Madurai Bench Upholds POCSO Conviction on DNA Evidence, Cuts Life Term to 20 Years

The Madurai Bench modified a life sentence to 20 years' rigorous imprisonment in a POCSO case where the victim and her parents turned hostile, relying on DNA evidence and a Section 164 statement.

The Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court has partly allowed a criminal appeal against a POCSO conviction, upholding the finding of penetrative sexual assault on a 13-year-old girl but modifying the sentence from life imprisonment to rigorous imprisonment for a term not less than 20 years. The Division Bench of Justice N. Anand Venkatesh and Justice K.K. Ramakrishnan, pronouncing judgment on 5 June 2026, held that a DNA report conclusively establishing paternity, combined with the victim's Section 164 statement, was sufficient to sustain the conviction even though the victim, her mother, and her father all turned hostile at trial. The bench also altered the specific POCSO provision under which the appellant was convicted and set aside a concurrent conviction under Section 506 of the IPC.

The Conviction Before the Fast Track Mahila Court

The appellant, Murugan, was tried before the Fast Track Mahila Court, Theni, in Special S.C.No.27 of 2020. The prosecution's case was that on 18 January 2020, the appellant, then aged about 40 years, called the victim girl, aged about 13 years, to the house of one Balaji and committed penetrative sexual assault on her. He allegedly threatened her not to disclose the incident. The prosecution further alleged that the appellant repeated the offence and again threatened the victim on 16 February 2020.

The victim's mother, PW1, lodged a complaint that was registered as Crime No.125 of 2020 for offences under Section 5(l) read with Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) and Section 506(1) of the IPC. The investigating officer, PW14, visited the scene on 29 March 2020, recorded statements, prepared an observation mahazar and rough sketch, and arrested the appellant the same day at about 15.30 hours. The victim's date of birth was confirmed as 29 May 2006 from school records obtained from the Government High School.

Medical examination by PW12 found the victim to be five weeks pregnant at the time of examination. Her statement was recorded before a Judicial Magistrate under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and marked as Exhibit P1. The trial court framed charges under Section 5(l) read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act, Section 506(2), and Section 506(1) of the IPC. The accused denied all charges.

The trial court examined 14 prosecution witnesses and marked 24 exhibits. After the accused declined to examine any defence witness or produce documents, the Fast Track Mahila Court convicted him under Section 5(l) read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act and sentenced him to life imprisonment with a fine of Rs.1,000, and to one month's simple imprisonment under Section 506 of the IPC, with sentences to run concurrently. Aggrieved, the appellant filed Crl. A(MD)No.1034 of 2023 before the Madurai Bench.

The DNA Evidence and Its Unusual Procedural History

A central feature of this case was that the DNA evidence came into existence only after the final police report had already been filed. The victim gave birth to a child on 24 October 2020. The Child Welfare Committee then wrote to the investigating officer on 17 December 2020 to initiate DNA testing. The investigating officer applied to the trial court on 5 January 2021 for an FTA card, which the court allowed the following day. The trial court wrote to the Deputy Director, Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL), Madurai, for the FTA card.

On 20 January 2021, the investigating officer applied for collection of blood samples from the accused, the victim, and the child. The trial court directed the Medical Officer, Government Medical College Hospital, Theni, to collect the samples. Blood samples were collected on 10 February 2021 and sent to the trial court with a covering letter. Within six days, the trial court forwarded the samples to the Assistant Director, FSL, Madurai. The DNA report was prepared on 11 August 2021 and submitted to the trial court on 4 September 2021. The report, marked as Exhibits P9, P10, P18, P19, P20, P21, and P24, established that the appellant was the father of the child born to the victim.

Appellant's Challenges: Chain of Custody, Section 207, and Expert Examination

Before the High Court, counsel for the appellant, Mr. Mayilvahana Rajendran, raised three principal objections to the DNA evidence. First, he argued that neither the victim nor her parents had supported the prosecution, and the conviction rested entirely on the DNA report. Second, he contended that there was no proper chain of custody and that the samples may not have been correctly taken. Third, he submitted that the DNA-related documents were marked through the investigating officer rather than through the expert who prepared the report, and that these documents surfaced only after the final report was filed and were never furnished to the accused as required under Section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

In support, the appellant's counsel relied on the Supreme Court's judgment in Karandeep Sharma @ Razia @ Raju v. State of Uttarakhand, Criminal Appeal Nos.630 to 631 of 2018, decided on 4 March 2025, where the apex court had excluded a DNA report on account of procedural lacunae in sample collection and a hasty trial that denied the accused adequate opportunity to cross-examine witnesses.

The State, represented by Mr. D. Venkatesh, countered that the investigating officer had explained the sample collection process in examination-in-chief and was never confronted with any questions on this point during cross-examination. On the Section 207 objection, the State pointed out that the DNA documents could not have been furnished before the final report because the child was born after that report was filed. The State also argued that the accused had in fact received the documents, as was evident from the cross-examination he conducted of PW13, the Deputy Director of FSL, Madurai, who was specifically examined to speak to the DNA report.

How the Bench Reasoned

The bench addressed each objection in turn. On the hostile witnesses, it noted that PW3, the victim girl, admitted that the signature on the Section 164 statement was hers and did not claim the statement was recorded under threat or coercion. She went so far as to deny the birth of the child. The bench held that since PW3 did not deny giving the statement before the Magistrate, Exhibit P1 could be used for corroboration under the applicable evidentiary principles.

On chain of custody, the bench found the sequence of events to be transparent and unimpeached. Blood samples were collected by the Medical Officer of Government Medical College Hospital, Theni, on 10 February 2021, reached the FSL within six days, and the DNA report was prepared on 11 August 2021. The bench observed that the appellant had not raised a single question to the investigating officer during cross-examination about the collection of samples, and that it was “too late in the day for the appellant to raise any doubts” at the appellate stage.

On the Section 207 objection, the bench held that none of the DNA documents existed at the time the police report was filed, because the child was born only after that filing. The fact that the accused had cross-examined PW13, the Deputy Director of FSL, on the basis of those very documents demonstrated that the copies had been furnished to him.

On the objection that the documents were marked through the investigating officer rather than the expert, the bench noted that PW13 was separately examined and explained the DNA report, and that the accused had a full opportunity to cross-examine him and availed of it. Having done so, the accused could not subsequently challenge the marking of the documents.

The bench then distinguished the Karandeep Sharma judgment relied upon by the appellant. In that case, the Supreme Court had found that hair samples recovered from a deceased child's body were not sealed before being sent to the FSL, the procedure was “full of lacunae and loopholes,” and the entire trial was conducted hastily without adequate opportunity for cross-examination. None of those features were present here. In the present case, blood samples were taken from three persons — the accused, the victim, and the child — the collection was never challenged, the samples moved promptly through the court to the FSL, and the expert was examined and cross-examined at trial.

Alteration of the POCSO Provision

Having upheld the conviction in substance, the bench turned to the specific charge. The trial court had convicted the appellant under Section 5(l) read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act. Section 5(l) applies where penetrative sexual assault is committed on a child more than once or repeatedly. Since PW3 had turned hostile and did not support the prosecution's case of repeated assaults, the bench found it was not established that the penetrative sexual assault occurred more than once. It therefore altered the conviction to Section 5(j)(ii) of the POCSO Act, noting that the consequence under Section 6 of the Act remained the same and that no prejudice would be caused to the accused by this alteration.

On the Section 506 IPC conviction for criminal intimidation, the bench set it aside entirely. Since PW3 had turned hostile, the charge of threatening the victim could not be sustained.

Sentence Modification

The bench modified the sentence of life imprisonment. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the case and the fact that the victim and her parents had chosen to remain hostile, it substituted rigorous imprisonment for a term not less than 20 years, as provided under Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

Outcome

The Division Bench partly allowed Crl. A(MD)No.1034 of 2023. The judgment of the Fast Track Mahila Court, Theni, in Special S.C.No.27 of 2020 dated 31 July 2023 was modified. The appellant stands convicted under Section 5(j)(ii) of the POCSO Act and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for a term not less than 20 years. The conviction under Section 506 of the IPC is set aside.