MP High Court Sets Aside POCSO Conviction After Finding Prosecution Failed to Prove Prosecutrix Was a Minor
The Jabalpur bench acquitted Munna Ram, convicted under POCSO and IPC, after finding contradictions in parental testimony and school records created reasonable doubt about the prosecutrix's age.
A Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur set aside the conviction of Munna Ram on 25 June 2026, acquitting him of charges under Sections 363, 366 and 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 5(l)/6 of the Protection of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The Special Judge (POCSO Act), Singrauli had convicted him on 14 October 2025 in Special Case No. 23/2024, sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment of seven years under Section 366 IPC and twenty years under Section 5(l)/6 POCSO, with both sentences directed to run concurrently. The High Court found that the prosecution had not satisfactorily established that the prosecutrix was a minor at the time of the incident in April 2024, and that she had been a consenting party throughout.
The Conviction Under Appeal
Munna Ram was tried before the Special Judge (POCSO Act), Singrauli on allegations that he had kidnapped and sexually assaulted the prosecutrix (PW-1). The Special Judge convicted him under Section 363 (kidnapping), Section 366 (kidnapping or abducting a woman to compel her marriage), and Section 376(2)(n) IPC (repeated rape by the same person), as well as Section 5(l)/6 POCSO, which deals with aggravated penetrative sexual assault on a child.
The sentences imposed were rigorous imprisonment of seven years with a fine of Rs. 500 under Section 366 IPC, and rigorous imprisonment of twenty years with a fine of Rs. 500 under Section 5(l)/6 POCSO. Default of fine payment attracted additional rigorous imprisonment of one year each. All sentences were made concurrent. Munna Ram remained in jail when the appeal came up for hearing.
On the appeal being taken up, an application for suspension of sentence and bail (I.A. No. 6788/2026) had been filed. Counsel for the appellant withdrew that application during the hearing, and it was dismissed as withdrawn. With consent of both sides, the appeal was then finally heard.
The Appellant's Case: Consent and Disputed Age
Shri Ravindra Pratap Singh, appearing for Munna Ram, advanced two connected arguments. First, he submitted that the relationship between the appellant and the prosecutrix was consensual. He pointed to Paragraph 6 of the prosecutrix's deposition (PW-1), where she admitted having called the appellant herself. Her Section 164 CrPC statement recorded that she had left home on her own after her father beat her, that she was already acquainted with Munna Ram who had given her a ring, and that they had gone to Banaras together where they performed a marriage ceremony before living as husband and wife.
Second, and more directly relevant to the POCSO charge, counsel argued that the prosecution had failed to prove the prosecutrix was below eighteen years of age at the time of the incident. Counsel referred to the testimonies of PW-2 (mother), PW-3 (father), Dr. Sarita Shah (PW-5), and the school teacher (PW-8) to support this submission. He argued that a positive DNA report alone, in a relationship between consenting adults, was not sufficient to sustain conviction.
The State's Position: Class-X Marksheet and DNA Report
Shri Abhishek Singh, Government Advocate for the State, supported the impugned judgment. He pointed to Exhibit P/5C, the Class-X marksheet of the prosecutrix, on which her date of birth was recorded as 27 December 2007. Since the incident occurred in April 2024, he submitted she was approximately sixteen and a half years old at the time — clearly a minor under POCSO. He also relied on the positive DNA report to affirm the finding of conviction.
How the Bench Analysed the Evidence on Age
Justice Vivek Agarwal, writing for the bench, examined the evidence on the prosecutrix's age carefully and found it riddled with internal contradictions.
The prosecutrix (PW-1) stated she was admitted to Class I at the age of seven years. Her father (PW-3), however, stated he had admitted her to L.K.G. on 31 July 2014. Critically, no admission record, marksheet, or document pertaining to L.K.G. or Class I was produced by the prosecution.
The parental testimonies on the date of the parents' marriage and the prosecutrix's birth were directly contradictory. The mother (PW-2) said her marriage was solemnised twenty years before the incident and that the prosecutrix was born two years after the marriage. The father (PW-3) stated his marriage was nineteen years before the incident and the prosecutrix was born one year thereafter. Reading both testimonies together, the bench concluded that they pointed to the prosecutrix having been an adult at the time of the incident in April 2024.
On the school records, the school teacher (PW-8) stated that the prosecutrix was admitted to Class II on 31 July 2014 and that her date of birth was recorded as 27 December 2007. The teacher, however, admitted that no record for Class I or any earlier schooling was produced by the parents or the prosecutrix. The bench held that the Class II admission record therefore did not conclusively establish that the date of birth entered therein was correctly recorded.
A further arithmetic inconsistency reinforced the doubt. If the prosecutrix was admitted to L.K.G. only in 2014, as her father (PW-3) stated, it would ordinarily take approximately twelve years of schooling before a student appears in the Class X examination. That would place her Class X appearance around 2026, yet the Class X marksheet is of the year 2023. The bench found it difficult to reconcile this gap, and held that the evidence as a whole gave rise to serious doubt regarding the correctness of the date of birth recorded in the school documents.
On the medical evidence, Dr. Sarita Shah (PW-5) admitted that the secondary sexual characteristics of the prosecutrix were fully developed, that no external or internal injuries were found on her person, and that no definite opinion was expressed regarding any violation of her privacy.
Consent and the Sufficiency of the DNA Report
Reading the prosecutrix's Section 164 CrPC statement alongside her court testimony, the bench held that she had been a consenting party. Her own account — that she called the appellant, left home voluntarily after being beaten by her father, accepted a ring from the appellant, travelled with him to Banaras, and participated in a marriage ceremony — was consistent throughout.
On the DNA evidence, the bench accepted the appellant's submission that a positive DNA report, standing alone, does not sustain a conviction when it arises from a relationship between consenting adults and where the prosecution has not proved the minority of the complainant. The bench held that “mere positivity of the DNA report, by itself, is not sufficient to sustain the conviction.”
The bench concluded that the Special Judge had convicted Munna Ram without appreciating the totality of facts and circumstances, and that the impugned judgment deserved to be set aside.
Outcome
The Division Bench of Justice Vivek Agarwal and Justice Avanindra Kumar Singh allowed Criminal Appeal No. 1920 of 2026. The judgment dated 14 October 2025 passed by the Special Judge (POCSO Act), Singrauli in Special Case No. 23/2024 was set aside. Munna Ram, who was in jail at the time, was directed to be released forthwith. The trial court record was directed to be returned immediately.