Madras HC: Disability Reservation Rules Do Not Apply to Engagement of Government Lawyers
The Madras High Court dismissed a writ appeal seeking disability reservation in government lawyer engagement, holding that contractual engagement of advocates is not an appointment to government service.
A Division Bench of the Madras High Court, comprising Justice S. M. Subramaniam and Justice N. Senthilkumar, on 28 July 2026 dismissed a writ appeal filed by V. Muthupandi, challenging the refusal to extend disability reservation to the engagement of government law officers. The court held that the engagement of lawyers by the government is a contractual arrangement between a litigant and an advocate, not an appointment to government service, and that Section 34 of the Right of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 has no application to such engagement. The judgment affirmed an earlier order of the learned single judge dated 27 November 2025 in WP No. 8428 of 2025, finding no infirmity in that decision.
The Dispute Before the High Court
The appellant, V. Muthupandi, a person with disability, challenged Notification No. 1 of 2024 dated 4 July 2024. That notification invited applications under Rule 5(3) of the Law Officers of High Court of Madras and its Bench at Madurai (Appointment) Rules, 2017, for posts including Additional Advocate General, Special Government Pleader, Additional Government Pleader, and Government Advocate on both civil and criminal sides.
The notification set a deadline of 22 July 2024 for receipt of applications and made clear that the appointment would be purely on a contractual basis, terminable at will with one month's notice or payment of retainer fee in lieu thereof. Appointees could make no claim towards regularisation.
The appellant's case before the single judge had been dismissed. He then filed WA No. 2214 of 2026 under Clause XV of the Letters Patent, pressing the claim afresh before the Division Bench.
The Legal Issue: Whether Section 34 Compels Disability Reservation in Government Lawyer Engagement
Section 34(1) of the Right of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 requires every appropriate government to reserve not less than four per cent of total vacancies in cadre strength in each group of posts in every government establishment for persons with benchmark disabilities.
The appellant argued, at least indirectly, that this provision required the government to accommodate him as a government lawyer. His counsel stated on one hand that the appellant was not insisting on reservation for differently abled persons in the engagement of government lawyers, while simultaneously contending that under the Act he must be accommodated as a government lawyer. The Division Bench found these two positions contradictory.
How the Bench Reasoned
Justice S. M. Subramaniam, delivering the judgment of the court, drew a firm line between appointment to government service and contractual engagement of a lawyer.
The bench held that the relationship between a lawyer and a litigant is privileged. Representing a client before a court or tribunal is not an appointment; it is an engagement founded on contract, under which confidentiality is maintained between the parties. The government, as a larger litigant, retains full liberty to withdraw a vakalat, engage any lawyer, or brief a Senior Counsel depending on the complexity or sensitivity of the matter. That prerogative, the court said, cannot be disputed.
The bench observed that service law applicable to government employees cannot be applied to the engagement of government lawyers. Terms and conditions of appointment in government departments and service conditions are, in its words, distinct and different from the engagement of an advocate to represent government cases on a contractual basis.
On the right of the litigant, the court held that the right to represent a case through lawyers of one's choice is a fundamental right. Extending disability reservation to lawyer engagement would, in effect, curtail the government's right as a litigant to choose its own counsel — a consequence the court was unwilling to countenance.
The bench referred to the Supreme Court's observations in Vikas Singh v. Union Public Service Commission (2021) 5 SCC 370 on reasonable accommodation, which recognises the positive obligation of the state to provide additional support to persons with disabilities so that their constitutional rights become real. The court acknowledged the laudable objective of the Disabilities Act and its growing application in both public and private sector appointments.
However, the bench drew the line clearly: reasonable accommodation and reservation under Section 34 operate in the domain of appointment to posts in government establishments. The engagement of government lawyers falls outside that domain entirely.
The court also addressed the judicial review aspect. It held that the High Court, in exercise of its power of judicial review, cannot direct a litigant to engage a particular lawyer by creating reservations. Engagement of a lawyer is purely the discretion of the litigant, and rules and guidelines on government lawyer appointments exist only to maintain transparency in that process.
On the factual position, the bench noted that nothing in the notification or the Rules prohibited a differently abled person from submitting an application. The appellant was therefore not shut out from applying; the grievance was the absence of a reserved quota, which the court found legally unsustainable.
Outcome
The Division Bench dismissed WA No. 2214 of 2026, finding no infirmity in the single judge's order dated 27 November 2025 in WP No. 8428 of 2025. The connected miscellaneous petition, CMP No. 19163 of 2026, was also closed. No order as to costs was made. The court observed that there is no impediment for the appellant to submit his application whenever a fresh notification is issued.