Complaints to Army Superiors and Removal of Thali Constitute Mental Cruelty, Rules Madurai Bench

The Madurai Bench upheld a divorce decree, holding that a wife's complaints to her Army husband's superiors and her admitted removal of the thali amounted to mental cruelty under the Hindu Marriage Act.

Justice P. Vadamalai, sitting singly at the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court, dismissed a wife's Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeal on 1 June 2026, confirming a divorce decree that two courts below had already granted in favour of her husband. The appeal arose from a marriage solemnised on 30 August 1977 under Hindu rites. The husband, a retired Army man, had sought divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) and (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act on grounds of cruelty and desertion. The wife challenged concurrent findings of the Principal Subordinate Court, Tenkasi and the Additional District and Sessions Judge/Fast Track Court, Tenkasi. The High Court found no reason to interfere, holding that the wife's own admissions in evidence — about lodging complaints with Army superiors and removing her thali — established mental cruelty.

The Dispute Before the High Court

The husband filed H.M.O.P.No.157 of 2014 before the Principal Subordinate Court, Tenkasi, seeking divorce on grounds of cruelty, desertion, and conversion of religion. He alleged that from early in the marriage the wife repeatedly accused him of illegal contacts with women and wrote a letter to his Army superiors on 19 September 1989 making abusive allegations. He further alleged that the wife, through their son, lodged a police complaint registered as Crime No.333 of 1997 at Alangulam Police Station, which led to his conviction in C.C.No.388 of 1998 before the Principal Assistant Sessions Court, Tenkasi, for seven years — later reduced on appeal. He also alleged that the wife converted to Christianity and removed her thali.

The wife denied conversion. She countered that the husband had developed an illegal relationship with a woman named Muthukutti before marriage, and later with Maragatham after retirement. She alleged that on 2 December 1996 the husband confined her and their children inside the house and set it on fire, and that he later cut her right thumb with a weapon, prompting their son to lodge the complaint in Crime No.333 of 1997. She stated that the husband was now living with another woman, Poornam Ammal, at KTC Nagar. She argued that the criminal cases arose from the husband's own conduct, not from any false complaint, and that the divorce petition was filed with the sole intention of depriving her of his retirement benefits.

The Trial Court allowed the petition and granted divorce on 4 December 2017. The wife appealed in C.M.A.No.53 of 2018. The Additional District and Sessions Judge/Fast Track Court, Tenkasi dismissed that appeal on 4 September 2019, confirming the divorce. The wife then preferred this second appeal, which was admitted on two substantial questions of law.

Substantial Questions of Law

The High Court admitted the second appeal on two questions: first, whether the courts below were correct in finding the wife guilty of cruelty and whether that finding was justified; and second, whether the courts below were correct in granting divorce without testing the grant of relief under Section 23(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act.

The wife's counsel argued that the 1989 letter to Army superiors was a stale incident, that the husband had condoned it by living jointly with the wife after his retirement in 1991, and that Section 23(1)(b) of the Hindu Marriage Act bars reliance on condoned incidents. Counsel relied on the Supreme Court's judgment in Suman Singh v. Sanjay Singh, (2017) 4 SCC 85, which held that isolated incidents of cruelty that occurred long before the petition and were condoned by subsequent cohabitation cannot sustain a divorce decree.

On the conversion ground, the wife's counsel argued that conversion to Christianity requires specific ceremonies and baptism, and that the husband had produced only Ex.P.1 — a birth certificate of a grandson through the couple's daughter — which could not prove the wife's conversion.

On irretrievable breakdown, the wife's counsel argued, relying on Vishnu Dutt Sharma v. Manju Sharma, (2009) 6 SCC 379, and Anil Kumar Jain v. Maya Jain, (2009) 10 SCC 415, that neither the trial courts nor the High Courts possess the power to grant divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. That power, counsel submitted, vests exclusively in the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution.

How the Bench Reasoned

Justice Vadamalai began with the wife's own evidence. The wife, examined as R.W.1, admitted in cross-examination that she had sent complaints to the Army's higher officials regarding the husband's alleged illegal contacts with women. The court treated this admission as conclusive, observing that admissions are the best evidence and do not require documentary corroboration.

The court then applied the Supreme Court's three-judge bench ruling in Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar, 2021 (1) MWN (Civil) 589. That judgment held that when a spouse makes defamatory complaints to the other spouse's superiors in the Army, causing adverse consequences to career and reputation, it constitutes mental cruelty. The court noted that the explanation that complaints were made to protect the matrimonial tie does not justify persistent efforts to undermine the dignity and reputation of the other spouse.

On the condonation argument, the court examined the husband's own cross-examination evidence. The husband stated that after retirement in 1991 he lived at Sivalarkulam with the wife, but that quarrels over the same allegation of illegal contacts continued there, eventually leading to the criminal cases. The court held that because the wife continued to raise the same allegations even during the period of alleged joint living, the earlier conduct was not condoned. The argument based on Section 23(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act therefore did not assist the wife.

On the thali, the wife admitted in her evidence that she had removed it and did not wear gold ornaments. The court relied on the Division Bench ruling in C. Sivakumar v. A. Srividhya, 2022 (3) MWN (Civil) 572, which in turn cited the coordinate bench decision in Vallabhi v. R. Rajasabahi, 2017 (1) MWN (Civil) 128 (DB). That ruling held that “no Hindu married woman would remove the Thali at any point of time during the lifetime of her husband” and that removal of the thali reflects mental cruelty of the highest order. Justice Vadamalai adopted that reasoning and held that the wife's admitted removal of the thali constituted mental cruelty.

On conversion, the court noted that while there was no direct documentary proof, Ex.P.1 and Ex.P.2 revealed that the wife's daughter had a Christian name and had married a Christian. The court held that the allegation of conversion could not be entirely discarded when the totality of evidence was considered.

On the irretrievable breakdown argument, the court accepted that the wife's counsel was “somewhat correct” that courts below and the High Court cannot grant divorce solely on that ground. However, the court held that the fact of long separation is relevant when considering cruelty as a ground. It relied on its own earlier judgment in C.M.A(MD)Nos.21 & 22 of 2023, dated 28 October 2024, which held that living separately for a long period and refusing to sever a strained relationship itself leads to mental cruelty. The wife had admitted in evidence that she had been living separately from her husband since 1996 — a period of more than 30 years by the time of the second appeal. She had not filed any petition for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, and this was not specifically denied by her side.

The court also cited the Supreme Court's ruling in Rakesh Raman v. Kavita, AIR 2023 SC 2144, which held that “long separation and absence of cohabitation and the complete breakdown of all meaningful bonds” can be read as cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act. On that basis, the court held that the courts below had correctly found the ground of cruelty established.

Outcome

Both substantial questions of law were decided against the wife. The court held that the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court did not warrant interference in second appeal. The Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeal was dismissed. The judgment and decree dated 4 September 2019 in C.M.A.No.53 of 2018, confirming the divorce decree dated 4 December 2017 in H.M.O.P.No.157 of 2014, were confirmed. No costs were awarded.