Madras HC Five-Judge Bench Lifts Bar on Leave Applications by Convicts Whose Appeals Are Pending

A five-judge Larger Bench of the Madras High Court has set aside an embargo on leave applications under the Tamil Nadu Suspension of Sentence Rules, 1982, holding that pendency of an appeal is no automatic bar to the grant of ordinary or emergency leave to convicts.

A five-judge Larger Bench of the Madras High Court, led by Chief Justice Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari, on 19 June 2026 passed interim directions in four connected writ petitions filed by wives of convicts held in central prisons across Tamil Nadu. The bench set aside a direction issued by the referring Division Bench on 19 November 2025 that had restrained the Registry from entertaining any applications for ordinary or emergency leave under the Tamil Nadu Suspension of Sentence Rules, 1982. The Larger Bench held that the Full Bench decision in T. Ramalakshmi v. State (2025) 1 LW (Crl.) 310 represents the most comprehensive and modern interpretation of the 1982 Rules and shall govern the field until the Supreme Court decides the pending matter in Mukesh Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi).

The Conflict That Prompted the Reference

The Larger Bench was constituted to resolve a judicial dichotomy between two coordinate Full Bench decisions of the Madras High Court. The referring Division Bench had identified an apparent irreconcilability between the earlier Full Bench ruling in State v. Yesu @ Velaiyan (2011) 5 CTC 353 and the more recent Full Bench view in T. Ramalakshmi v. State (2025) 1 LW (Crl.) 310.

The Division Bench framed two questions for the Larger Bench. First, whether leave under the 1982 Rules can be granted to a prisoner under Article 226 of the Constitution when his appeal against conviction is pending before the Supreme Court or the High Court. Second, whether the exemption power under Rule 40 of the 1982 Rules can be exercised by the State to grant leave outside the scope of those Rules during the pendency of such an appeal, in light of the Constitution Bench decision in K.M. Nanavati v. State of Bombay AIR 1961 SC 112.

While passing its reference order on 19 November 2025, the Division Bench had also directed the Registry not to entertain any applications for leave. It is that embargo which the Larger Bench has now lifted on an interim basis.

What the 1982 Rules Say — and What They Do Not

The 1982 Rules were notified under Section 432(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. A central dispute before the bench was the meaning of “sentence” in Rule 2(4), which defines it as “a sentence as finally fixed on appeal or revision or otherwise.”

The State's position, drawing on Nanavati, was that a conviction not yet finally settled on appeal falls outside the Rules. The Larger Bench found merit in the contrary reading. Relying on the Constitution Bench decision in Lila Vati Bai v. State of Bombay (1957) 1 SCC 411, the bench held that the phrase “or otherwise” in Rule 2(4) is a term of extension, not limitation, and covers all possible ways in which a sentence may be fixed. The bench observed that while an appeal is pending, the conviction is not “finally fixed” in the sense of absolute finality, yet the individual has legally transitioned from an under-trial to a convict.

Rule 35 of the 1982 Rules bars the grant of leave only to prisoners whose cases are “pending trial.” The bench read this exclusion as drawing a precise boundary: by specifying only pre-trial prisoners, Rule 35 leaves all other categories — including those at the appellate stage — within the reach of the Rules. To deny the benefit of the 1982 Rules to appellate-stage convicts, the bench held, would be to ignore the explicit exclusionary boundary that the legislature itself drew.

Distinguishing Nanavati and Reading Yesu Correctly

The bench examined whether K.M. Nanavati v. State of Bombay operated as a per se bar to the grant of leave under the 1982 Rules during the pendency of an appeal. It held that it did not.

Nanavati arose from a direct clash between an executive order of suspension of sentence and a judicial warrant during the pendency of a Special Leave Petition. The Governor had suspended the sentence until the disposal of the appeal intended to be filed before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held in that context that it was for the Supreme Court to consider whether the convict should be granted bail or surrender to his sentence, and that the Governor had no power to suspend the sentence for the period during which the matter was sub judice before the Supreme Court.

The Larger Bench distinguished that situation from the operation of the 1982 Rules. In Tamil Nadu, the bench noted, there are no rules governing the temporary release of convicts for any exigencies except the 1982 Rules. The grant of leave for a temporary period — which can extend to a maximum of 40 days per annum — does not interfere with the power of the High Court or any appellate court to grant or deny suspension of sentence pending the appeal. To apply Nanavati as a blanket bar to the 1982 Rules would, in the bench's view, be to misapply a precedent born of executive overreach to a field governed by settled statutory policy.

On Yesu, the bench found that the Full Bench therein was concerned with an altogether different question: whether “parole” as an administrative, executive release outside any statute could be granted in Tamil Nadu, and whether the period spent on parole counted towards the sentence. The Full Bench in Yesu drew a conceptual distinction between parole simpliciter — which does not disrupt the running of the sentence — and suspension of sentence under the 1982 Rules, which does. It held that since Tamil Nadu had framed no rules or administrative instructions under Article 162 of the Constitution regulating parole, no authority possessed the power to grant temporary release by way of parole, and any such release would have to be treated as suspension of sentence under the 1982 Rules.

The Larger Bench held that Yesu never considered, and did not pronounce upon, the question of whether leave under the 1982 Rules may be granted to a prisoner whose appeal is pending. Its ratio is confined to the field occupied by Rule 36 of the 1982 Rules — that any period of leave does not count towards sentence served — and to the impermissibility of parole outside the Rules. Invoking Yesu as authority for the proposition that the 1982 Rules cannot be resorted to during the pendency of an appeal, the bench held, proceeds upon a misreading, since the judgment contains no such finding, express or implied.

The bench expressed respectful agreement with the reasoning of the Full Bench in T. Ramalakshmi v. State, which had directly and exhaustively considered the grant of leave during the pendency of an appeal with reference to Rules 22, 35 and 40 of the 1982 Rules.

Fundamental Rights of Prisoners and the Writ Jurisdiction

The bench reaffirmed that incarceration does not extinguish fundamental rights. Drawing on the Supreme Court's decision in State of A.P. v. Challa Ramkrishna Reddy (2000) 5 SCC 712, the bench noted that prisoners — whether convicts, under-trials, or detenus — retain the residue of constitutional rights, including the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21. The right to socialise with family members is part of personal liberty, subject to valid prison regulations, and such regulations must be reasonable and non-arbitrary.

The bench held that leave and temporary release are facets of human dignity that cannot be suspended indefinitely merely because a judicial appeal is pending. It also reaffirmed that the power of the High Court under Article 226 to protect these rights is an indestructible part of the basic structure of the Constitution, and that High Courts are duty-bound to exercise that power where a public authority has failed to exercise or has wrongly exercised a statutory discretion.

The Supreme Court's Pending Examination of a Pan-India Policy

The Amicus Curiae, Senior Advocate Abudu Kumar Rajaratnam, brought to the bench's attention that the harmonisation of remission and leave policies is under active scrutiny of the Supreme Court in Mukesh Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [MA No. 1658/2023 in Crl.A. No. 1343/2012]. By orders dated 2 April 2024 and 16 April 2024, the State of Tamil Nadu has been impleaded as a party respondent in those proceedings. The Supreme Court is navigating the complexities of State-specific prison rules to evaluate the feasibility of a Pan-India policy, and Tamil Nadu is yet to file its response.

The bench noted that this pending proceeding made it imperative that the interim approach of the Madras High Court aligns with the progressive evolution of the law at the highest level. It directed that these matters be listed before the Larger Bench after the Supreme Court renders its decision in the Mukesh Kumar case, given that the decision will have a direct bearing on the issues referred.

The Division Bench Decision Calling T. Ramalakshmi Per Incuriam

During the hearing, the Amicus and members of the Bar brought to the bench's notice a Division Bench decision in Rajammal v. The Deputy Inspector General of Prisons and Correctional Services Department 2026 (2) MLJ (Crl.) 476, which had held the decision in Latha v. State 2023 MHC 5402 — and consequently the Full Bench judgment in T. Ramalakshmi — to be per incuriam. This Division Bench decision was rendered while the reference before the Larger Bench was pending.

The Larger Bench rejected that characterisation. The Division Bench in Latha had considered the Supreme Court's judgment in Nanavati and taken a view that was approved by the Full Bench in T. Ramalakshmi. Those decisions cannot be said to be per incuriam even assuming a different view is possible, the bench held, noting that the law relating to judicial discipline and the conditions under which a judgment may be called per incuriam is well settled.

Order

The Larger Bench passed the following interim directions on 19 June 2026:

The direction in paragraph 34 of the reference order dated 19 November 2025, which restrained the Registry from entertaining applications for emergency or ordinary leave under the 1982 Rules, is kept in abeyance. The Registry shall entertain petitions in terms of the Full Bench decision in T. Ramalakshmi.

Pending the final determination of the reference and the proceedings in Mukesh Kumar v. State before the Supreme Court, the Full Bench judgment in T. Ramalakshmi v. State shall hold the field and govern the grant of leave.

The competent Prison Authorities are directed to process applications for ordinary and emergency leave in accordance with the 1982 Rules and the guidelines in T. Ramalakshmi, adjudicating each on its individual merits. A copy of the order is to be marked to the Secretary to Government, Home Department, Fort St. George, Chennai, for necessary instructions to authorities across the State.

The decision in K.M. Nanavati shall not be construed as an automatic bar to the consideration of leave applications under the statutory rules during the interim period.

All four writ petitions are to be listed before the concerned Division Bench for passing necessary orders in light of the observations made. The matters are also to be listed before the Larger Bench after the Supreme Court decides the Mukesh Kumar case.