He rented out his vehicle for ₹3.25 lakh and got back neither the rent nor the vehicle, and the High Court sent him to the Magistrate

Justice Pramod Kumar Agrawal declined a mandamus to register an FIR, setting out the layered remedies under the CrPC and the BNSS and holding that sanction operates at cognizance and not before it.

The petitioner is the registered owner of a vehicle. He gave it on rent to the fourth respondent for eleven months for ₹3,25,000. On his case, the respondent has neither paid the rent nor returned the vehicle. He came to the High Court under Article 226 asking for a mandamus directing the authorities to decide his representation and to register an FIR against the respondent in compliance with Lalita Kumari v. Government of U.P., and for a direction to the respondent to hand over the vehicle. On 13 October 2026 the petition was dismissed — not on the merits of his grievance, but because he had come to the wrong forum.

The architecture the Court set out

The order proceeds by setting out a legal conspectus on the subject in ten propositions, drawn from the Court's examination of the point, and then applying it.

The starting point is favourable to the petitioner: the duty of the police to register an FIR upon disclosure of a cognizable offence is mandatory, as settled in Lalita Kumari. But the consequence of non-registration is not a writ. The Code of Criminal Procedure, now the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, provides a comprehensive and layered mechanism to set the criminal law in motion. In cases of non-registration, an aggrieved person may approach the Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3) of the CrPC or the corresponding Section 173(4) of the BNSS, and thereafter invoke the jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the CrPC, corresponding to Section 175 of the BNSS, or proceed by way of a complaint under Section 200 of the CrPC, corresponding to Section 223. Those remedies, the Court held, constitute a complete statutory architecture.

The availability of those remedies, coupled with the supervisory jurisdiction of constitutional courts under Articles 32 and 226, demonstrates that no legislative vacuum exists warranting the intervention sought. The appropriate course lies in ensuring faithful and even-handed enforcement of existing law. The conspectus records the broader observation that a greater extent of the concerns highlighted arises not from the absence of law but from deficits in its consistent and effective enforcement — and that such concerns, however significant, cannot justify the judicial assumption of legislative functions.

Two propositions worth noting

Two of the ten propositions have reach well beyond this petitioner's vehicle.

The first concerns the breadth of the Magistrate's power. The supervisory jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the CrPC, or Section 175 of the BNSS, is of wide amplitude and includes supervisory oversight over the investigation at appropriate stages. That power is intended to ensure the investigation is conducted in a fair, impartial and lawful manner, and may be exercised simultaneously during the stage of investigation where the material on record discloses any deficiency, inaction or taint in the investigative process. The Magistrate, in other words, is not merely a switch that starts an investigation; he retains a role in how it is conducted.

The second concerns sanction, and settles a question that often stalls complaints against public servants. The requirement of prior sanction under Sections 196 and 197 of the CrPC, corresponding to Sections 217 and 218 of the BNSS, operates at the stage of taking cognizance and does not extend to the pre-cognizance stage of registration of an FIR or investigation under Section 156(3). An order directing investigation under Section 156(3) does not amount to taking cognizance within the meaning of Section 190 of the CrPC, corresponding to Section 210 of the BNSS.

The conspectus also carries an observation on the subject matter from which it originally arose — that issues relating to hate speech and rumour mongering bear directly upon the preservation of fraternity, dignity and constitutional order, and that it would be open to the Union of India and the competent legislative authorities to consider, in their wisdom, whether further legislative or policy measures are warranted in the light of evolving societal challenges, or to bring about suitable amendments as suggested by the Law Commission's 267th Report dated 23 March 2017.

The order

Applying that conspectus, the Court held that since the petitioner had rushed to the High Court without availing the alternative efficacious remedy envisaged under the Code and the Sanhita, the petition could not be entertained.

Nothing in the order touches the merits of his complaint about the vehicle, and nothing in it suggests the grievance is not a real one. What it holds is that the forum he chose is not the one the legislature has provided, and that the one it has provided reaches further than he may have assumed.

The petition was accordingly dismissed, with liberty to the petitioner, if he so desires, to approach the concerned Magistrate under the provisions of the CrPC or the BNSS for redressal of his grievance. Mr Hemant Sausarkar appeared for the petitioner and Mr Yogesh Dhande, Government Advocate, for the State.