Kerala HC Quashes RTI Order Directing KPSC to Disclose Disciplinary File Notings, Sets Aside Section 20(1) Penalty Proceedings
The Kerala High Court held that internal note files in disciplinary proceedings are personal information exempt from RTI disclosure, and that the State Information Commission's order directing blanket disclosure was legally unsustainable.
Justice Mohammed Nias C.P., sitting singly at the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam, on 25 May 2026 quashed an order of the Kerala State Information Commission that had directed the Kerala Public Service Commission to disclose the entire note file relating to disciplinary proceedings against one of its own officers. The Commission had also initiated penalty proceedings against the KPSC's State Public Information Officer under Section 20(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2005. The High Court found that the note file — containing internal deliberations, evaluative comments and inter-departmental opinions — constituted personal information protected under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act, and that no larger public interest had been pleaded or established to justify disclosure. The direction to initiate proceedings under Section 20(1) was also set aside, the court holding that the KPSC's refusal rested on a plausible and legally sustainable interpretation of the exemption provision.
The Dispute Before the High Court
The second respondent, Rani Wilfred, was working as a Cashier in the Kerala Public Service Commission when disciplinary proceedings were initiated against her. The Internal Audit Wing found that the physical balance of cash did not tally with the book balance, with a shortage of Rs. 25,341. She was suspended pending enquiry, a memo of charges was issued, and the enquiry found that she had made false entries in cash transactions. A punishment of barring increment was imposed, and she was required to remit the amount determined as loss to the PSC, which she did with interest. An appeal against the punishment was rejected by the Commission on 13 October 2008.
Six years later, on 7 April 2014, Wilfred filed a petition seeking reconsideration of the matter. She also filed a review petition, which the Chairman examined and rejected on 16 January 2017. It is in relation to this file — File No. SS I (1) 162/14/GW — that she filed an RTI application in April 2017 seeking copies of the extract of orders in the file.
The Information Officer declined to disclose the information on 9 May 2017. The Appellate Authority under the KPSC rejected her first appeal on 22 June 2017. She then preferred a second appeal before the Kerala State Information Commission. The Commission, by order dated 28 July 2018, directed the KPSC to make available all documents sought, held that the denial under Sections 8(1)(e) and 8(1)(j) was unsustainable, and ordered proceedings under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act against the State Public Information Officer. The KPSC challenged that order before the High Court in January 2019.
In her counter affidavit, Wilfred submitted that she had been exonerated from all charges in 2014 and that despite repeated requests in October 2016 and January 2017, copies of the exoneration order, enquiry report and monitoring committee report were not furnished to her, compelling her to invoke the RTI Act.
The Legal Questions
The central question was whether the State Information Commission's order directing disclosure of file notings and initiating proceedings under Section 20(1) was sustainable, having regard to the scope of the exemption under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act and the nature of the information sought.
The KPSC contended that the file note sought contained the notings and opinions of various officers and Members of the Commission, that it did not constitute a public document to which a delinquent employee was entitled, and that disclosure would hamper the fiduciary relationship between the Commission and its officers. The KPSC also argued that mens rea is an essential ingredient for proceedings under Section 20(1) and that no such finding had been recorded.
The State Information Commission and Wilfred argued that file notings fall within the definition of “information” under Section 2(f) of the RTI Act, that the information pertained to proceedings initiated against Wilfred herself and therefore could not be treated as an invasion of her own privacy, and that the proviso to Section 8(1)(j) — which states that information which cannot be denied to Parliament or a State Legislature shall not be denied to any person — required disclosure.
The court also had the benefit of submissions from Smt. Surya Binoy, appointed as Amicus Curiae by order dated 30 January 2026. The Amicus drew attention to the amendment of Section 8(1)(j) by Section 44(3) of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, which came into force on 30 November 2025, expanding the exemption relating to personal information, though noting that the validity of the DPDP Act and the DPDP Rules 2025 is under challenge before the Supreme Court.
How the Bench Reasoned
Justice Mohammed Nias C.P. began by examining the structure of Section 8(1)(j). He identified three components: first, whether the information is personal information; second, whether its disclosure would cause an unwarranted invasion of privacy; and third, whether a larger public interest justifies disclosure notwithstanding the claim of privacy.
On the first component, the court held that the expression “personal information” in Section 8(1)(j), as it stood at the relevant time, takes within its fold not merely personal records but also professional records, including service records, disciplinary proceedings, confidential assessments and employment-related materials. Relying on the Supreme Court's judgment in Girish Ramchandra Deshpande v. Central Information Commissioner [(2013) 1 SCC 212], the court noted that memos, show-cause notices, censure orders and service-related materials constitute personal information, disclosure of which ordinarily bears no nexus to public activity and would amount to an unwarranted invasion of privacy unless justified by demonstrable larger public interest. The same principle was reiterated in R.K. Jain v. Union of India and Canara Bank v. C.S. Shyam.
The court drew a distinction between the ultimate decision communicated to an employee in disciplinary proceedings and the internal note file containing deliberations, evaluative comments and decision-making processes. The request in the present case was not confined to the final order but extended to the entire note file. Such materials, the court held, stand on a fundamentally different footing from final orders communicated in discharge of statutory duties.
On the third component, the court found that no larger public interest had been pleaded or established by Wilfred. The State Information Commission's order had proceeded on the assumption that the entire note file was mechanically disclosable without undertaking any balancing exercise between transparency, privacy, confidentiality and institutional integrity.
The court also examined the Manual of Office Procedure Other than Secretariat. Rule 49 of Chapter VII defines the aim of a note; Rule 52 provides that the note file shall be maintained separately from the current file; Rule 72 states that the full text of an order should never be communicated, much less the whole correspondence embodied in the proceedings; and Rule 92(iii) recognises that matters relating to individual officers may require confidential treatment. This framework, the court observed, treats internal note files and deliberative correspondence as distinct from the final decision communicated to the affected party.
The Proviso to Section 8(1)(j) and Parliamentary Privilege
The court gave detailed attention to the proviso to Section 8(1)(j), which had been the foundation of the State Information Commission's order and Wilfred's case. The Commission had held that since the information would have been supplied to the Legislature if a question on the floor was raised, it could not be denied to Wilfred.
The court traced the divergent judicial interpretations of the proviso. Earlier decisions of the Kerala High Court, including the Division Bench in Canara Bank v. Central Information Commission [2007 (3) KHC 185], had adopted an expansive reading, effectively elevating the proviso above the substantive exemption. The Single Bench in the same matter had held that information relating to transfers and postings of employees could not be denied under Section 8(1)(j). The court in Treesa Irish v. Central Public Information Officer [2010 (3) KHC 940] had stated that the proviso “takes the sheen out of the main section.” The Bombay High Court in Surupsingh Hrya Naik v. State of Maharashtra had extended the reasoning even to confidential medical records.
However, the Supreme Court in Canara Bank v. C.S. Shyam reversed the Kerala High Court's Division Bench judgment, holding that the information sought was personal in nature and therefore exempted from disclosure under Section 8(1)(j), and that the performance of an employee in an organisation is primarily a matter between the employee and the employer.
The Delhi High Court in Vijay Prakash v. Union of India [2010 KHC 6477] had also disagreed with the expansive reading, holding that the proviso must be confined to the class of information that Parliament can ordinarily seek, and that if all information relating to public servants could be accessed by Parliament, Section 8(1)(j) would be devoid of substance.
Justice Mohammed Nias C.P. examined the actual scope of parliamentary powers to call for information. Under Article 105(3) of the Constitution, Parliament possesses privileges including the power of Parliamentary Committees to send for persons, papers and records. However, Rule 269 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Lok Sabha limits this power to matters required for the purposes of the Committee, and Rule 270 confines it to matters relevant to the enquiry. Direction 13 of the Directions of the Chairman of Rajya Sabha states that questions relating to matters of day-to-day administration of government employees, including service conditions, postings and transfers, are not admissible. Questions relating entirely to personal matters are also not admissible in practice.
The court held that the State Information Commission's finding — that the information would have been supplied to the House if a question on the floor was raised — was rendered without ascertaining whether such a question would have been allowed to be raised in the first place. The proviso, the court held, does not confer an unrestricted right to seek every information, and reading it otherwise would render the protections under Sections 8 and 11 otiose. A proviso cannot be read in a way which nullifies the provision to which it is a proviso unless such an intention is manifest.
The court also noted that the DPDP Act, 2023, which came into force on 30 November 2025, has since omitted the proviso itself, albeit prospectively. The amendment has substantially widened Section 8(1)(j) to exempt “information which relates to personal information,” materially curtailing the earlier disclosure framework. Though the amendment does not directly govern the present dispute, the court observed that the legislative development demonstrates a statutory shift towards greater protection of personal and service-related information, and that the basis for expansive arguments founded on the proviso stands substantially diluted even under the amended provision.
Section 20(1) Penalty Proceedings
The court held that penal consequences under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act can arise only upon a clear finding of malafide denial, unreasonable refusal, or deliberate obstruction in furnishing information. The KPSC's stand was founded on a plausible and legally sustainable interpretation of Section 8(1)(j), supported by binding precedents recognising that service and disciplinary records constitute personal information unless outweighed by demonstrable larger public interest. The legal position under Section 8(1)(j) not being free from complexity or doubt, the stand taken by the KPSC could not be characterised as malafide, contumacious, or deliberately obstructive so as to attract proceedings under Section 20(1).
Order
The writ petition was allowed. Ext. P5 — the order dated 28 July 2018 passed by the Kerala State Information Commission — was quashed in its entirety, both insofar as it directed disclosure of file notings and insofar as it initiated proceedings under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act against the State Public Information Officer of the KPSC.
The court placed on record its appreciation for the assistance rendered by the Amicus Curiae, Smt. Surya Binoy.