Madras HC Dismisses Petition to Ban Film ‘Karuppu’, Holds Artistic Licence Must Be Placed on a High Pedestal

A Division Bench of the Madras High Court refused to ban the Tamil film ‘Karuppu’, holding that its portrayal of a corrupt fictional court attracts neither contempt law nor grounds for a ban after CBFC clearance.

On 21 May 2026, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court comprising Justice G. R. Swaminathan and Justice V. Lakshminarayanan dismissed a writ petition filed by a practising lawyer, R. S. Tamilvendan, seeking a direction to ban or regulate the Tamil film Karuppu from cinema theatres and OTT platforms. The petitioner alleged that the film’s depiction of a corrupt judge and an unethical advocate damaged the majesty of courts. The bench, in an order authored by Justice G. R. Swaminathan, rejected every ground advanced — from artistic licence and CBFC clearance to the scope of criminal contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 — and held that a fictional court set in an imaginary locality called “Seven Wells” cannot be the subject of contempt proceedings. The petition was dismissed with no costs.

The Petition and Its Deficiencies

Tamilvendan, whose name loosely translates as “King of Tamil language,” filed a representation in Tamil before the authorities and then approached the court under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a Writ of Mandamus. The bench noted at the outset that the representation itself was riddled with spelling errors. The petitioner had misspelt the Tamil word for “majesty of the courts,” had written the word for “sacred” incorrectly, and had used a word meaning “pilgrimage spots” when he intended to write “OTT platforms.” He had even misspelt his own name in the representation.

The bench observed that the writ petition deserved dismissal on that ground alone, but chose instead to address the merits. The court described its approach as giving the petition “a decent burial by delving into the merits.”

The respondents included the Tamil Nadu Home Department, the Information and Public Relationship Department, the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC), the producer Dream Warrior Pictures, director-actor R. J. Balaji, actor S. Suriya, and actress Trisha.

What the Film Depicts

The film Karuppu is set in a court located in a fictional area called “Seven Wells.” The presiding officer is portrayed as corrupt, and an unethical advocate is shown wielding immense power over the court’s functioning. The bench noted that the theme is the unholy alliance between a corrupt judge and an unethical lawyer. Justice Swaminathan disclosed that he had personally watched the film in a theatre, without any special screening arranged by the producer.

The bench accepted that the portrayal of the system in the film is grossly exaggerated, but placed that exaggeration in the context of Tamil cinema generally, where melodrama and hyperbole are standard features of the medium.

Artistic Licence and Freedom of Expression

The bench held that artistic licence must be placed on a high pedestal, citing Manoharlal Sharma v. Sanjayleela Bansali, (2018) 1 SCC 770. It drew a distinction between a factual essay or documentary, which may be tested on a stricter standard, and an artistic production, which is weighed on a different scale altogether. An artist, the bench said, has a greater leverage and freedom.

The court quoted from Nachiketa Walhekar v. Central Board of Film Certification, (2018) 1 SCC 778, for the proposition that authors express their thoughts according to their own choice of words, phrases, and expressions, and may create characters who look absolutely different from what an ordinary person would conceive. It also drew on Via Com 18 Media Private Limited v. Union of India, (2018) 1 SCC 761, for the observation that when intellectual and creative power is interfered with outside the permissible facets of law, creativity faces extinction and civilisational values corrode.

The bench invoked Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to freedom of speech and expression, and noted that the communication of ideas through cinema falls squarely within that right, citing S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574. It also cited Indibily Creative Private Ltd. v. Government of West Bengal, AIR 2019 SC 1918, for the principle that commitment to free speech involves protecting speech that is palatable as well as speech that one does not want to hear.

Drawing an analogy with political cartoons, the bench referred to Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s opinion in Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), noting that a cartoonist is entitled to a greater latitude because the art form is intrinsically one of exaggeration and satire. What applies to a cartoonist, the bench held, applies equally to a film-maker.

Effect of CBFC Certification

The bench addressed the statutory framework under the Cinematograph Act, 1952. Section 5B of that Act provides that a film shall not be certified for public exhibition if it is against the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, public order, decency or morality, or if it involves defamation or contempt of court, or is likely to incite the commission of any offence.

The CBFC had cleared Karuppu for exhibition. The bench held that once an expert body has cleared a film, a writ court will not substitute its own opinion. It relied on Prakash Jha Productions v. Union of India, (2011) 8 SCC 372, where the Supreme Court held that after CBFC clearance, it was for the Government to maintain law and order rather than ban the film. The bench extended that principle to contempt of court: when the CBFC has cleared a film, a writ court will not, in a Public Interest Litigation, direct its ban on the ground that it involves contempt of court.

The bench also pointed out a procedural gap in the petitioner’s case. He had not filed a Writ of Certiorari challenging the clearance certificate issued by the CBFC. He had filed only a Writ of Mandamus. That choice, the bench noted, was itself a significant deficiency in the petition.

Contempt of Courts Act and the Fictional Court

The petitioner’s counsel argued that the private respondents had scandalised the judicial system and that the court should treat the film as criminal contempt and issue appropriate directions. The bench rejected this argument on two distinct grounds.

First, it held that the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 make an inroad into the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) and must therefore be given a narrow, strict, and restrictive interpretation. Section 2(c) of the Act defines criminal contempt as the publication of any matter that scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower, the authority of any court. The bench observed that the word “Court” in the provision opens with a capital “C,” and that the contemnor must have scandalised or lowered the authority of an actual court.

Second, and more concretely, the bench found that the court depicted in Karuppu is entirely fictional. Metropolitan Magistrate Courts in Chennai are known as George Town Courts, Egmore Courts, and Saidapet Courts. There is no court called “Seven Wells Court.” The bench compared the fictional court to Malgudi, the imaginary village in R. K. Narayan’s works. When a person presiding over an imaginary court is portrayed as corrupt, the penal provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 are not attracted.

The bench also noted that the director had not portrayed the entire judicial system as corrupt, only the presiding officer of this one fictional court.

Judiciary, Criticism, and the Sentinel Role of Courts

The bench addressed the broader question of whether courts should seek to insulate themselves from criticism through judicial orders. It acknowledged that corruption in the judiciary exists and that the Full Court of the Madras High Court regularly takes action against errant judicial officers. It cited the Supreme Court’s observation in High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. V. Shirish Kumar Rangrao Patil, (1997) 6 SCC 339, that cancerous cells of corruption constantly creep into the vital veins of the judiciary and that the need to stem it lies on the judiciary itself through self-imposed corrective measures and disciplinary action under Article 235 of the Constitution.

The bench drew on Lord Atkin’s observation that justice is not a cloistered virtue and must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even outspoken, comments of ordinary men. It cited Sheela Barse v. Union of India, (1988) 4 SCC 226, for the proposition that criticism of judicial functioning is a healthy aid for introspection and improvement. It also referred to D. C. Saxena v. Hon’ble Chief Justice of India, 1996 (5) SCC 216, for the principle that debates on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and extended that principle explicitly to courts and judges.

The bench invoked Justice Black’s observation in Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, that an enforced silence solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench would engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt far more than it would enhance respect.

The bench also drew on a story from the Ramayana to articulate the sentinel role of courts. When Lord Rama’s arrow accidentally pierced a frog, the frog explained that when others hurt it, it called Rama’s name, but when Rama himself was the source of trouble, there was no one else to call. The bench used this to make the point that persons come to court to protect their freedom and liberty against the State, and it is the court that stands as the sentinel. A court ought not to issue any direction to curtail the freedom of citizens. As long as a portrayal or expression does not attract any of the provisions of Article 19(2), it is the duty of the court to protect it — including words the court itself may not like.

The bench applied the standard from S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574, that the question of whether a movie involves contempt of court should be viewed from the perspective of a calm judge with broad shoulders, not a touchy character.

Outcome

The Division Bench dismissed WP No. 20286 of 2026 with no costs. The connected miscellaneous petition, WMP No. 21743 of 2026, was closed. The order was made on 21 May 2026.