Kerala HC: Insisting on Address of Unknown ‘John Doe’ Defendant to Number Suit Creates Procedural Paradox

The Kerala High Court set aside a Munsiff Court order refusing to number a John Doe injunction suit for non-compliance with Order VI Rule 14A of the CPC, holding the demand impossible to satisfy and directing the suit to be numbered forthwith.

A film entertainment company approached the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam after the Principal Munsiff Court, Ernakulam refused to number its suit for injunction against anonymous persons who had posted reviews of the film Kattalan on the BookMyShow platform. The refusal was grounded on non-compliance with Order VI Rule 14A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which requires every pleading to be accompanied by a statement containing the party’s address. Justice Easwaran S., sitting singly, allowed the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, holding that demanding a physical address for an inherently unknown “John Doe” defendant creates a procedural paradox and defeats the entire purpose of John Doe jurisprudence.

The Suit and the Munsiff Court’s Refusal

The petitioner, M/s Cubes Entertainments, a firm based at Changampuzha Nagar, Ernakulam, filed a suit for injunction in the Principal Munsiff Court, Ernakulam. The first defendant was Big Tree Entertainment Private Limited, the company that operates the online ticketing and entertainment platform BookMyShow, with its registered office in Mumbai. The second defendant was arrayed as “John Does / Ashok Kumars” because the petitioner did not know the exact identities of the persons who had posted the impugned reviews on the BookMyShow platform.

The relief sought was removal of the reviews of the film Kattalan posted on the BookMyShow platform by these unidentified persons, along with other connected reliefs. When the suit was presented, the Munsiff Court declined to number it, recording an endorsement on the back of the plaint. The petitioner then filed an application — IA 4/2026 — seeking exemption from complying with Order VI Rule 14A and Order VII Rule 1(c) of the CPC. The Munsiff Court rejected that application by order dated 5 June 2026. It was this rejection that was challenged before the High Court in OP(C) No. 2655 of 2026.

The Conflict Between Order VI Rule 14A and John Doe Proceedings

Order VI Rule 14A of the CPC requires that every pleading filed by a party be accompanied by a statement, in the prescribed form and signed as provided under Rule 14, setting out the address of the party. The Munsiff Court read this provision as mandating that the address of the second defendant — the unknown reviewer — be furnished before the suit could be numbered.

Justice Easwaran S. identified the core difficulty directly: in a John Doe proceeding, the second defendant is by definition an unidentified person. The plaintiff cannot furnish what it does not have and cannot obtain. Requiring the plaintiff to provide the physical address of someone operating anonymously on an online platform, before the court would even assign a suit number, makes the suit self-defeating from the moment of filing.

The Court noted that the Munsiff Court “was completely at remiss in not appreciating the requirement of the plaintiff and also the urgency expressed in the suit.” The procedural conflict between Order VI Rule 14A and the John Doe exemption, the Court held, was not considered in its correct perspective by the trial court.

John Doe Jurisprudence in India

Justice Easwaran S. traced the origins and expansion of John Doe proceedings in Indian courts. The concept was introduced for the first time by the Delhi High Court in Taj Television v. Rajan Mandal [(2003) FSR 22], where unlicensed cable operators were restrained from unlawfully broadcasting the 2002 FIFA World Cup without identifying each operator individually. That precedent established that courts could grant injunctions against unnamed, unidentified defendants where the plaintiff lacked the means to ascertain their identities before filing.

The concept was subsequently expanded in E.S.P.N Software India Pvt Ltd. v. Tudu Enterprises and Ors [CS(OS) No. 384/2011]. The Delhi High Court later elaborated the test to be applied when issuing John Doe orders in UTV Software Communications Ltd and Ors v. 1337X.To and Ors [(2019) SCC Online Del 8002].

The Court referred to these precedents not to decide the merits of the injunction application itself, but to establish that John Doe litigation is a recognised, rapidly expanding area of procedural law. In that context, courts must adopt a progressive approach when entertaining such suits and must not allow themselves to be constrained by procedural requirements that are structurally incompatible with the nature of John Doe proceedings.

Procedural Rules as Handmaidens, Not Obstructions

The High Court reiterated a foundational principle: procedural rules under the CPC are the handmaidens of justice and should not be used as technical obstructions to deny substantive justice. This principle applied with particular force in the present case, where the procedural requirement being insisted upon was one that the plaintiff was incapable of fulfilling — not through any fault or omission, but because the identity of the second defendant was entirely masked behind an online platform.

The Court pointed to a workable alternative that the Munsiff Court had overlooked. Rather than refusing to number the suit altogether, the trial court could have obtained an undertaking from the plaintiff to implead the actual person who posted the review once that person’s identity was revealed through the proceedings. This approach would have preserved the integrity of the CPC provisions while allowing the suit to progress.

Because the Munsiff Court had failed to apply this approach and had instead allowed a procedural provision to operate as a complete bar, Justice Easwaran S. held that the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was required to be invoked to correct the procedural infirmity and render substantive justice.

Order

The High Court allowed OP(C) No. 2655 of 2026 and set aside Ext.P4 order dated 5 June 2026 passed by the Principal Munsiff Court, Ernakulam, rejecting the exemption application in IA 4/2026.

The Principal Munsiff Court, Ernakulam, was directed to number the suit on the date of production of a certified copy of the High Court’s judgment. Upon numbering, the trial court was further directed to proceed to consider the interlocutory application forthwith. The judgment was delivered on 14 September 2026, the same day the petition came up for admission.