Family Court Has No Jurisdiction When Alleged Husband Is Already Dead, Kerala HC Rules

A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court held that a petition seeking declaration of marriage and property rights cannot be filed before a Family Court when the alleged husband had died before the petition was instituted.

On 11 June 2026, a Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam, comprising Dr. Justice A.K. Jayasankaran Nambiar and Justice Preeta A.K., dismissed a matrimonial appeal filed by Renuka Kumari, who had challenged a Family Court order returning her Original Petition for want of jurisdiction. The Family Court, Thiruvananthapuram, had found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the petition because the man she claimed as her husband, Sasikumar, had died on 3 December 2016 — well before she filed O.P. No. 18 of 2018. The Division Bench agreed, holding that the Family Courts Act, 1984 confers jurisdiction only over disputes arising in a subsisting marriage between living parties.

The Petition Before the Family Court

Renuka Kumari filed O.P. No. 18 of 2018 before the Family Court, Thiruvananthapuram, claiming to be the legally wedded wife of the late Sasikumar. She arrayed two respondents: the first respondent, whom she described as a woman who had an illicit relationship with Sasikumar, and the second and third respondents, whom she alleged were children born of that relationship.

Her petition carried three prayers: a declaration that she was the legally wedded wife of Sasikumar; partition of the properties described in the petition schedule; and an order allowing her to realise mesne profits from those properties.

The respondents were initially set ex-parte. After the appellant filed her affidavit-in-chief, the respondents appeared and filed an application under Order IX Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure to set aside the ex-parte order. In that very application, they also challenged the maintainability of the Original Petition, arguing that Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 did not extend jurisdiction to the Family Court in these circumstances, and that the petition ought to be returned for presentation before a civil court of competent jurisdiction.

The Family Court accepted the respondents' contention and, by order dated 8 December 2025 in I.A. No. 4 of 2025, directed return of the Original Petition. Renuka Kumari challenged that order through Mat. Appeal No. 194 of 2026.

The Jurisdictional Question Under Section 7 of the Family Courts Act

Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 vests Family Courts with jurisdiction over suits and proceedings where, among other things, a declaration as to the validity of a marriage or as to the matrimonial status of any person is sought. Explanation (b) to that provision specifically covers such declaratory proceedings.

Counsel for the appellant, Sri. Kishore D., argued that this language is unambiguous: a Family Court has jurisdiction wherever a declaration as to matrimonial status is sought, even when the alleged husband is no longer alive. He relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Balram Yadav v. Fulmaniya Yadav [2016 KHC 6310] to support the proposition that the death of the husband does not oust Family Court jurisdiction. He also pointed to Sections 8 and 20 of the Family Courts Act to contend that the legislature had deliberately carved out Family Court jurisdiction from the general civil court jurisdiction, and that the court below had erred in sending the appellant back to a civil court.

Counsel for the respondents, Sri. Arun V.G., took the contrary position. He drew the court's attention to the Supreme Court's decision in Kasthuri R. and others v. M. Kasthuri and others [2018 KHC 2535], which had been followed by the Kerala High Court in Brinda and others v. Muktha K.N. [2022 (5) KHC 719]. He argued that the statement of objects and reasons of the Family Courts Act makes clear that the statute was enacted to facilitate conciliation and settlement of family disputes through a process different from ordinary civil proceedings, with the overarching aim of preserving the institution of marriage. The 59th Report of the Law Commission had similarly stressed that Family Courts should adopt a radically different approach from civil courts and make reasonable efforts at settlement before trial.

On the specific language of Explanation (b) to Section 7(1), the respondents' counsel argued that “matrimonial status” must be determined in praesenti — it is a status that exists at the time of adjudication and cannot be determined when one party to the marriage is no longer alive. Since Sasikumar had died on 3 December 2016, before the Original Petition was even filed in 2018, the Family Court had no jurisdiction.

How the Division Bench Reasoned

The Division Bench found force in the respondents' submissions. Writing for the court, Dr. Justice A.K. Jayasankaran Nambiar read the Supreme Court's decision in Kasthuri R. as laying down a clear principle: where a dispute arises after the death of the person to whom both parties claim to be married, that dispute is not a “family dispute” requiring adjudication by a Family Court. It retains the character of a civil dispute simpliciter to be decided by a civil court of competent jurisdiction.

The court also looked at the actual prayers in the Original Petition. A reading of those prayers, the bench observed, revealed that the petition was filed primarily to secure rights in the property of the deceased Sasikumar, and that the declaration of marriage was sought only to bolster the claim for a share in that property. The matrimonial declaration was, in substance, ancillary to a property claim.

The bench then addressed the legislative intent behind Explanation (b) to Section 7(1). The words “declaration of validity of a marriage” and “matrimonial status” appear together in that provision, and the court read them as jointly pointing to disputes connected with a subsisting relationship of marriage — a relationship in praesenti. A dispute that arises when one of the parties to the marriage, whether actual or alleged, is no longer alive cannot be placed before a Forum tasked with adjudicating disputes in a subsisting relationship between living persons.

The bench drew on the objects and reasons behind the Family Courts Act to reinforce this reading. The statute was enacted for settlement of family disputes, if possible through pre-litigation proceedings, and if not, through a process different from ordinary civil proceedings. Read alongside the primary objective of preserving and saving the institution of marriage, the court concluded that Family Court jurisdiction under the Act can operate only where both parties to the marriage are alive and are made parties to the proceedings.

This distinction, the bench held, also explains why Balram Yadav — relied upon by the appellant — does not apply here. The court did not elaborate on the facts of Balram Yadav beyond noting that the criteria of both parties being alive serves to distinguish it from the present case.

Protection on Limitation

While dismissing the appeal, the Division Bench made one protective direction in favour of the appellant. Since Renuka Kumari had been pursuing her remedy bona fide before the Family Court and then before the High Court, the civil court before which she now presents her suit must exclude the time spent in those proceedings when computing the limitation period applicable to her suit.

This direction ensures that the appellant is not penalised for having approached the wrong forum in good faith, and that the time consumed in the Family Court proceedings and in this appeal does not extinguish her right to seek relief before the competent civil court.

Outcome

Mat. Appeal No. 194 of 2026 was dismissed on 11 June 2026. The order of the Family Court, Thiruvananthapuram, dated 8 December 2025, directing return of O.P. No. 18 of 2018 for presentation before the civil court of competent jurisdiction, stands. The civil court that receives the suit filed by Renuka Kumari is directed to exclude the time spent before the Family Court and before the High Court when computing the applicable limitation period.