Justice A. Shroti Madhya Pradesh HC COMPLAINT QUASHED University cannot bypass ICC topunish professor for harassment
[ High Court of Madhya Pradesh ]

Disciplinary Authority Cannot Bypass ICC for Sexual Harassment Inquiry, MP High Court Quashes Termination

The Madhya Pradesh High Court held that an employer cannot appoint an independent inquiry officer for sexual harassment allegations, quashing a university professor's termination order and directing reinstatement.

The High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior, in a judgment delivered on 15 May 2026, quashed the termination of an Assistant Professor at a State university after finding that the entire departmental inquiry had been conducted in violation of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, and the University Grants Commission (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal of Sexual Harassment of Women Employees and Students in Higher Educational Institutions) Regulations, 2015. Justice Ashish Shroti, sitting singly, held that once allegations of sexual harassment are made, the disciplinary authority is stripped of its power to appoint an independent inquiry officer and is obliged to refer the matter to the Internal Complaints Committee or the Local Complaints Committee. The order of termination dated 31 December 2025 was quashed, and the University was directed to forward the complaint to the ICC or LCC forthwith.

The Dispute Before the Court

Dr Sajan Kurien Mathew was appointed as an Assistant Professor at the respondent University on 26 July 2012. On 26 March 2025, certain students made a complaint alleging sexual harassment against him. The University constituted a Students’ Grievance Redressal Committee under the University Grants Commission (Redressal of Grievances of Students) Regulations, 2023. The SGRC conducted an inquiry, recorded statements of the complainants, and submitted its report on 28 April 2025. The committee found that the complainants had not produced documentary evidence and that the matter was under police investigation; it recommended no further action by the SGRC.

Separately, an FIR was registered at Police Station, Jhansi Road, Gwalior, for offences punishable under Sections 74, 75, 79 and 351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.

The petitioner was transferred to Sanskriti Sanchalnalaya (Directorate of Culture), Bhopal, by order dated 15 April 2025. He did not comply with the transfer order and was placed under suspension on 4 May 2025. A charge-sheet was issued on 10 June 2025, containing three charges: sexual harassment of a B.F.A. third-year student on 6 December 2018; similar conduct towards another student on 15 January 2024 and in March 2024; and disobedience of the transfer order dated 15 April 2025 in violation of Rule 37 of the M.P. Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965.

The Vice-Chancellor appointed a retired Principal District Judge as Inquiry Officer by order dated 25 August 2025. The inquiry report was submitted on 6 November 2025 and placed before the Executive Council on 2 December 2025. A show-cause notice was issued the same day, received by the petitioner on 9 December 2025, and his explanation was submitted on 17 December 2025. The impugned termination order followed on 31 December 2025.

Dr Mathew challenged the termination under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The respondents raised a preliminary objection that an efficacious alternate remedy, an appeal before the Governor within 30 days, was available, and the writ petition was therefore not maintainable.

The Legal Issue: Who Is the Lawful Inquiry Authority?

The petitioner's counsel argued that Rule 14 of the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 designates the Internal Complaints Committee as the inquiry authority for sexual harassment complaints, and that no independent inquiry officer could lawfully have been appointed by the Vice-Chancellor. The inquiry conducted outside the POSH Act framework was, on this argument, wholly without jurisdiction.

Counsel for the respondents countered that the ICC inquiry under the POSH Act is independent of the disciplinary authority's power to appoint an inquiry officer under the CCA Rules, and that even absent an ICC inquiry, the disciplinary authority could appoint an independent officer for misconduct including sexual harassment. In support, reliance was placed on a Division Bench judgment of the Guwahati High Court in Airports Authority of India & Others v. Shri Prabin V.S., W.P. No. 149 of 2025. Counsel fairly disclosed that the Apex Court had stayed that judgment by order dated 16 January 2026 in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 675 of 2026, and the matter remains pending.

The court therefore heard arguments on the preliminary objection and the jurisdictional question together, reserving the matter on 29 April 2026.

How the Court Reasoned

Justice Shroti traced the legal framework from its origin. The three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Vishaka & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., (1997) 6 SCC 241, had directed that disciplinary action for sexual harassment must follow service rules, and that a specialised Complaints Committee, headed by a woman, with at least half women members and an external NGO member, must be constituted in every employer's organisation. The court read these directions as creating a separate, specialised mechanism deliberately insulated from senior-level influence.

Parliament enacted the POSH Act in 2013. Section 4 mandates constitution of an ICC by every employer; Section 5 provides for a Local Complaints Committee where an ICC is unavailable. Section 11(1) requires the ICC or LCC to conduct the inquiry in accordance with applicable service rules. Section 11(4) fixes a ninety-day timeline for completion. Section 13 governs the inquiry report and limits the ICC or LCC to recommending action; the ultimate decision on punishment remains with the disciplinary authority.

The Supreme Court, in Medha Kotwal Lele v. Union of India, (2013) 1 SCC 311, directed that the Complaints Committee envisaged in Vishaka shall be deemed an inquiry authority for the purposes of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, and that its report shall be deemed an inquiry report under those rules.

In compliance, the State amended Rule 14(2) of the CCA Rules by notification dated 17 March 2005. The proviso inserted by that notification states that where a complaint of sexual harassment within the meaning of Rule 22(3) of the M.P. Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965 is made, the complaints committee constituted in each department or office “shall be deemed to be the inquiring authority appointed by the Disciplinary authority.” Justice Shroti read this proviso as expressly removing the disciplinary authority's power to appoint any other inquiry officer in sexual harassment cases.

The court identified three specific harms that flow from permitting a parallel inquiry authority. First, the confidentiality obligations under Section 16 of the POSH Act would be breached. Second, an employer-appointed officer may lack the specialised composition, women members, external NGO representative, that the statute and Vishaka require. Third, no statutory timeline would govern such an inquiry, unlike the ninety-day limit binding the ICC or LCC under Section 11(4).

The court also addressed the SGRC constituted under the UGC (Redressal of Grievances of Students) Regulations, 2023. It held that the SGRC's jurisdiction is confined to student grievances as defined under Regulation 3(h) of those Regulations and does not extend to complaints of sexual harassment. The applicable instrument for sexual harassment complaints in higher educational institutions is the UGC (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal of Sexual Harassment of Women Employees and Students in Higher Educational Institutions) Regulations, 2015, which apply to every university within the meaning of the UGC Act, 1956. Regulation 4 of those Regulations mandates constitution of an ICC whose composition mirrors, and in some respects supplements, the requirements of Section 4(2) of the POSH Act, including a bar on persons in senior administrative positions such as the Vice-Chancellor, Registrar, and Deans from being ICC members, to ensure autonomy.

Synthesising the scheme, the court set out the correct procedure in three steps: complaints of sexual harassment must be forwarded to the ICC or LCC; the ICC or LCC treats the complaint as a charge-sheet and conducts the inquiry following the procedure in Rule 14 of the CCA Rules; and the competent authority then treats the ICC or LCC report as an inquiry report and proceeds under Rule 15 of the CCA Rules.

Because the entire action of the University was found to be in violation of the POSH Act and the UGC Regulations, the court held that the availability of an alternate remedy before the Governor was no bar to entertaining the writ petition. The impugned order was, in the court's view, completely without jurisdiction.

Outcome

Justice Ashish Shroti quashed the termination order dated 31 December 2025. The respondent University was directed to forthwith forward the complaint made against the petitioner to the ICC or LCC, which shall deal with it in accordance with the provisions of the POSH Act. Pending that process, the petitioner was directed to be reinstated in service and permitted to join at his transferred place in Bhopal.

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