Property Received in Partition of Father's Self-Acquired Land Is Not Ancestral: Karnataka HC Dismisses Daughter's Partition Suit

A Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court held that properties allotted to a father under a family partition of his own father's self-acquired land do not acquire ancestral character, defeating a daughter's coparcenary claim under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

A Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru, comprising Justice D K Singh and Justice T M Nadaf, on 16 June 2026 dismissed a regular first appeal filed by Smt Usha N Swamy, a resident of the United States, who had sought partition of four schedule properties from her father and siblings. The Bench, in a judgment authored by Justice D K Singh, affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the original suit and held that once a grandfather's self-acquired property is partitioned among his children, each child's share becomes that child's individual and separate property. The daughter's claim that her father held those properties as part of a Hindu Undivided Family, giving her a coparcenary right by birth, was rejected on the ground that the foundational premise — that the properties were ancestral — was never proved.

The Suit Before the Trial Court

Smt Usha N Swamy filed O.S. No. 703 of 2014 before the XXXV Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, seeking partition by metes and bounds of four schedule properties. The defendants were her father Sri M Venkataswamy (Respondent 1), her mother Smt Jayamma (Respondent 2), and her sister Smt Shyla Venkataswamy (Respondent 3). A fourth daughter, Smt Roopasri, was impleaded as Respondent 4 during the pendency of the appeal.

The four properties at issue were: Schedule A — agricultural land in Survey No. 16/2 (later Survey No. 16/6) at Kannayana Agrahara Village, Jigani Hobli, Anekal Taluk, Bengaluru South; Schedule B — a site at 37th F Cross, 4th T Block, Jayanagar, Bengaluru; Schedule C — agricultural land in Survey No. 138/13 at Badavanavrathna Kavalu, Kengeri Hobli, Bengaluru South Taluk; and Schedule D — a house at Pattabhirama Nagar, Jayanagar 4th Block, Bengaluru.

The plaintiff's case was that Schedule A was ancestral property that had been recorded in her father's name as Khatedar from 1982 to 2013, that her father had obtained a quarrying licence from the State of Karnataka over Schedule A and generated substantial income from it, and that Schedule B was purchased from that quarrying income. She further contended that Schedules C and D were inherited by her father from his own father. She claimed a one-fourth share in Schedules A, C and D as a coparcener, and a 50 per cent share in Schedule B on the basis that it had been gifted to her and her sister when they were minors.

The defendants denied that any of the properties were joint family or ancestral properties. The father specifically pleaded that Schedule A was his absolute property, acquired under a family settlement, and that the plaintiff had no right to seek partition.

The trial court dismissed the suit on 13 April 2018. It held that Schedules A, C and D were the absolute properties of the father, that Schedule B was not purchased from ancestral income, and that the plaintiff had failed to prove any coparcenary character in the properties.

The Legal Issue on Appeal

The Division Bench framed the central question as: whether Schedules A, C and D were the self-acquired properties of the plaintiff's father, or whether he had inherited them from his ancestors such that they constituted joint Hindu family property.

Senior Advocate Sri S Sreevatsa, appearing for the appellant, advanced two principal arguments. First, he contended that the trial court had framed Issue No. 1 incorrectly — asking whether the properties were “inherited by her father” — and then, having answered that issue in the affirmative, contradicted itself by treating the properties as the father's absolute property. He argued that once inheritance from an ancestor is established, the property necessarily takes on ancestral character in the hands of the successor under Mitakshara law, and the plaintiff as a daughter was entitled to a coparcenary share under the amended Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, as affirmed in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma [(2020) 9 SCC 1].

Second, he argued that the defendants had filed a written statement but led no oral or documentary evidence, and that an adverse inference ought to have been drawn against them under settled principles, relying on Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao and Another [AIR 1999 SC 1441].

Sri B N Prakash, appearing for the respondents, countered that the grandfather Muniyappa had purchased Survey No. 16/2 measuring 107 acres, and that it was divided among his two sons and daughter — the father receiving 46 acres, his brother M Narayanaswamy receiving 51 acres, and their sister Jayamma receiving 10 acres. Since the grandfather had purchased the land himself, it was his self-acquired property, and what the father received in partition was therefore his individual property, not ancestral property available for further partition.

How the Bench Reasoned

The Bench began with the family tree (Exhibit P1). The parties traced their lineage to late Muniyappa, who was the grandfather of the plaintiff. Muniyappa's son Sri M Venkataswamy was the plaintiff's father (Defendant 1). The plaintiff and Defendant 3 were daughters of Defendant 1 and his wife.

The Bench then turned to the oral evidence. PW2, who was the brother of Defendant 1 and the plaintiff's paternal uncle, was examined by the plaintiff herself in support of her case. His evidence proved decisive — but against the plaintiff. In his examination-in-chief, PW2 stated that Survey No. 16/2 “was purchased by my father” and that in the partition, Schedule A came to the share of Defendant 1. In cross-examination, he admitted that “suit schedule 'A' property is the absolute property of 1st defendant.” He made the same admission for Schedule C. The plaintiff herself admitted in her deposition that Schedule A was purchased by her grandfather.

The Bench applied the principle from C L Arunachala Mudaliar v. C A Murugathna Mudaliar and Another [(1953) 2 SCC 362] that a Mitakshara father has full powers of disposition over his self-acquired property, and that property received by a son under a gift or partition from his father does not, merely by reason of such receipt, become ancestral property in the hands of the son. This was reinforced by Govindbhai Chhottabhai Patel v. Patel Ramanbhai Mathurbhai [(2020) 16 SCC 255], where the Supreme Court reiterated that a property gifted or partitioned to a son cannot become ancestral property in the hands of the donee simply because he received it from his father or ancestor.

The Bench also referred to Kalianji Ranchhod v. Bezonji Hasarwanji [ILR 32 Bombay 512], which held that a son who inherits property on partition by the father gets it as his separate property and not as joint family property.

On the question of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the Bench acknowledged that the amended provision makes a daughter a coparcener by birth in the same manner as a son. However, it held that this right arises only in respect of property that is coparcenary property. If the property is the self-acquired property of a family member, it does not become joint Hindu family property, and no coparcenary right arises. Since the grandfather's land was his self-acquired property, and since the father received his share under a partition of that self-acquired property, the father's share became his individual and separate property. The plaintiff therefore had no coparcenary right in it.

The Bench also addressed the argument that the trial court had framed a wrong issue. It held that Issue No. 3 — whether the plaintiff as a member of the Hindu Undivided Family was entitled to partition — effectively covered the question of the character and nature of the properties. The parties were aware of what they needed to prove. The plaintiff's own pleadings and evidence described the grandfather's properties as self-acquired, which foreclosed any claim that they were ancestral properties devolving by survivorship.

On the adverse inference argument, the Bench rejected it squarely. It held that the burden of proof rests on the plaintiff to establish her case on its own merits. A suit can be dismissed for want of evidence even if the defendant leads no evidence at all. Since the plaintiff's own witness PW2 admitted that the properties were the self-acquired properties of the grandfather and the absolute properties of the father, there was no initial burden discharged by the plaintiff that could shift any onus to the defendants.

The Bench also addressed Schedule B separately. The plaintiff's own case was that Schedule B was purchased from the income generated by quarrying on Schedule A. Since Schedule A was the father's self-acquired property, any income from it and any property purchased from that income was equally the father's self-acquired property. Schedule B therefore could not be treated as coparcenary property either.

On Schedule D, PW2 stated he did not know how it came to the father. The Bench found that these were self-acquired properties of the grandfather that came to the father's share in the partition, and the same analysis applied.

The Bench drew a clear doctrinal line: a coparcenary right by birth under Section 6, as amended in 2005, attaches only to property that is already coparcenary property. The amendment enlarged the class of persons who can be coparceners to include daughters, but it did not convert a father's self-acquired or individually-held property into joint family property. The plaintiff's reliance on Vineeta Sharma was therefore inapplicable on the facts, because that case presupposes the existence of coparcenary property in the first place.

Outcome

The Division Bench found no error in the judgment and decree dated 13 April 2018 passed by the XXXV Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, in O.S. No. 703 of 2014. Regular First Appeal No. 1568 of 2018 was dismissed. All pending interlocutory applications, if any, were disposed of as not surviving for consideration.