MP High Court Upholds Conviction for Rape and Kidnapping of Two-Year-Old, Modifies Life Sentence to 20 Years

The Gwalior bench confirmed guilt under Sections 366, 376(2)(i) and (m), and 307 IPC, while reducing the rape sentence from life till natural death to 20 years rigorous imprisonment.

The High Court of Madhya Pradesh at its Gwalior bench, on 1 July 2026, upheld the conviction of Mukesh Jatav for kidnapping a two-year-old girl, raping her, and abandoning her in roadside bushes in a bid to cause her death. A Division Bench of Justice G.S. Ahluwalia and Justice Anuradha Shukla — with the judgment authored by Justice Anuradha Shukla — dismissed the challenge to guilt but partially allowed the appeal to modify one sentence. The trial court's life sentence under Section 376(2)(i) IPC, which had been treated as imprisonment till natural death, was reduced to a fixed term of 20 years of actual rigorous imprisonment with no remission. Sentences for kidnapping under Section 366 and attempted murder under Section 307 were left intact.

The Crime and the Trial Court's Verdict

The incident occurred on 13 July 2014. The victim and her father were outside their home when Mukesh Jatav, an acquaintance of the father, arrived. On the pretext of playing with the child, he grabbed her, started a motorcycle parked nearby with its key in the ignition, and fled towards Gwalior. The father and a neighbour gave chase but could not stop him.

When neither the appellant nor the child could be found, the father lodged FIR No. 164/2014 at police station Mohna the same evening — the incident occurred at 6 PM and the FIR was registered at 8 PM. The child was recovered the following day, 14 July 2014, at 1 PM from roadside bushes at village Nayagaon on A.B. Road, on information furnished by the appellant. Her undergarment was also recovered from the bushes on the same information. Medical examination conducted the same day confirmed she had been physically and sexually ravished and had multiple bruises on her body.

The 5th Additional Sessions Judge, Gwalior, convicted Jatav under Sections 366, 376(2)(i) and (m), and 307 of the IPC and sentenced him to 10 years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 5,000 under Section 366, life imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 10,000 under Section 376(2)(i), and 10 years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 10,000 under Section 307, vide judgment dated 6 February 2017 in S.T. No. 530/2014. Jatav had been in custody for over 12 years by the time the High Court heard the appeal.

Arguments Before the High Court

Counsel for the appellant argued that the conviction rested on false implication arising from a financial dispute between the appellant and the victim's father. It was contended that the appellant was summoned from his home and arrested on false grounds, that he had in fact suffered injuries in a road accident, and that his medical examination was done at a primary health centre at Barai. Two specific evidentiary lapses were pressed: that no DNA report was proved by the prosecution, and that the child victim was not produced as a witness to identify the perpetrator.

The State, represented by Public Prosecutor Shri C.P. Singh, countered that the named FIR, eyewitness testimony, the victim's age, and her medical report together formed a complete case. The prosecution argued that the defence had not established any enmity and that the conviction deserved no interference.

How the Bench Reasoned

The bench dealt with each defence argument in turn. On enmity, it found that the appellant had alleged a financial dispute with the father but never disclosed the nature of the dispute or the amount involved, examined no witnesses in his defence, and did not himself state the fact of enmity on oath. The bench held that enmity remained “only of a colour of hypothesis” and was never established as fact.

On the motive of independent witnesses, the court noted that Pradeep (PW/3) and Indresh Batham (PW/6) — who had seen the appellant take the child away on the motorcycle — had no claimed enmity with the appellant. Minor inconsistencies in their knowledge of documents they had signed were held to relate only to alleged infirmities of investigation and had no bearing on their account of the incident itself. Their testimony on the core facts remained unchallenged by the defence.

On the question of not examining the child victim, the bench invoked section 36 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, which prohibits a child from seeing the accused at the time of testifying, and also referred to the Supreme Court's direction in Sakshi vs. Union of India (2004) 5 SCC 518. The bench observed that dock identification through a child victim was not permissible in law and asked what other facts could realistically have been proved through the testimony of a child barely two years old with limited vocabulary. The fact of rape itself was not in dispute. The fact of kidnapping was proved by the father and independent witnesses. The court found no lapse in the prosecution case for not examining the child.

On DNA evidence, the bench relied on Sunil vs. State of M.P. (2017) 4 SCC 393, which held that conviction is possible even without a DNA report provided the remaining evidence is clinching in nature. The bench added a further observation: if a DNA report could have assisted the defence, the appellant could have requested the trial court to summon it, but no such prayer was ever made.

The court then applied section 106 of the Evidence Act and the last-seen theory. The appellant had kidnapped the child in the presence of her father and witnesses. Approximately 19 hours later, the child was recovered from roadside bushes at a distant location on information given by the appellant. She was found badly injured and had been raped. The bench drew on Teja vs. State of U.P. (1956) 1 SCC 481 and Ravasaheb alias Ravasahebgouda and Others vs. State of Karnataka (2023) 5 SCC 391 to hold that under these circumstances the burden lay on the appellant to explain how he parted company with the child and what her physical state was at that time. He offered no such explanation.

On the charge of attempted murder under Section 307, the bench reasoned that abandoning a seriously wounded, ravished two-year-old in roadside bushes at night — in a location far from her home — intentionally put her life at grave risk. The court found that the sole intention in leaving her there was to facilitate her death.

Modification of Sentence Under Section 376(2)(i) IPC

While upholding all three convictions, the bench found one aspect of the sentencing to warrant modification. The trial court had awarded life imprisonment under Section 376(2)(i) IPC and, in paragraph 51 of the impugned judgment, had indicated that this meant imprisonment for the remainder of the convict's natural life. The provision itself allows a minimum sentence of a definite term rather than mandating imprisonment till natural death.

Taking into account the full range of sentences prescribed for the offence and the fact that no prior criminal antecedents of the appellant were proved, the bench held that the life-till-natural-death sentence needed conversion to a limited period. It reduced the sentence to a fixed term of 20 years of actual rigorous imprisonment with no remission.

On the separate question of Section 376(2)(m) IPC — which covers rape accompanied by grievous bodily harm or endangering the life of the victim — the bench noted that the trial court had not passed a separate sentence for this head and that the State had not challenged this omission. Given that the appellant had already been sentenced for rape and for attempted murder, the court found no irregularity or illegality in the impugned judgment on that count.

Outcome

The appeal was partly allowed only to the extent of modifying the sentence for the offence under Section 376(2)(i) IPC from life till natural death to 20 years of actual rigorous imprisonment with no remission. Convictions under Sections 366, 376(2)(i) and (m), and 307 IPC were all upheld. All substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently. The court directed that its judgment be certified in compliance with section 388 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that the concerned trial court be directed to pass consequential orders, and that a copy of the judgment be sent to the jail authorities for being provided to the appellant.