Madurai Bench Acquits on SC/ST and Abetment Charges, Cuts POCSO Sentence to Ten Years Citing Article 20(1) Bar on Ex Post Facto Punishment

The Madurai Bench held that SC/ST Act offences require caste to be the motive, acquitted on abetment of suicide, and reduced a life-term POCSO sentence under the constitutional bar on ex post facto punishment.

A Division Bench of the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court, comprising Justice N. Anand Venkatesh and Justice K.K. Ramakrishnan, has partly allowed a criminal appeal filed by a man convicted under the POCSO Act, the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2015 and Section 306 read with Section 511 of the IPC. The bench acquitted the appellant of all charges under the SC/ST Act and the abetment-of-suicide charge, and reduced the POCSO sentence from imprisonment for the remainder of natural life to ten years rigorous imprisonment. The reduction turned on Article 20(1) of the Constitution, which prohibits subjecting a person to a punishment greater than what the law prescribed at the time the offence was committed. Because the penetrative sexual assault occurred before the POCSO Amendment Act of 2019 came into force on 16 August 2019, the enhanced punishment introduced by that amendment could not be applied.

The Conviction Below and the Appeal

The Additional Mahila and Sessions Judge, Srivilliputhur, convicted the appellant in Special S.C. No. 19 of 2021 and sentenced him as follows: ten years rigorous imprisonment under Section 306 read with Section 511 of the IPC; imprisonment for the remainder of natural life under Section 5(l) and 5(j)(ii) read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act; life imprisonment under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act; and five years rigorous imprisonment under Section 3(1)(w)(i) of the SC/ST Act. All sentences were directed to run concurrently.

The prosecution's case, registered as Crime No. 67 of 2020 by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Thiruchuli Utkottam, Virudhunagar District, arose from events beginning in August 2019. The victim, whose date of birth was recorded as 18 May 2003, was then studying in the eleventh standard. The accused, who had known her since she was in the eighth standard, contacted her by phone and induced her to meet him near S. Vagaikulam Village, promising marriage. The prosecution alleged that he repeatedly had sexual intercourse with her, resulting in pregnancy. When the victim informed him of the pregnancy, he denied responsibility and refused to marry her, stating she belonged to the Scheduled Caste community. On 4 May 2020, when she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy, she again approached him; he refused and asked her to go and die. On 5 May 2020 at about 10:00 AM, she allegedly consumed rat poison at her house. She was admitted to the Government Hospital, Thiruppuvanam, and delivered a female child on 6 May 2020 at 4:50 AM.

The victim's mother filed a complaint on 7 May 2020. The FIR was initially registered for POCSO offences and was later altered to add charges under the IPC and the SC/ST Act. The trial court examined fourteen prosecution witnesses and marked twenty-one exhibits, including the Section 164 statement of the victim, the forensic DNA report, the community certificates of both parties, and the school headmaster's certificate showing the victim's date of birth.

Age of the Victim: Public Documents Accepted

The appellant's counsel argued that the prosecution had not proved the victim's age. The headmaster, examined as PW8, did not possess the original birth certificate in school records, and the birth certificate itself was issued only in 2016 — nearly thirteen years after the victim's birth in 2003. The bench rejected this argument. The birth certificate, Exhibit P4, is a public record and was issued in 2016, well before the dispute arose in 2020. It was not a document created after the controversy began. The Secondary School Leaving Certificate, also a public document, carried the same date of birth: 18 May 2003. The bench held that the prosecution had proved beyond doubt that the victim had not completed eighteen years at the time of the incident and therefore fell within the definition of a “child” under the POCSO Act.

Consent Is No Defence Under the POCSO Act

The appellant's counsel contended that the relationship was consensual and romantic, that there was no coercion or force from the outset, and that the accused was barely nineteen years old at the time. The submission was that the POCSO Act was not intended to punish teenage persons in a relationship entered with mutual understanding.

The bench acknowledged the submission but rejected it without qualification. The POCSO Act does not contemplate any romantic relationship as an exception to its provisions on sexual assault or penetrative sexual assault. A child below eighteen years is incapable of giving consent in the eyes of law, and that eventuality is not contemplated under the Act. The bench observed that if consent were accepted as a ground for exemption, it would have serious consequences and would militate against the very objective of the legislation. The forensic DNA report, Exhibit P20, established that the accused was the father of the child. The charge under Section 5(l) and 5(j)(ii) read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act was therefore proved.

SC/ST Act Charges: Caste Must Be the Motive

Two charges under the SC/ST Act were examined separately.

For Section 3(1)(w)(i), the bench noted that the provision requires proof that the accused intentionally touched a woman belonging to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, knowing her community, in a sexual manner and without her consent. The community of the victim was proved through Exhibit P6 and that of the accused through Exhibit P7. However, the bench found that the relationship between the two had developed from the time the victim was in the eighth standard and had continued over years. The physical intercourse was not on account of the victim belonging to the Scheduled Caste community; it was a natural attraction between the two individuals in which caste played no role. The Section 164 statement and the victim's deposition confirmed a sustained relationship, not a one-off encounter. The charge under Section 3(1)(w)(i) was therefore not made out.

For Section 3(2)(v), the bench relied on its earlier judgment in Suresh v. State, reported in 2019-1-L.W.(Crl.) 738, and on the Supreme Court's decisions in Asharfi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2018) 1 SCC 742, and Khuman Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2019 SC 4030. The settled position is that an offence under Section 3(2)(v) is attracted only if the offence was committed because the victim belongs to the SC/ST community and to belittle that person. The bench held that the POCSO offence was committed because the victim was below eighteen years of age, not because of her caste. The charge under Section 3(2)(v) was also not made out. Both SC/ST Act charges resulted in acquittal.

Abetment of Suicide: Instigation Not Established, Medical Evidence Creates Doubt

The charge under Section 306 read with Section 511 of the IPC required the prosecution to establish that the accused intended to instigate or actively provoke the victim to attempt suicide. The prosecution relied on the accused's alleged statement asking the victim to go and die. The bench held that this statement alone does not constitute instigation within the meaning of Sections 107 and 306 of the IPC.

The bench also found that the medical evidence created doubt about whether the victim had actually consumed poison. PW6, the doctor, admitted in cross-examination that if poison had genuinely been consumed, it would have had a very serious effect on the foetus. The child, however, was born in a normal condition almost immediately after the alleged ingestion. The prosecution had not established that the accused intended the victim to commit suicide or that he actively provoked the act. The charge under Section 306 read with Section 511 of the IPC was not proved, and the appellant was entitled to acquittal on this count.

Article 20(1) and the Ex Post Facto Bar on Enhanced POCSO Punishment

The most consequential issue in the appeal was the sentence imposed under the POCSO Act. The trial court had sentenced the appellant to imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life, relying on the enhanced punishment introduced by the POCSO Amendment Act, 2019 (Act 25 of 2019), which came into force on 16 August 2019.

The appellant's counsel pointed out that the victim herself had deposed that the penetrative sexual assault first occurred on 7 August 2019 — before the amendment came into force. The child was delivered on 6 May 2020, which was relatable to that act. The counsel relied on Ravinder Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 2010 SC 199, and The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Another, 2026 INSC 47, among other decisions.

The bench accepted this argument. Article 20(1) of the Constitution provides that no person shall be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. The bench extracted the relevant passage from Ravinder Singh, which confirmed that the sentence imposable on the date of commission of the offence determines the sentence imposable on completion of trial. Since the offence was committed before 16 August 2019, the enhanced punishment under the 2019 amendment could not be applied.

Under the pre-amendment version of Section 6 of the POCSO Act, the punishment was rigorous imprisonment for a term not less than ten years, extendable to life imprisonment. The bench then considered whether the minimum of ten years or life imprisonment was appropriate on the facts. The accused was barely nineteen years old at the time of the offence. The bench took into account the long-standing relationship between the parties and the role of hormonal changes at that age, and concluded that the life sentence imposed by the trial court was harsh and required modification. The sentence was reduced to ten years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 5,000, and in default, one year simple imprisonment.

Outcome

The criminal appeal was partly allowed. The appellant was acquitted of the charge under Section 306 read with Section 511 of the IPC, the charge under Section 3(1)(w)(i) of the SC/ST Act, and the charge under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act. His conviction under Section 5(l) and 5(j)(ii) read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act was maintained, but the sentence was modified from imprisonment for the remainder of natural life to ten years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,000, with one year simple imprisonment in default of payment of fine.