DNA Test Cannot Resolve Bigamy Charge When Paternity Is Not in Issue, Holds Madurai Bench
The Madurai Bench set aside a trial court order directing DNA testing in a Section 495 IPC case, holding that paternity is neither an ingredient of bigamy offences nor a fact directly in issue.
The Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court has set aside a direction issued by the Additional Mahila Court, Thanjavur, requiring the accused, the complainant, and their minor child to undergo DNA testing in a criminal case involving allegations of bigamy and cheating. Justice Mohammed Shaffiq, sitting singly, held on 24 July 2026 that the result of a DNA paternity test has no bearing on the essential ingredients of offences under Sections 494 and 495 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The court reasoned that ordering DNA profiling where paternity is at best a collateral matter rests on a fundamental misapprehension of both the statutory framework and the constitutional safeguards available to an accused.
The Dispute Before the High Court
The accused and the complainant, Ms. Ramya, married on 24 January 2011 in Madurai. A male child, Vikrama Pandiyan, was born on 18 June 2012. The complainant later discovered that the accused had a subsisting first marriage and had concealed this fact from her. She also alleged that he had dishonestly obtained money and property from her. Based on a private complaint and directions from a Judicial Magistrate, an FIR was registered in Crime No. 11 of 2018 for offences under Sections 495, 420 read with 418, and 468 of the IPC. After investigation, a final report was filed and the matter proceeded to trial as C.C. No. 14 of 2021 before the Additional Mahila Court, Thanjavur.
During cross-examination of the complainant at trial, the accused suggested that he was not the biological father of the minor child and raised the claim that the complainant had earlier married one Sivaganesh. The prosecution responded by filing C.M.P. No. 462 of 2025, seeking a direction to conduct DNA testing of the accused, the complainant, and the child. The Trial Judge allowed the petition, finding that DNA testing would conclusively determine the issue of paternity. The accused challenged that order in Crl.RC(MD) No. 17 of 2026 before the Madurai Bench.
The Grounds of Challenge
Before the High Court, the accused pressed several grounds. He argued that paternity is neither an ingredient of the offences under Sections 494 and 495 of the IPC nor a fact in issue necessary to adjudicate the charges—it is merely a collateral matter. The Trial Judge, according to him, had mechanically allowed the application purely on the basis of suggestions put to the complainant during cross-examination, without recording any satisfaction that there was a strong prima facie case or an eminent necessity for such testing.
He further contended that compelling him to provide a DNA sample invades bodily integrity, privacy, and personal autonomy guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and infringes the protection against self-incrimination under Article 20(3). He also pointed to the statutory presumption under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (corresponding to Section 116 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023), which raises a strong presumption of legitimacy for a child born during a subsisting marriage, and argued the Trial Court had not examined whether the conditions for rebutting that presumption had been met before ordering the test. Finally, he submitted that the application was filed at a belated stage after the trial had substantially progressed, amounting to an attempt to fill lacunae in the prosecution case.
The respondent, represented by the Additional Public Prosecutor, maintained that the impugned order did not warrant interference because the DNA test had become necessary in view of the issues arising during cross-examination.
Essential Ingredients of Sections 494 and 495 IPC
Justice Mohammed Shaffiq began his analysis by setting out the statutory ingredients of the offences charged. Section 494 of the IPC punishes a person who, having a husband or wife living, marries again during the subsistence of the first marriage. For a conviction under Section 494, it must be proved that the complainant was validly married to the accused, that the accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of the first, and that both marriages were valid according to the law governing the parties.
Section 495 IPC is an aggravated form of Section 494. It applies where the accused additionally concealed the fact of the former marriage from the person with whom the subsequent marriage was contracted. All elements of Section 494 must be proved, along with the concealment. The court noted that nowhere within the statutory ingredients of either provision does biological paternity of a child feature. Whether the accused is the biological father of the child born of the second marriage is simply irrelevant to proving bigamy or the concealment that aggravates it.
The Law on DNA Testing in Criminal Proceedings
The court then surveyed the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on when DNA testing may be directed. From Aparna Ajinkya Firodia v. Ajinkya Arun Firodia, (2024) 7 SCC 773, Justice Shaffiq extracted principles that a DNA test is not to be ordered routinely in matrimonial disputes; it may be directed only where there is no other mode of proving the assertion, where there is sufficient prima facie material to dislodge the statutory presumption of legitimacy, and only in exceptional and deserving cases where such a test is indispensable to resolve the controversy. Where paternity is merely collateral, a court is not justified in mechanically ordering DNA profiling.
From Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 175, the court noted the Supreme Court's reiteration that an “eminent need” must exist before a DNA test is directed, requiring a balancing of the interests of all parties, including privacy and the risk of social stigma flowing from a declaration of illegitimacy.
In Chaturbhuj Pradhan v. Amar Pradhan & Anr., 2026 INSC 600, the Supreme Court had stated that the only test to be satisfied is whether the DNA test result is directly in issue and whether any other evidence on record can substitute for what scientific testing would reveal. The court also drew on R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2372, where the Supreme Court had held that “a direction for DNA testing must have a direct and demonstrable nexus with the offences under investigation” and that compelling DNA profiling without such nexus amounts to an unwarranted intrusion into bodily autonomy and privacy contrary to Articles 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution.
Madras High Court Precedents on Bigamy and DNA
Justice Shaffiq also relied on two prior decisions of the Madras High Court squarely on point. In K. Neelaveni v. S.K. Sivakumar, Crl.R.C. No. 1117 of 2008, CDJ 2008 MHC 3971, the court had held that to maintain a charge under Section 494 IPC, evidence must establish that the essential ceremonies of a valid second marriage were performed, and that a valid marriage cannot be presumed merely from the fact that a child was born of a relationship. DNA testing was therefore not the correct route to prove bigamy.
In Vijayavelu v. V. Sujatha, Crl.R.C. No. 1345 of 2017, the court had followed K. Neelaveni and held that the offence of bigamy must be proved by independent evidence and not by establishing the birth of a child from the alleged bigamous relationship. The DNA petition in that case had been allowed merely on the ground that the report would be “additional evidence”—a reason the court found wholly inadequate and contrary to law.
How the Bench Reasoned
Applying these principles, Justice Mohammed Shaffiq held that there was no doubt that the result of a DNA test on paternity would have no bearing in determining whether the offences under Sections 494 and 495 of the IPC were committed. The core question in the trial is whether the accused had a subsisting first marriage and concealed it from the complainant when he married her—neither of which turns on biological paternity of the child born of that second marriage.
The court found that the Trial Judge had proceeded from a fundamental misapprehension of the statutory framework. The suggestion put by the accused during cross-examination—that he was not the biological father—may have prompted the prosecution to seek DNA testing, but that suggestion, taken alone, cannot constitute the eminent need that the law requires. The paternity issue raised during cross-examination was collateral, not directly in issue, and the Trial Court's order did not record any satisfaction that the stringent conditions for directing DNA profiling had been met.
Importantly, the court observed that even where DNA profiling is one possible mode of establishing an essential element in a case, it must be directed only after exhausting other modes of proof as a last resort. Where the issue relates to bigamy and paternity is not even remotely an element of that offence, a direction for DNA testing to determine paternity suffers from misdirection in law. Such an order also fails to balance the constitutional rights of the accused against the prosecution's interest, and risks converting a criminal trial into a fishing inquiry.
Order
Justice Mohammed Shaffiq set aside the order of the Additional Mahila Court, Thanjavur dated 27 June 2025 in C.M.P. No. 462 of 2025 in C.C. No. 14 of 2021. The Criminal Revision Petition in Crl.RC(MD) No. 17 of 2026 was disposed of with no order as to costs. The connected miscellaneous petition, Crl.MP(MD) No. 239 of 2026, was closed. The judgment was pronounced on 24 July 2026.