Kerala HC Dismisses Union of India's Challenge to Disability Pension for Army Veteran's Widow, Holds Medical Board's Unreasoned Finding on Schizophrenia Unsustainable

A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court upheld the Armed Forces Tribunal's grant of disability pension to the widow of an ex-serviceman invalided out with Schizophrenia, finding the medical board gave no reasons for its constitutional-origin finding.

The High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam, in a judgment delivered on 26 May 2026, dismissed a writ petition filed by the Union of India challenging an order of the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Kochi. The Tribunal had granted disability pension to Valsala S., the widow of No. 6906255 Ex Sep late Sreekantan Nair, who was invalided out of the Indian Army on 15 July 1979 with a diagnosis of Schizophrenia assessed at 60% disability for two years. The Division Bench, comprising Justice K. Natarajan and Justice Johnson John, found that the Release Medical Board had stated the disease was constitutional in origin without providing any reasoning, and that this omission was fatal to the Union's case. The Tribunal's order granting disability pension was accordingly upheld.

The Dispute Before the High Court

Late Sreekantan Nair was recruited into the Indian Army on 7 August 1973. He was invalided out on 15 July 1979 in the low medical category “EEE (Psychotic)” for the diagnosis Schizophrenia-295, with the disability assessed at 60% for two years. His claim for disability pension was rejected by the authorities. An appeal to the Defence Ministry was also rejected. He died on 14 August 1994.

His widow, Valsala S., filed Original Application No. 172 of 2018 before the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Kochi. By an order dated 11 November 2022, the Tribunal allowed the application and granted disability pension. The Union of India and three other respondents — the Chief of Army Staff, OIC Records AOC Records, and PCDA(P) Prayagraj — challenged that order by filing WP(C) No. 48547 of 2025 before the Kerala High Court.

The writ petition came with its own procedural history. The Union had first filed applications before the Tribunal seeking leave to appeal and condonation of a delay of eleven months and nine days. Both applications were disposed of by orders dated 1 January 2024, after which the writ petition was filed in the High Court.

The Legal Issue: Onus, Statutory Presumptions, and the Medical Board's Silence

The central contest was whether the Release Medical Board's finding that Schizophrenia was “constitutional in origin” — meaning not attributable to or aggravated by military service — could stand without any supporting reasoning.

The Union's counsel, Sri. S. Vaidyanathan, Central Government Counsel, argued that the Release Medical Board's report showed the disability was neither attributable to nor aggravated by military service, and that the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction by substituting its own conclusions for those of the medical board. He also pressed the point that the Tribunal had ignored the long delay in filing the application.

Counsel for Valsala S., Smt. Rati Varma, countered that the onus of proving non-attributability lay on the authority, particularly where the serviceman was physically fit at enrolment and no adverse physical note was recorded at the time of entry into service. She relied on the statutory presumptions under Rules 4, 5 and 14(a), (b) and (c) of the Entitlement Rules for Casualty Pensionary Awards, 1982, and Regulation 423(a) and (c) of the Regulations for Medical Services for Armed Forces, 1983.

Regulation 423(c) of the 1983 Regulations is directly relevant: it provides that a disease which has led to an individual's discharge will ordinarily be deemed to have arisen in service if no note of it was made at the time of acceptance for service. The exception applies only where medical opinion holds, for reasons to be stated, that the disease could not have been detected on medical examination prior to acceptance. In the present case, no such reasons were recorded.

How the Bench Reasoned

Justice Johnson John, writing the judgment, noted at the outset that it was not in dispute that Sreekantan Nair was enrolled fit and was subsequently invalided out with Schizophrenia assessed at 60% for two years. The medical board had recorded that the disease was constitutional in origin, but had given no reasoning for that conclusion.

The bench drew on the Supreme Court's decision in Rajumon T.M. v. Union of India and others [2025 SCC OnLine SC 1064], which dealt with a disability pension claim also arising from Schizophrenia. In that case, the Supreme Court had held that courts must be cognisant of the debilitating effects of Schizophrenia, which impairs cognitive capacity and naturally affects a person's ability to advance his own cause before the authority. The bench noted that in Rajumon, the disability had been assessed at 30% for two years, whereas in the present case it was assessed at the higher figure of 60% for two years.

The bench also referred to the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Veer Pal Singh v. Secretary, Ministry of Defence [(2013) 8 SCC 83], which had extensively described the nature of Schizophrenia as a chronic, severe, and disabling brain disorder, cataloguing its positive and negative symptoms and the various clinical varieties recognised in medical literature. That decision had been relied upon to contextualise why a person suffering from Schizophrenia may be unable to pursue claims promptly.

On the question of beneficial interpretation, the bench stated that social security legislation must always be interpreted liberally, with the widest possible meaning the language permits. Where a word is capable of two meanings, the interpretation that preserves benefits is to be adopted. The provisions for disability pension are in the nature of a beneficial scheme.

The bench then addressed the core issue directly. Since the serviceman had not opted out of service but was invalided out by the authority itself after obtaining the medical board's opinion, the onus of proving the disability and the grounds for denying pension lay heavily on the authority. The medical board's report stated the disease was constitutional in origin, but offered no reasoning. The bench applied the principle from Rajumon that an opinion of the medical board devoid of reasons cannot sustain a denial of post-discharge benefits, and that such an act of the authority is rendered invalid.

On the Union's argument that the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction, the bench turned to the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India v. Parashotam Dass [(2025) 5 SCC 786]. That decision had held that where there is a denial of a fundamental right, a jurisdictional error, or an error apparent on the face of the record, the High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, and that self-restraint by the High Court is distinct from placing an embargo on such jurisdiction. The bench quoted the Supreme Court's observation that High Courts are conscious of the parameters within which jurisdiction is to be exercised.

Applying that framework, the bench found no jurisdictional error or error apparent on the face of the record in the Tribunal's order. The Tribunal had correctly identified that the medical board's finding lacked reasoning and had correctly applied the statutory presumptions. There was no basis for the High Court to interfere.

Outcome

The Division Bench dismissed WP(C) No. 48547 of 2025. The order of the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Kochi dated 11 November 2022 in OA No. 172 of 2018, granting disability pension to Valsala S. as the widow of late Sreekantan Nair at 60% for two years, stands.