the marriage, and went out of its way to note that her children's claims are not closed by her own decision not to make one.
The decree that went
The appeal was against the judgment of 9 February 2026 and the decree signed on 16 February 2026 by the Additional Principal Judge, Additional Family Court No. 1, Jamshedpur, East Singhbhum, in an original suit of 2024.
On a consideration of the evidence on record, the Bench held that the judgment and decree “cannot be sustained in law”, and quashed and set them aside. The prayer made in the original suit was consequently allowed, the marriage between the parties stands dissolved, and the Registry of the High Court was directed to issue the decree of dissolution.
What desertion means, and who deserts whom
The suit was brought under the Special Marriage Act, and the ground was desertion — which is why the judgment spends its reasoning on what that word carries.
The Explanation to Section 27 of the Act defines desertion as desertion of the petitioner by the other party “without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party”, and includes wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party. The Bench set that against the standard statement of the case law, quoting Rayden on Divorce: desertion is the separation of one spouse from the other, with an intention on the part of the deserting spouse of bringing cohabitation permanently to an end without reasonable cause and without the other's consent — “but the physical act of departure by one spouse does not necessarily make that spouse the deserting party”.
That last clause is the one that decides cases of this kind, and the judgment restates it in plainer terms: where a spouse withdraws from the house of their own volition it will not amount to desertion by the other, but where a spouse is forced to leave the house, leaving is not desertion by the one who left. Whoever walks out of the door is not automatically the deserter; the question is who brought the cohabitation to an end.
Two things the Court said without being asked
Having granted the relief sought, the Bench added two observations that are the reason to read the judgment.
The first concerns the children. “It goes without saying that the Right to inheritance of the children will remain intact and will have no bearing with the dissolution of marriage, which is being allowed.” Dissolution ends a marriage; it does not touch what the children inherit. Saying so on the face of the decree forecloses an argument that might otherwise be made years later.
The second concerns maintenance, and the Bench handled it with some delicacy. It records that the wife had not approached the court for maintenance, “which reflects bona fide on the part of the appellant-wife”, the reason being that she has a job as a nurse in a private hospital to sustain herself and her two children. Her restraint is treated as a point in her favour rather than as a waiver.
And then the limit of it: “though the wife herself has not chosen to file an application for maintenance of herself … that does not preclude her from claiming maintenance for her minor children for their sustenance and study.” Liberty was expressly left to her to claim maintenance for the children from the husband by filing an appropriate application before the appropriate forum.
The distinction the Bench is drawing is between a claim a spouse can choose to forgo and one that belongs to someone else. A mother supporting two children on a private hospital salary may decide she wants nothing for herself; she cannot give away what is theirs, and the judgment makes sure nobody later says she did.
Order
The appeal was allowed and disposed of in those terms, with any pending interlocutory application also disposed of. The decree of dissolution issues from the High Court's own Registry.
Two appeals from the same city, decided by the same two judges on the same day, make an instructive pair. In the other, a wife who had spent eighteen years resisting her husband's divorce petition left with the decree standing against her and twenty lakh rupees. Here a wife who brought her own suit left with the decree she wanted and no money, because she had not asked for any and said she did not need it. What the Bench added in each case was the thing the party had not secured for herself: enforceable payment terms in the first, and in the second a record that the children's claims survive her restraint.
Two appeals from the same city, decided by the same two judges on the same day, make an instructive pair. In the other, a wife who had contested her husband's divorce petition for eighteen years left with the decree against her and twenty lakh rupees. Here a wife who brought her own suit left with the decree she wanted and no money, because she had not asked for any and said she did not need it. What the Bench added in each case was the thing the party had not secured for herself: enforceable payment terms in the first, and in the second a record that the children's claims survive her restraint.