Karnataka HC Recalls Contempt Notice, Holds Private Party Cannot Bypass Advocate General's Consent

A Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court held that a private criminal contempt petition filed without the Advocate General's consent cannot be numbered or admitted on the judicial side without first being placed before the Chief Justice as “information” under the Karnataka High Court Contempt Rules.

A Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru, comprising Justice Anu Sivaraman and Justice Venkatesh Naik T, on 16 June 2026 recalled an earlier order that had overruled the Registry's maintainability objection in a criminal contempt petition filed by a private company. The bench held that a petition filed by a private party without the prior written consent of the Advocate General of Karnataka cannot be treated as a regular contempt petition, numbered on the judicial side, and proceeded with by issuing notice to the accused. The judgment, authored by Justice Venkatesh Naik T, draws a firm line between a court's power to act suo motu and a private party's right to move a contempt petition, and clarifies the procedural route that must be followed when the two are conflated.

The Dispute Before the High Court

The complainant, New Space Research and Technologies Pvt. Ltd., had filed Original Suit No.8367 of 2024 before a civil court in Bengaluru against Prabhat Sharma, Garima Sharma, and others, seeking a perpetual injunction to restrain them from copying, sharing, or using the company's confidential and proprietary information as identified in a Forensic Investigation Report.

Along with the suit, the company filed interlocutory applications seeking appointment of a Court Commissioner to carry out search and seizure of data storage media and documents at the accused's premises. The trial court, by order dated 29 November 2024, declined to pass an ex parte order on one application and failed to pass any speaking order on the other. The company challenged this before the Karnataka High Court in Writ Petition No.32999 of 2024.

The High Court, in that writ petition, passed an ex parte order appointing a Court Commissioner and directed execution of the warrant between 20 December 2024 and 28 December 2024, with a report to be submitted by 6 January 2025. Accused Nos.1 and 2 declined to comply. The Court Commissioner and his team were kept outside the premises, in direct contravention of the High Court's directions. The Commissioner documented the obstruction and submitted a formal report dated 1 June 2025. The High Court, by order dated 29 January 2025, disposed of the writ petition and directed the trial court to pass appropriate orders on the Commissioner's report.

The company then filed Criminal Contempt Petition No.5 of 2025 under Article 215 of the Constitution of India read with Sections 2(c), 10, 12, and 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and Rule 3 of the High Court of Karnataka (Contempt of Court Proceedings) Rules, 1981, seeking initiation of criminal contempt proceedings against the four accused — including two police officers, Ms. Ranu Sharma (IPS, ADCP Traffic, Jaipur) and Mr. Tanvir (ACP, Bengaluru) — for wilful disobedience of the order dated 6 December 2024.

The Registry raised an objection on maintainability, noting that the Advocate General's consent had not been obtained. On 24 February 2026, the Court overruled that objection and directed issuance of notice to the accused. The accused then filed I.A. No.1 of 2026 seeking recall of that order.

The Legal Question

The bench framed a single question of law: whether a criminal contempt petition filed by a private party, without the prior written consent of the Advocate General, is maintainable?

Senior counsel for the accused argued that the Advocate General's consent under Section 15(1)(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, is not a procedural formality but a substantive safeguard. Without it, the petition cannot be entertained, notice cannot issue, and the Court cannot proceed. He relied on P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker and Others, (1988) 3 SCC 167, and Bal Thackrey v. Harish Pimpalkhute and Others, (2005) 1 SCC 254.

Counsel for the complainant countered that the petition was not a private motion under Section 15(1)(b) at all. It was, he argued, merely the vehicle through which information reached the Court, and the Court could take suo motu cognizance under Article 215 of the Constitution without requiring the Advocate General's consent. He relied on Rule 5(v) of the Karnataka Rules, which preserves the Court's power to act suo motu on information disclosed, and on the Supreme Court's decision in Prashant Bhushan and Another, (2021) 1 SCC 745, where a private petition had served as the source of information for suo motu contempt action.

How the Bench Reasoned

The bench began with Article 215 of the Constitution, which confers on every High Court the power to punish for contempt of itself. It accepted that this power is wide, covering both the categories in Section 14 and Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and that it can be exercised on the Court's own motion without requiring the Advocate General's consent.

Section 15(1) of the Act sets out three modes of initiation: the High Court acting on its own motion; a motion by the Advocate General; or a motion by any other person with the Advocate General's written consent. The bench noted that the complainant had not obtained that consent, and the Advocate General had neither granted nor denied it.

The bench then examined the Karnataka Rules carefully. Rule 5(v) requires a complainant in a criminal contempt case to state whether the Advocate General's consent has been obtained, but also preserves the Court's power to act suo motu on information disclosed. Rule 7 deals with information that reaches the Court otherwise than through a petition or reference — such information must first be placed before the Chief Justice on the administrative side. Rule 8 governs the preliminary hearing once a petition or reference is properly before the appropriate bench.

The bench drew a clear distinction between two categories of contempt action: proceedings initiated suo motu by the Court, and proceedings instituted on the Advocate General's motion or with his permission. The mode of initiation differs in each case. In suo motu proceedings, it is the Court itself that must initiate by issuing notice. In other cases, initiation can only be by a party filing an application that complies with Section 15.

Relying on P.N. Duda, the bench held that when a private person wishes to place information before the Court and invite suo motu action, the petition at that stage “constitutes nothing more than a mode of laying the relevant information before the court.” It cannot be styled as a contempt petition, numbered as a case, and placed for admission on the judicial side. Instead, it must be placed before the Chief Justice for orders on the administrative side, and the Chief Justice must decide whether to take cognizance.

From Bal Thackrey, the bench extracted the proposition that the procedural requirements of Section 15 serve a substantive purpose: screening allegations so that the Court is not burdened with frivolous contempt matters. The Supreme Court in that case had also held that frequent use of suo motu power on the basis of information furnished in a petition that is otherwise incompetent under Section 15 may render the Advocate General's consent requirement nugatory. The bench in Bal Thackrey had further held that where proceedings were vigorously pursued and argued as private petitions and were never treated as suo motu petitions, the absence of compliance with Section 15 rendered them not maintainable.

The bench in the present case found that the same position applied. The complainant had filed the petition under Section 15 and Article 215, had it numbered as a Criminal Contempt Case, and had it placed on the judicial side. The Registry had correctly raised an objection. The order dated 24 February 2026 overruling that objection, without the petition first being routed through the Chief Justice on the administrative side, was therefore unsustainable.

The bench was careful to note that the complainant was not left without a remedy. A private party may place information before the Court requesting suo motu action. But the procedure approved in P.N. Duda must be followed: the information cannot be numbered as a contempt case and notice cannot issue to the accused without the Chief Justice first deciding whether to take cognizance.

On the Complainant's Reliance on Prashant Bhushan

The complainant had argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Prashant Bhushan, (2021) 1 SCC 745, settled the matter in his favour, since in that case a private petition had served as the source of information for suo motu contempt action and the objection about absence of Advocate General's consent was rejected.

The bench did not expressly disagree with the ratio of Prashant Bhushan but distinguished the present situation on procedural grounds. The issue here was not whether a private petition could ever constitute the source of information for suo motu action — it can. The issue was whether such a petition could be numbered as a contempt case, placed on the judicial side, and proceeded with by issuing notice, without first being routed through the Chief Justice. On that question, the bench held it could not, and the directions in P.N. Duda and Bal Thackrey governed.

Order

The bench allowed I.A. No.1 of 2026. The order dated 24 February 2026, which had overruled the Registry's maintainability objection, was recalled. The Registry was directed to treat Criminal Contempt Petition No.5 of 2025 as “information” within the meaning of Rule 7 of the High Court of Karnataka (Contempt of Court Proceedings) Rules, 1981, and to place it before the Chief Justice for necessary orders. The criminal contempt petition was closed for statistical purposes.