Trial Court Cannot Convict Without Hearing Defence Arguments, Madras HC Sets Aside Life Sentence

A Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that oral arguments by the defence are a facet of fair trial under Article 21, and a trial court must appoint an amicus if counsel fails to argue rather than proceed to judgment.

A Division Bench of the Madras High Court, comprising Justice G.R. Swaminathan and Justice V. Lakshminarayanan, on 29 May 2026 set aside a judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Salem, in S.C.No.72 of 2017. The trial court had convicted a father and son — Chinnavan @ Govindaraj (A1) and Thangabalu (A2) — of murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced each to life imprisonment, without hearing the oral arguments of the defence. The Division Bench held that the right to advance oral arguments is not merely a statutory entitlement under Sections 234 and 235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure but a fundamental right flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution. Because that right was denied, the conviction could not stand. The matter has been remanded to the trial court for fresh hearing of arguments.

How the Procedural Lapse Came to Light

The two appellants are father and son. While they were incarcerated in Salem Central Prison pursuant to the conviction, the daughter of the first appellant was to be married. They filed Crl.M.P.No.6476 of 2024 seeking interim suspension of sentence so they could attend the wedding. While granting limited relief in that petition on 20 May 2026, the bench noticed that the impugned judgment had been passed without the defence side being heard.

The bench immediately informed the Government Counsel that it would take up the main appeal itself for disposal on 29 May 2026, making clear it would not enter the merits but would confine itself to whether the judgment was vitiated by the absence of defence arguments.

The trial court's own judgment explained what had happened. Paragraphs 10 and 11 of that judgment recorded that the defence side had repeatedly failed to come forward to argue, that there had been a High Court direction to dispose of the case within four months on a day-to-day basis, and that from 24 February 2022 onwards there was no representation on the defence side at all. The trial Judge, describing the situation as one where “sufficient opportunity was given to the defence side for argument,” proceeded to pronounce judgment on the basis of available records after hearing only the prosecution.

Conviction and Sentence Under Challenge

The trial court's judgment dated 2 March 2022 convicted both accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC for murder and sentenced each to life imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 25,000, with six months' additional rigorous imprisonment in default. A1 was separately convicted under Section 326 IPC and sentenced to seven years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 5,000, and under Section 324 IPC with a fine of Rs. 5,000. Both accused were convicted under Section 294(b) IPC on two counts each, with fines of Rs. 2,000 per accused. A2 was additionally convicted under Section 323 IPC with a fine of Rs. 1,000. The total fine imposed on A1 was Rs. 37,000 and on A2 was Rs. 28,000.

The Legal Question: Can a Trial Court Proceed Without Defence Arguments?

The bench framed the central question as whether the court below could have pronounced judgment without the oral arguments of the defence side.

Section 234 of the CrPC (corresponding to Section 257 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) provides that after examination of defence witnesses is complete, the prosecutor shall sum up the case and the accused or his pleader “shall be entitled to reply.” Section 235(1) CrPC (corresponding to Section 258 BNSS) states that “after hearing arguments and points of law (if any), the Judge shall give a judgment in the case.”

The bench read these provisions together. The language of Section 235 requires arguments to precede the pronouncement of judgment. The words “if any” appearing in parenthesis in Section 235(1) were held to qualify only “points of law,” not “arguments.” The bench relied on the Delhi High Court's analysis in Dr. Narayan Waman Nerukar v. State, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 3613, which explained that parenthetical expressions create exceptions to the words they interrupt, and concluded that arguments are mandatory while points of law are contingent.

Section 314(3) CrPC bars adjournments for the purpose of filing written arguments unless the court records reasons in writing. Section 314(4) allows the court to regulate oral arguments that are not concise or relevant. The bench drew significance from the contrast: the bar on adjournments applies only to written arguments, not oral ones. That asymmetry, the bench reasoned, shows the legislature prioritised oral advocacy. Nowhere does the legislature grant the trial court power to dispense with oral arguments altogether.

Why the Right Cannot Be Waived or Bypassed

The bench addressed whether an accused can be taken to have waived the right to argue by failing to exercise it. It held that the right to a fair trial, recognised as a fundamental right under Article 21, cannot be waived. Relying on Lombardi Engineering v. Uttarakhand Jal Vidyut Nigam Ltd., (2024) 4 SCC 341, and Basheshar Nath v. CIT, (1959) 35 ITR 190, the bench noted that what applies to Article 14 applies equally to Article 21. The corollary drawn was that even if an accused wanted to waive the right, he cannot be permitted to do so. If he fails to exercise it, the right must be exercised on his behalf through appropriate arrangements.

The bench drew an analogy from the appellate stage. In K. Muruganadam v. State, (2021) 20 SCC 642, the Supreme Court held that when counsel for the accused does not appear before the appellate court, the appeal cannot be dismissed for default; the court must appoint an amicus curiae. The bench held that the same obligation applies to trial courts with even greater force, given the primacy of oral advocacy in the adversarial system at the trial stage.

The bench also addressed the practical reality of appellate proceedings. Arguments before the trial court, it observed, can be compared to a five-day test match, while arguments before the appellate court are comparable to an IPL game. The canvas is spread wide only at the trial stage. An accused who is denied the opportunity to argue before the trial court approaches the High Court at a considerable disadvantage, and it is no consolation that the appellate court can hear him.

Dissent from the Allahabad High Court View

The bench expressly dissented from a view taken by a third Judge of the Allahabad High Court (Justice Vikram Nath, as he then was) in a matter that had produced a split verdict. That judge had held that the right under Section 314 CrPC is for availing the opportunity provided and not to misuse it; that the question of appointing legal aid counsel arises only when the accused lacks means; and that any prejudice caused by the absence of defence arguments at trial can be set right by granting an opportunity at the appellate stage.

The Madras bench disagreed on three grounds. Sections 234 and 235 CrPC had not been brought to the notice of the Allahabad judge. Article 21 had not been invoked before him. And the proposition that an appellate hearing can cure the denial of oral arguments at trial was inconsistent with the mandatory language of Section 235(1) and with the structural importance of the trial stage in the adversarial system.

The bench also declined to follow the Government Counsel's reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in K.S. Panduranga v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 3 SCC 721. In that case, the appellate court had disposed of an appeal without hearing the accused's counsel. The present case concerned the trial court proceeding to judgment without hearing the defence. The bench held the factual matrix was different and the decision inapplicable.

Obligation on Defence Counsel

The bench used the occasion to address the conduct of defence counsel. It noted that if a counsel's authority has not been withdrawn by the accused, the counsel is obliged to proceed with the matter and not decline to argue. Deliberate avoidance, the bench observed, may amount to professional misconduct.

On the question of costs for any amicus appointed at the remand stage, the bench noted that the accused did not appear to lack means — they had engaged counsel both before the trial court and before the High Court. Any fee payable to an amicus, if one is appointed, shall be recovered from the accused as if it were an arrear of fine.

Order

The Division Bench allowed Crl.Appeal No.1185 of 2022 and set aside the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 2 March 2022 passed by the III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Salem, in S.C.No.72 of 2017. The matter is remitted to the trial court. The trial Judge is directed to call upon both sides to advance their arguments. If the accused do not cooperate, an amicus shall be appointed to argue the case, following which the trial court will pronounce judgment afresh. The bench made clear it had not gone into the merits. Since the conviction has been set aside, the appellants will continue on bail. The connected miscellaneous petition was closed.