Madras HC Stays Tamil Nadu Cyber Crime Wing's Omnibus Twitter Blocking Notice, Orders URL Restoration
A Division Bench found the notice bereft of post-wise reasons, invoking Section 79(3)(b) IT Act without following Section 69A safeguards, and directed X Corp to unblock all listed URLs pending a detailed counter affidavit.
A Division Bench of the Madras High Court on 13 May 2026 stayed a notice issued by the Superintendent of Police, Cyber Crime Wing, Tamil Nadu, directing the removal and blocking of multiple URLs on X/Twitter. The bench, comprising Justice L. Victoria Gowri and Justice N. Senthilkumar, found at the interlocutory stage that the notice dated 08.05.2026 with reference C.No.393-16/SP/CCD-I/CB/2026 clubbed together posts by different users under a single omnibus direction without assigning individualised reasons for each URL. The court also directed the fourth respondent to forthwith communicate with X Corp seeking restoration of all blocked URLs, and called for a detailed counter affidavit by 08 June 2026. The matter arises at the intersection of State power over digital platforms and the constitutional protection of political speech under Article 19(1)(a).
The Dispute Before the Court
The petitioner, P. Chockalingam, President of Vishwa Hindu Parishad, North Tamil Nadu, describes himself as a social activist engaged in matters of temple administration, cultural heritage and public affairs. He maintains an active presence on social media and regularly participates in public discourse on governance and political developments.
He came across the impugned notice dated 08.05.2026 issued by the Cyber Crime Wing, Tamil Nadu, purportedly under Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 read with Rule 3(1)(d) of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021. The notice directed removal and blocking of multiple Twitter/X URLs. One of the affected posts, on a plain reading, appeared to contain political criticism and commentary on contemporary developments within the State.
The petitioner filed WP.No.19439 of 2026 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a writ of certiorarified mandamus to quash the notice as unconstitutional, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(a). He also sought a consequential direction restraining the respondents from issuing blanket or omnibus blocking directions against lawful political criticism, democratic discussion, satire, dissent or strong opinion against governmental actions on social media. Two miscellaneous petitions sought interim protection and restoration of the blocked URLs pending disposal of the writ petition.
The petitioner had submitted a representation on 11.05.2026 raising these constitutional concerns, but it had not been considered before the matter came before the court.
The Legal Issues Raised
Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Sunny Sheen for Mr. C. Gunasekaran, pressed several distinct constitutional and statutory objections.
The notice grouped multiple URLs belonging to different users under one common direction without separately examining the content, context and constitutional status of each post.
The affected account holders were neither informed of the allegations against them nor given any opportunity to respond before the blocking directions were issued.
The notice used broad and generalised expressions like “provocative political remarks”, “disturbing public tranquillity” and “politically sensitive remarks”, without disclosing how any individual post crossed the constitutional threshold of incitement to violence or public disorder under Article 19(2).
The direction required compliance within three hours, which counsel argued was wholly disproportionate in the absence of any disclosed emergency, imminent threat of violence or extraordinary circumstance affecting public order.
On the statutory side, counsel submitted that Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act does not confer an independent substantive power of censorship or blocking. It concerns intermediary liability and the withdrawal of safe harbour protection in limited circumstances. Where the State seeks to block public access to information, the framework under Section 69A of the IT Act and the procedure prescribed thereunder must be followed. The impugned notice, issued without compliance with Section 69A, was argued to be ex facie arbitrary.
Counsel placed reliance on the Supreme Court's judgment in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, which drew a constitutional distinction between discussion, advocacy and incitement, holding that only incitement crosses the boundary of permissible State interference.
How the Bench Reasoned
Justice L. Victoria Gowri, writing the order for the bench, framed the central question at the outset: whether political criticism, democratic dissent, satire and public opinion expressed on social media can be interdicted by omnibus executive directions, without individualised reasons, without disclosure of a proximate threat, without statutory safeguards and without compliance with the constitutional discipline of Articles 14 and 19(1)(a).
The bench observed that the right to criticise the government, its functionaries and public policies is not a concession granted by the State is a constitutional guarantee. The digital public square, though new in form, is not outside the protection of the Constitution.
On a careful reading of the impugned notice, the court found prima facie that multiple URLs belonging to different users had been clubbed under a common direction. The notice did not contain individualised reasons with reference to each URL, did not disclose the precise words or context rendering each post unlawful, and did not indicate how each post satisfied the threshold of incitement to violence or public disorder under Article 19(2).
The bench stated plainly: “When the State restricts speech, it must speak through reasons.” A citizen's liberty cannot be curtailed by a cryptic command, and a political opinion cannot be removed merely because it is sharp, inconvenient, satirical or unpalatable.
On the statutory framework, the court held that Section 79(3)(b) is not an independent reservoir of blocking power and cannot be converted into a general censorship mechanism. Where the State seeks to block public access to information through a computer resource, Section 69A of the IT Act and the procedure prescribed thereunder assume constitutional significance. The requirement of recorded reasons under Section 69A is not a decorative formality as it demonstrates application of mind, permits judicial review and assures the citizen that power has not been exercised arbitrarily.
The bench drew on Shreya Singhal at length. It reiterated that discussion and advocacy, even of unpopular causes, remain protected under Article 19(1)(a), and that State interference is constitutionally permissible only when speech reaches the level of incitement. The court also noted the Supreme Court's caution in that judgment against vague and open-ended restrictions that create a chilling effect in terms of compelling citizens to self-censor not because the law prohibits speech, but because the consequences of speaking are uncertain, sudden and opaque.
The three-hour compliance window drew specific attention. The bench held that such a short timeline, in the absence of a disclosed emergency or imminent threat, prima facie appears disproportionate. Where the State invokes urgency, the urgency must be apparent from the record or from the reasons; otherwise urgency becomes a cloak for bypassing procedural fairness.
The court also addressed the public dimension of the case. Blocking a URL may silence a speaker, erase a viewpoint and impoverish public debate. The power to block or remove online content must therefore be exercised with precision, restraint and reasons. The bench observed that the more precious the right, the heavier the burden on the State to justify its restriction.
On the balance of convenience, the bench found it tilted in favour of preserving the constitutional status quo. If the notice were allowed to operate without scrutiny, lawful speech might remain suppressed and the injury to democratic discourse would be immediate and continuing. The respondents retained the liberty to place specific materials before the court and seek appropriate orders if any particular post truly fell within the prohibited zone of Article 19(2).
Directions on the Counter Affidavit
The Additional Public Prosecutor, appearing for respondents 2 to 4, accepted notice and sought time to file a counter affidavit. At the hearing, no counter affidavit had been filed explaining the specific nature of the alleged offending contents, the individual reasons for blocking each URL, or the statutory basis for the three-hour deadline.
The bench directed the Additional Public Prosecutor to file a detailed counter affidavit specifically addressing six points: the statutory source of power invoked for the notice; the individual reasons for directing removal or blocking of each URL; the manner in which each URL allegedly falls within the permissible restrictions under Article 19(2); whether the procedure under Section 69A of the IT Act and the Rules framed thereunder was followed; the material basis for the three-hour compliance window; and whether any opportunity of hearing or post-decisional review was afforded to the affected users and content creators.
Order
The Division Bench granted an interim stay of the impugned notice dated 08.05.2026 bearing C.No.393-16/SP/CCD-I/CB/2026, pending further orders.
The fourth respondent, the Superintendent of Police, Cyber Crime Wing, was directed to forthwith issue a communication to X Corp, Safety – Legal Policy, 865 FM 1209, Bldg. 2, Bastrop, TX 78602, seeking to unblock and restore all URLs mentioned in the impugned notice, pending disposal of the writ petition.
The court made clear that the interim order does not preclude the respondents from taking action in accordance with law against any specific content that independently satisfies the threshold under Article 19(2) and where the procedure under the IT Act and relevant Rules is duly followed with recorded reasons and application of mind.
The matter is listed on 08 June 2026 for filing of the counter affidavit.