Writ Against a Workers' Union to Restrain a Strike Is Not Maintainable, But Industrial Tribunal Can Intervene During Conciliation: Karnataka HC
The Karnataka High Court dismissed Bosch Automotive's writ petition against a strike notice, holding that a trade union is not amenable to Article 226 jurisdiction, while simultaneously ruling that the Industrial Tribunal retains limited jurisdiction to enforce the statutory strike prohibition even while conciliation proceedings are pending.
On 24 July 2026, Justice Anant Ramanath Hegde of the High Court of Karnataka, sitting singly at Bengaluru, dismissed a writ petition filed by Bosch Automotive Electronics India Pvt Ltd against the Robert Bosch Automotive Electronics Employees Union. The company had sought to quash a strike notice dated 23 February 2026 and restrain the union from proceeding with a strike during the pendency of conciliation proceedings before the Additional Labour Commissioner. The court held that, as a general rule, a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not maintainable against a workers' union to restrain a proposed strike. At the same time, the court answered a second question in the petitioner's favour: the Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 — or the Labour Court and Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 until the Code's Tribunals are constituted — can entertain a limited application to enforce the statutory prohibition on strikes during conciliation, without entering the merits of the underlying industrial dispute.
The Dispute Before the Court
Bosch Automotive Electronics India Pvt Ltd, incorporated and registered at Bengaluru, manufactures and supplies automotive electronic components since 2009. A dispute arose between the company and respondent No. 2, the Robert Bosch Automotive Electronics Employees Union, over a charter of demands. Despite the company's attempts at settlement, the union submitted a fresh charter of demands dated 23 February 2026 covering the period April 2026 to March 2027. On the same date, the union issued a strike notice stating the strike would commence on or after 9 March 2026.
The company filed a representation with the Deputy Labour Commissioner on 23 February 2026. Acting on that representation, respondent No. 1, the Additional Labour Commissioner acting as Conciliation Officer, convened conciliation on 3 March 2026. Those proceedings were adjourned first to 6 March 2026 and then to 10 March 2026. The writ petition was filed on 9 March 2026, the very date on which the strike was to begin, by which point conciliation had commenced but had not concluded. The court granted an ex parte interim order restraining the union from proceeding with the strike.
The petition prayed for a writ of certiorari quashing the strike notice dated 23 February 2026 and for directions restraining the union and its members from obstructing the free movement of employees, contract labourers and others into or out of the factory premises.
The Two Legal Questions
Justice Hegde framed two distinct questions for determination:
First, whether an industrial establishment, during the pendency of conciliation proceedings, can maintain a writ petition to restrain a strike on the ground that the proposed strike is prohibited under Section 62(1)(d) and illegal under Section 63 of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020.
Second, whether an aggrieved party can approach the Industrial Tribunal under the Code, 2020, to challenge the legality of a proposed strike when conciliation proceedings concerning the industrial dispute are still pending.
The Petitioner's and Union's Competing Positions
Counsel for Bosch Automotive urged that Section 62(1)(d) of the Code, 2020 prohibits a strike during the pendency of conciliation proceedings and for seven days after their conclusion. A strike commenced in contravention of Section 62 is illegal under Section 63. The company further contended that because conciliation was pending, it could not approach the Tribunal under the Code, 2020, making the writ petition the only available remedy. It was additionally argued that the union, being a recognised negotiating union under the Code, 2020, is bound by its statutory provisions, and a writ lies to enforce statutory duties.
Counsel for the union countered that a writ of certiorari cannot issue against a trade union, which is neither a court nor a tribunal nor an administrative body discharging public duties, and which does not fall within the definition of “State” or its instrumentality under Article 12. The union also submitted that the Code, 2020 provides a statutory forum for resolution of industrial disputes, making the writ petition not maintainable, and that the right to strike is a statutory right which cannot be curtailed otherwise than in accordance with law.
The Court's Reasoning on Writ Maintainability
Justice Hegde turned first to the Supreme Court's judgment in S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd., (2025 SCC OnLine SC 177), which he regarded as governing the field. That decision holds that the key test for maintainability of a writ against any body — public or private — is the “function test”: whether the body discharges a public duty or public function. Where a public duty is imposed by statute upon a private body, a writ may issue, but only to compel performance of that specific duty.
Applying that test, the court held that the union does not qualify as a body discharging a public duty or public function. It is neither the State nor an instrumentality or agency of the State. It is not a statutory authority, not substantially funded by the State, and not required by statute to discharge any public function. The court rejected the argument that mere registration and recognition under the Code, 2020 transforms a workers' union into a body amenable to Article 226. Registration and recognition do not confer the character of an instrumentality of the State.
The court also considered T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, AIR 1954 SC 440, which the union cited for the proposition that certiorari lies only against judicial or quasi-judicial orders. A decision to go on strike, the court held, does not satisfy that test either.
The court distinguished the Madras High Court judgment in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Petroleum Employees Union (2003-III-LLJ 2) and the co-ordinate bench judgment in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Karnataka Petroleum & Gas Workers Union CITU on the ground that both petitioners in those cases were government-owned companies with the characteristics of instrumentalities of the State and, in the Bharat Petroleum case, the employer also fell within the definition of public utility service under the Act, 1947. Those features were absent in the case of Bosch Automotive, a private manufacturing company.
The court acknowledged that the petitioner was complaining of a violation of statutory provisions of the Code, 2020 governing strikes, but held that such statutory obligations cannot by themselves be equated with a public duty or public function so as to attract Article 226 jurisdiction against the union. The writ petition against the union was accordingly held not maintainable as a general rule, though the court left open the possibility of recourse in exceptional circumstances brought about on the specific facts of a given case.
Statutory Architecture of Conciliation and the Tribunal's Jurisdiction
On the second question, Justice Hegde worked through the scheme of Chapter VII of the Code, 2020. Section 53(1) requires the Conciliation Officer to hold conciliation proceedings whenever an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended or a notice under Section 62 has been given. Section 53(5) prescribes a fourteen-day period for submission of the conciliation report where proceedings arise from a strike notice under Section 62, extendable by written agreement with the Conciliation Officer's approval. Section 53(6) allows a concerned party to approach the Tribunal within ninety days of receiving the conciliation failure report.
The company argued that because conciliation had not ended in a failure report, Section 53(6) barred it from approaching the Tribunal. The court rejected this argument, holding that it would create an unintended vacuum. The court drew on the settled interpretation of Section 20 of the Act, 1947 — the analogue of Section 60 of the Code, 2020 — which provides that conciliation proceedings do not automatically conclude upon expiry of the prescribed period. Under Section 60 of the Code, 2020, proceedings are deemed to have concluded only when the failure of conciliation is recorded by the Conciliation Officer. A report submitted late does not become invalid, and the proceedings do not end merely because fourteen days have elapsed.
The court then examined Section 44 of the Code, 2020, which constitutes Industrial Tribunals and defines their jurisdiction. Section 44(7)(c) expressly provides that the “illegality or otherwise of a strike or lockout” must be decided by a Bench consisting of a Judicial Member and an Administrative Member. This confers subject-matter jurisdiction on the Tribunal over the precise question that arose in the writ petition.
The court identified two legally distinct issues: the legality of the underlying industrial dispute and the charter of demands; and whether the union could call a strike during a period when Section 62 expressly prohibits it. Section 53(6) postpones adjudication of the first issue. The second issue, however, does not require the Tribunal to enter the merits of the underlying dispute at all. The Tribunal need only ascertain whether there is a proposed or continuing strike during the pendency of conciliation proceedings.
A reading of Section 97 of the Code, 2020 was equally significant. That provision expressly bars civil court jurisdiction in any matter to which the Code applies, and prohibits civil courts from granting injunctions in respect of anything done or intended to be done under the Code. This foreclosed the option of approaching a civil court for an injunction against the strike.
Harmonious and Purposive Construction to Avoid a Legislative Gap
Justice Hegde held that construing Section 53(6) as an absolute bar on Tribunal jurisdiction during conciliation would produce an anomaly: the Code mandates conciliation and simultaneously prohibits a strike during conciliation, yet on that construction the aggrieved party would have no forum until conciliation ended — by which time the prohibited strike would have already occurred. That reading would rob Sections 62(1)(d) and 63 of their efficacy.
The court preferred a harmonious and purposive construction. The Tribunal, under Section 44 read with Section 62 of the Code, 2020, can decide the limited question of the validity of a strike or lock-out during conciliation without adjudicating the merits of the underlying industrial dispute. This does not amount to conferring fresh jurisdiction; it traces existing jurisdiction within the scheme of the Code. Such an interpretation strengthens, rather than weakens, the conciliation process because it enables enforcement of the express statutory prohibition that makes conciliation viable.
The court drew a careful boundary around this limited jurisdiction. It operates only during the period of prohibition under Section 62(1)(d) — that is, during the pendency of conciliation and for seven days after its conclusion. If conciliation concludes while a Section 62 application is pending before the Tribunal, any protective order can operate only to give effect to the seven-day tail of the prohibition and not beyond. Once the period of prohibition expires, such a proceeding ceases to survive.
On the question whether any Tribunal was available, the court addressed the fact that Industrial Tribunals under the Code, 2020 had not yet been constituted. It pointed to the amendment to Section 104 of the Code, 2020 introducing sub-section (1A), which confers jurisdiction on Labour Courts and Tribunals under the Act, 1947 to decide disputes that have arisen after the Code's commencement. Those forums, the court held, will exercise jurisdiction until Code Tribunals are established. The petitioner could therefore approach the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal under the Act, 1947.
Period of Interim Order Excluded
The court noted that an interim order restraining the union from striking had remained in operation throughout the pendency of the writ petition from 9 March 2026 until 24 July 2026. Section 62 of the Code prescribes a time frame governing when a strike may be called after notice. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in M/s Style (Dress Land) v. Union Territory, Chandigarh, AIR 1999 SC 3678, the court held that the period spent in prosecuting the writ petition must be excluded when reckoning the statutory period prescribed under Section 62. The period of the interim order accordingly stood excluded.
Order
Justice Anant Ramanath Hegde passed the following directions:
The writ petition was dismissed as not maintainable. The petitioner was granted liberty to approach the competent Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 — or, until such Tribunal is constituted, the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — for relief in respect of the alleged violation of Section 62(1)(d), provided the statutory prohibition under that provision was still operative at the time of filing.
Any Tribunal so approached was directed to confine its adjudication strictly to the question whether the proposed or continuing strike violates Section 62(1)(d), without entering the merits of the strike notice or the substantive industrial dispute which is the subject matter of conciliation. Any proceeding instituted before the Tribunal solely for enforcement of Section 62(1)(d) would cease to survive upon expiry of the statutory prohibition period.
The period during which the interim order of the High Court remained in operation stood excluded for the purpose of reckoning the time period prescribed under Section 62 of the Code, 2020. All contentions of the parties on the merits of the substantive industrial dispute were kept open. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, were disposed of accordingly.