Advocate Cannot Use Article 226 as Debt Recovery Tool Against PNB, Madras HC Division Bench Rules

A Division Bench led by Chief Justice Dharmadhikari holds that disputed professional fee claims against a public-sector bank must go before a civil court, not a writ court.

The Madras High Court has dismissed a writ appeal filed by a former empanelled advocate of Punjab National Bank who sought a direction for payment of outstanding professional fees claimed at Rs.10,00,628/-. A Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari and Justice G. Arul Murugan, deciding W.A.No.1750 of 2024 on 14 July 2026, affirmed the Single Judge's view that Article 226 of the Constitution is not the appropriate vehicle for recovering disputed contractual dues, even when the debtor is an instrumentality of the State. The bench directed the appellant to pursue his claims before a competent civil court and expressly protected him against limitation by excluding the time spent in the writ proceedings.

The Dispute Before the Court

The appellant, Sunit Kumar Agarwal, an advocate, was formerly empanelled with Punjab National Bank and rendered legal services to its various branches and offices in Tamil Nadu. He approached the writ court — filing W.P.No.1379 of 2024 — seeking a direction compelling the bank and its officials to clear unpaid bills toward professional fees and expenses. The amount was initially quantified at Rs.6,80,412/- but was enhanced to Rs.10,00,628/- in the appellate proceedings on account of newly discovered bills.

The appellant appeared in person throughout both proceedings. He contended that the dues were undisputed, that his services had been rendered to the bank's satisfaction over several years, and that the delay in payment was attributable to administrative malice. Specifically, he alleged that certain bank officials had demanded a 40% commission to release his legitimate dues. He argued that the bank, as an instrumentality of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution, cannot act arbitrarily or in breach of trust.

The respondents — a set of senior PNB officials posted across Chennai, Hyderabad, Vijayawada, and Trichy, both in current and former capacities — were represented by counsel. The bank's position was that certain undisputed bills had already been settled, that other claims were seriously disputed, and that deficiencies in the legal services rendered had necessitated closer scrutiny of the bills. The bank characterised the entire dispute as a private contractual matter outside the scope of writ jurisdiction.

The Single Judge declined to exercise extraordinary writ jurisdiction and dismissed the writ petition. Aggrieved, the appellant filed this Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.

Whether Article 226 Can Enforce a Disputed Fee Claim

The Division Bench identified the core question as whether a writ petition under Article 226 is the appropriate remedy for enforcing a claim for professional fees arising out of an attorney-client relationship, particularly where the facts are seriously disputed.

The bench set out the foundational premise plainly: a writ is an extraordinary public law remedy, designed to correct constitutional overreaches, failures of public duty, and arbitrary abuses of State power. It is not intended to function as an alternate recovery mechanism for commercial or professional contracts.

The court went further and articulated the narrow gateway through which a contractual claim can enter writ jurisdiction. For a court to step into the realm of contract under Article 226, the appellant must demonstrate an absolute, unambiguous admission of liability by the respondent, coupled with shocking arbitrariness that offends the sense of justice under Article 14. Once the respondent raises questions regarding the performance of a service, the matter loses its public law character and moves into the domain of private civil obligations.

Applying that standard, the bench examined the record and found that the bank had explicitly cited deficiencies in the legal services rendered and had not admitted the claims. The appellant had countered with grave criminal allegations of bribery and corruption. The bench observed that this was precisely the kind of factual contest — requiring detailed pleadings, documentary evidence, and cross-examination of witnesses — that a civil court is constituted to resolve. A writ court, operating on affidavits alone, is not equipped for that exercise.

The bench found no legal infirmity in the approach of the Single Judge and declined to interfere.

Liberty to Approach Civil Court and Protection on Limitation

While dismissing the appeal, the bench took care to clarify that the dismissal did not leave the appellant without a remedy. The court observed that the appellant had “knocked on the wrong judicial door” and that the proper course was to approach a competent civil court where both sides could file detailed pleadings, produce documents, cross-examine witnesses, and establish the truth through a regular trial.

The bench granted the appellant liberty to file a civil suit or approach any appropriate forum to establish his claims for professional fees and agitate his grievances. Importantly, if the appellant files a civil suit, the time spent bona fide prosecuting the writ petition in W.P.No.1379 of 2024 and this writ appeal shall be excluded for the purpose of computing limitation.

There was no order as to costs.

Outcome

W.A.No.1750 of 2024 is dismissed. The order dated 18 April 2024 of the Single Judge in W.P.No.1379 of 2024, declining to exercise extraordinary writ jurisdiction over the professional fees dispute, is affirmed. The appellant retains liberty to pursue his claims before a competent civil court or appropriate forum, with the benefit of exclusion of time spent in the writ proceedings for limitation purposes.