No Vested Right to a Particular Judge: Karnataka HC Upholds Mid-Trial Transfer of Murder Case Under BNSS Reallocation Notification
The Karnataka High Court dismissed a murder accused's writ petition challenging an administrative notification that transferred his sessions trial to another court mid-way through the prosecution evidence, holding that an accused has no right to insist upon trial before a particular Presiding Officer.
The High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru, sitting singly through Justice M. Nagaprasanna, has dismissed a writ petition filed by Krishna Murthy @ Murthy, an accused facing trial for murder under Section 302 of the IPC, who sought to quash an administrative notification dated 20 May 2026 that transferred his part-heard sessions case from the LXI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge to the LVIII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City. Pronouncing the order on 2 September 2026, the court held that neither the statute nor any binding precedent confers upon an accused a vested right to continue before the same Presiding Officer who commenced his trial. The judgment analyses the interplay between Sections 365, 448 and 449 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) and their predecessor provisions under the Code of Criminal Procedure, and concludes that commencement of trial is not a statutory bar to transfer.
The Sessions Case and the Reallocation Notification
Sessions Case No.824 of 2013, arising from the Kamakshipalya Police Station, Bengaluru, had been proceeding before the LXI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City. By the time of the impugned notification, the prosecution had examined 20 witnesses — PW-1 to PW-20 — with PW-20 being the Investigating Officer. His evidence, however, had not yet been completed.
On 20 May 2026, the Deputy Registrar, City Civil Court, Bengaluru issued Notification No.ADM-I(A) 340/2026, directed by the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge in exercise of powers under Sections 408 and 409 of the Cr.P.C./Sections 448 and 449 of the BNSS. The notification effected a general reallocation of Police Stations among the District and Sessions Judge Courts in Bengaluru City, operative from 1 June 2026.
The notification was not without safeguards. It expressly carved out an exception permitting courts to retain and dispose of matters that had already reached three advanced stages: first, where the statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C./Section 351 BNSS was already posted; second, where the matter had proceeded to final arguments; and third, where it stood reserved for judgment. Matters not having reached any of these stages were to be transferred to the reallocated courts.
On 19 June 2026, the order sheet of the court reflects that Krishna Murthy's case was still at the stage of securing the presence of PW-20 for recording of his evidence. The case was accordingly transferred to the Court of the LVIII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge. It was this transfer that Krishna Murthy challenged in Writ Petition No.21332 of 2026 before the High Court.
The Petitioner's Challenge and the State's Response
Sri Hasmath Pasha, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, advanced a two-fold argument. He submitted, first, that the entire evidentiary record had been built before the LXI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, whose opportunity of observing the demeanour of witnesses was irreplaceable, and that the case was at its concluding stage — about to be posted for recording of the statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. Allowing the transfer would cause serious prejudice to the petitioner. Second, he contended that the notification was issued without considering the mandatory requirements of Sections 326, 408 and 409 Cr.P.C., and that Section 409(2) Cr.P.C. disentitled the Sessions Judge from recalling a case made over to an Additional Sessions Judge once the trial had commenced. He relied upon the Division Bench decision of this Court in Amrithappa v. State of Karnataka, reported in 1981 SCC OnLine Kar 197.
Sri B.N. Jagadeesha, learned State Public Prosecutor-I appearing for Respondent No.1 — the State of Karnataka — opposed the petition, contending that an administrative decision to transfer or reallocate cases cannot be challenged by an accused, that no prejudice would result since the incoming court would analyse the entire existing material and proceed from the stage at which the transfer occurred, and that no fresh trial from the beginning was contemplated.
Sri M.A. Subramani, appearing for Respondents 2 and 3 — the Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka, and the Deputy Registrar, City Civil and Sessions Court — supported the notification on the ground that the power was exercised in accordance with law following a series of communications between the High Court and the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge. He submitted that an accused cannot claim the right to be tried before a court of his choosing.
Where the Case Actually Stood When the Transfer Took Effect
Justice Nagaprasanna examined the order sheet of the transferring court. The entry dated 19 June 2026 recorded that the case was called out for securing the written statement of PW-20 and was being transferred pursuant to the notification. The court receiving the case noted the matter transferred and directed the accused to produce evidence by 14 July 2026.
The court held that the order sheet left no room for doubt: the evidentiary stage had not concluded. PW-20's evidence was yet to be recorded. The case had not reached, much less crossed, the stage of examination of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. It had neither proceeded to final arguments nor been reserved for judgment. The petitioner's case therefore fell outside every protective exception that the notification had consciously carved out.
Statutory Architecture: Sections 365, 448 and 449 of the BNSS
The court set out the relevant BNSS provisions — Section 365 (successor to Section 326 Cr.P.C.), Section 448 (successor to Section 408 Cr.P.C.), and Section 449 (successor to Section 409 Cr.P.C.) — and read them together to identify the legislative scheme.
Section 365 BNSS deals with the consequence when a criminal proceeding passes from one Presiding Officer to another. It provides that where a case is transferred from one Judge to another, the former shall be deemed to have ceased to exercise jurisdiction and the latter shall succeed him. The successor court inherits the proceeding at the stage at which the predecessor leaves it and may act on evidence already recorded. If further examination of a witness is necessary in the interests of justice, the successor court may re-summon that witness; beyond that, no retrial is required.
The court reasoned that the very existence of Section 365 BNSS, and its predecessor Section 326 Cr.P.C., is premised on the possibility of transfer after commencement of trial. If every transfer once a trial had commenced were impermissible, there would have been no occasion for the legislature to enact a provision dealing with evidence partly recorded by one court and partly by another. Section 365 BNSS is the legislative bridge between the court that begins a trial and the court that may be called upon to continue it after a lawful transfer.
Section 448 BNSS confers upon the Sessions Judge the power to transfer any particular case from one criminal court to another in the sessions division whenever it is expedient for the ends of justice. Critically, Justice Nagaprasanna held that Section 448 does not in terms erect a statutory bar against transfer merely because trial has commenced. Commencement of trial is not a point beyond which the transfer power evaporates. Judicial circumspection in the exercise of that power cannot be elevated into a statutory prohibition against its existence.
As regards Section 449(2) BNSS, which provides that a Sessions Judge may recall a case made over to an Additional Sessions Judge at any time before the trial has commenced, the court distinguished between the recall power under Section 449 and the transfer power under Section 448. The Allahabad High Court's decision in Jitendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2016 SCC OnLine All 3352, was noted with approval: the limitation in Section 409(2) Cr.P.C. — corresponding to Section 449(2) BNSS — applies only to the recall power, not to the independent transfer power under Section 408 Cr.P.C./Section 448 BNSS.
Precedents on Part-Heard Transfers
The court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Nitinbhai Saevatilal Shah v. Manubhai Manjibhai Panchal, (2011) 9 SCC 638, which held that Section 326 Cr.P.C. is a statutory exception to the principle that the judge who hears the evidence should pronounce upon guilt. The provision was enacted precisely to obviate the need to commence a trial de novo whenever the Presiding Officer changes. Continuity of the trial is preserved notwithstanding discontinuity in the person presiding.
Drawing on the Allahabad High Court's reasoning in Jitendra Singh, the court observed that a party cannot be permitted to pick and choose the court before which it is tried, and that an accused's preference for a particular Presiding Officer does not constitute a ground to impede an otherwise lawful administrative exercise.
The court declined to apply the 1981 Division Bench decision in Amrithappa v. State of Karnataka relied upon by the petitioner's senior counsel, preferring instead the statutory analysis under the BNSS and the Supreme Court's authoritative exposition in Nitinbhai.
The Maxim “He Who Hears Must Decide”
The petitioner's counsel had invoked the administrative law maxim that the decision-maker who hears a matter must be the one who decides it. Justice Nagaprasanna addressed this submission directly. The maxim has its roots in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings; it cannot be transplanted wholesale into criminal adjudication so as to efface an express statutory regime that authorises succession of judges and transfer of proceedings. A principle of administrative law cannot be employed to defeat an express command of criminal procedure. When the statute itself contemplates that one judge may record evidence and another may, upon lawful succession or transfer, proceed with the case, the maxim must yield to the legislative mandate.
The court added that holding otherwise would permit a general principle to devour a specific statutory provision.
The General Nature of the Reallocation Exercise
Justice Nagaprasanna emphasised that Krishna Murthy's case had not been singled out. The notification embodied a general administrative exercise of reallocating Police Stations among Sessions Courts in Bengaluru City. The transfer of his proceeding was merely a consequence of that larger reorganisation. There was no allegation and no material to suggest that the administrative exercise was designed against him or that his case was selectively transferred for any collateral purpose. The court found the reallocation to be a rational distribution of judicial work intended to secure expedition in disposal.
The court held that administrative decisions concerning distribution and reallocation of judicial business are best left within the domain of those entrusted with court administration. Judicial review remains available but does not sit as an appellate authority over every arrangement concerning distribution of judicial work. Unless an exercise is shown to be infected by arbitrariness, caprice, mala fides, manifest unreasonableness or demonstrable prejudice forbidden by law, constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked merely because a litigant prefers a particular Presiding Officer.
The court stated plainly: <“An accused has a right to a fair trial before a competent and impartial Court; he does not possess a vested right to insist upon trial before a particular Judge.”
Outcome
Justice M. Nagaprasanna dismissed Writ Petition No.21332 of 2026. The court held that neither the notification dated 20 May 2026 nor the resulting transfer of Sessions Case No.824 of 2013 to the LVIII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City, could be interfered with in exercise of the court's extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 Cr.P.C. The case was therefore to continue before the LVIII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City, from the stage at which the transfer took effect.