Compound Wall Collapse Alone Not Prima Facie Evidence Against Officer: Karnataka HC Sets Aside Suspension

The Karnataka High Court held that an event by itself cannot constitute prima facie evidence of gross dereliction against a specific officer under Rule 10 of the CCA Rules, 1957, and set aside the suspension of an Executive Engineer before the investigating committees had even submitted their reports.

A Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka, comprising Justice Suraj Govindaraj and Dr. Justice K. Manmadha Rao, set aside the suspension of M. B. Nagaraj, an Executive Engineer in the Department of Health and Family Welfare Services, on 21 May 2026. The suspension, ordered on 1 May 2026 under clause (d) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 of the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957, followed the collapse of a compound wall. The bench found that the mere occurrence of the event could not, without more, constitute prima facie evidence of gross dereliction of duty against the petitioner personally, particularly when two investigating committees had been constituted but had not yet submitted their reports.

The Suspension and the Tribunal's Refusal

Nagaraj, aged 59, was working as Executive Engineer and was placed under suspension by the Principal Secretary, Department of Health and Family Welfare Services, vide order No. Aa Ku Ka 171 CGIM 2026 dated 1 May 2026. The suspension was invoked under clause (d) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 of the CCA Rules, 1957, which requires the existence of “prima facie evidence of gross dereliction of duty” against the officer concerned.

Nagaraj challenged the suspension before the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, Bengaluru, in Application No. 2561/2026, seeking an interim stay. The Tribunal, by its order dated 6 May 2026, declined to grant any interim relief. The Tribunal's stated reason was that an investigation by an enquiry committee was already in progress. It is this refusal that Nagaraj brought before the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

The Competing Arguments

Sri P. S. Rajagopal, Senior Counsel for the petitioner, relied on the Supreme Court's decision in State of Haryana v. Dinesh Singh, (2024) 13 SCC 357, to argue that the requirements of clause (d) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 of the CCA Rules must be satisfied before an officer can be suspended. His submission was that the suspension order dated 1 May 2026 recorded no prima facie evidence of gross dereliction against Nagaraj specifically.

He pointed out that the Public Works Department had constituted two separate bodies: an investigating team comprising the Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore Urban District, and the Tahsildar, Yelahanka, to conduct a local investigation; and a committee of Public Works Department officers to technically examine the cases and submit a report within seven days. Since neither report had been placed on record implicating the petitioner, there was no basis for suspension. The argument was that disciplinary proceedings could only be contemplated after the committee reports were received, and only then could the power under clause (d) be lawfully exercised.

The Advocate General, appearing for the State respondents, countered that the fact of the compound wall having fallen, and the petitioner being the Executive Engineer of that location, was itself sufficient prima facie evidence to justify invoking clause (d) and suspending him.

The Bench's Reasoning on “Prima Facie Evidence Against Him”

Justice Suraj Govindaraj, writing for the bench, focused on the precise language of clause (d) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 of the CCA Rules. The provision requires prima facie evidence “against him”, that is, against the officer proposed to be suspended. The bench held that the use of the word “him” makes clear that the evidence must be directed at the individual officer, not merely at the event itself.

The bench accepted that the collapse of the compound wall was a tragic event. However, it held that the event, standing alone, does not create any prima facie evidence of gross dereliction against Nagaraj. The falling of the wall is evidence only of the wall having fallen; it cannot, at that stage, be attributed to the petitioner on account of gross dereliction, let alone constitute prima facie evidence of gross dereliction.

The bench observed that two committees had been appointed precisely to determine whether there was any gross dereliction of duty by the petitioner. Until those committees submitted their reports, the respondents were not in a position to record any prima facie finding against him. The power under clause (d) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 of the CCA Rules could not have been exercised without an application of mind recording such prima facie evidence.

The bench also addressed a drafting anomaly in the writ petition. The main relief as framed sought only to quash the Tribunal's order of 6 May 2026, and did not expressly seek setting aside of the suspension order itself. The bench treated this as a clerical error, noting that the interim relief sought was also for stay of the suspension order. Since the Tribunal's order was being set aside, the bench held that the suspension order would also have to be set aside.

Order

The Division Bench passed the following directions on 21 May 2026:

The order dated 6 May 2026 passed by the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, Bengaluru in Application No. 2561/2026 was set aside.

The suspension order passed against Nagaraj by Respondent No. 2 bearing No. Aa Ku Ka 171 CGIM 2026 dated 1 May 2026 was also set aside.

Liberty was reserved to the respondents to initiate action under clause (d) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 of the CCA Rules upon receipt of the report to be submitted by the investigating committees.