Madurai Bench Upholds Life Term in POCSO Case Where Victim's Dying Declaration Drove Conviction
The Madurai Bench confirmed life imprisonment for a man who recorded and circulated a sexual assault, then intimidated the minor victim until she committed self-immolation, relying on her dying declaration recorded by a Judicial Magistrate.
The Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court, in a judgment pronounced on 1 June 2026, dismissed the criminal appeal of M. Vigneshwaran, the sole accused convicted under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) and Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code. The Division Bench of Justice N. Anand Venkatesh and Justice K.K. Ramakrishnan confirmed the sentence of imprisonment for the remainder of the accused's natural life, imposed by the Sessions Judge, Special Court for Exclusive Trial of Cases under the POCSO Act, Srivilliputhur, by judgment dated 27 March 2023. The case turned on the reliability of a dying declaration recorded by a Judicial Magistrate from a 17-year-old victim who had sustained severe burn injuries after committing self-immolation. The Bench also corrected the trial court's erroneous rejection of electronic evidence, though that correction did not alter the outcome of the appeal.
What Happened: Assault, Recording, Intimidation, and Self-Immolation
About fifteen days before 5 February 2021, the appellant began communicating with the victim, then aged about 17 years, through mobile phones. He sent her messages and video images, developed an acquaintance, made promises, and persuaded her to meet him. On several occasions he engaged her in conversation at secluded places.
Eventually, the appellant took the victim to a lonely place on the southern side of Garuman Temple near Sindusaapram, in the vicinity of Sivakasi. There, despite her resistance, he removed her clothes and, under the pretext of marrying her, committed penetrative sexual assault. He then secretly recorded the act without her knowledge or consent and subsequently transmitted the recording through social media and directly to the victim.
After the assault, the appellant refused to marry the victim. He threatened to further circulate the material, subjected her to criminal intimidation, and instigated her to end her life. Unable to bear the continuous harassment, humiliation, and threats, the victim committed self-immolation at her house during the absence of her parents on 5 February 2021. Neighbours noticed the fire and she was immediately admitted to hospital.
Upon her admission at about 2:30 p.m., the attending doctor intimated both the jurisdictional police and the Judicial Magistrate. The Sub-Inspector of Police (P.W.12) reached the hospital at about 3:15 p.m. and began recording her statement. When the Judicial Magistrate arrived at about 3:30 p.m., the Sub-Inspector discontinued his recording. The Magistrate commenced recording the dying declaration at 3:40 p.m. and completed it at 4:05 p.m. The Sub-Inspector then resumed and completed the victim's statement at about 4:15 p.m., which formed the basis for registration of Crime No. 66 of 2021. The victim died at about 7:40 p.m. that evening, after which the offence was altered to graver charges. The accused was arrested on 6 February 2021, and his mobile phone was recovered pursuant to his voluntary confession.
The trial court convicted the accused under Sections 5 and 6 of the POCSO Act and Section 363 IPC, sentencing him to imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, along with three years' rigorous imprisonment under Section 363 IPC. He was acquitted of charges under Sections 66E and 67B of the Information Technology Act, 2000, on the ground that no certificate under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act had been produced for the electronic evidence.
The Appellant's Challenge: Fitness, Tutoring, and Selective Reliance
Senior Counsel for the appellant argued that the prosecution case rested substantially on the dying declaration recorded by the Judicial Magistrate. He contended that the victim had sustained extensive second-degree burn injuries and was therefore not in a fit state of mind to make a voluntary and reliable statement. In the absence of cogent evidence of her conscious and fit mental condition, the dying declaration could not be relied upon.
The Senior Counsel pressed a tutoring argument: the occurrence took place at about 2:00 p.m., the victim died at about 6:00 p.m., and the dying declaration was recorded at 3:45 p.m. In the interval before the Magistrate arrived, the Sub-Inspector had already commenced recording a statement. This sequence, it was argued, created a reasonable possibility of tutoring, rendering both the police statement and the subsequent dying declaration unreliable.
On medical evidence, the defence pointed to the doctor's cross-examination, in which the doctor stated that a person with such burn injuries would generally not be in a position to give a coherent statement. It was also argued that the trial court, having acquitted the accused under the IT Act provisions, could not on the same evidence convict him under the remaining charges, and that reliance on selective portions of the dying declaration was impermissible.
How the Bench Reasoned on the Dying Declaration
The Bench began by setting out the governing legal framework under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, which admits statements made by a person as to the cause of death or the circumstances resulting in death. The underlying maxim is nemo moriturus praesumitur mentiri — a person on the verge of death is not presumed to lie. The Bench drew on a line of Supreme Court decisions including Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 22; Nallapati Sivaiah v. SDO, (2007) 15 SCC 465; Kamal Khudal v. State of Assam, (2022) 20 SCC 654; and Dharmendra Kumar v. State of M.P., (2024) 8 SCC 60, to recapitulate the settled principles.
The Bench identified the key principles as follows: a truthful and voluntary dying declaration can form the sole basis for conviction without corroboration; a dying declaration recorded by a Judicial Magistrate stands on a higher evidentiary footing than one recorded by a police officer; minor inconsistencies do not render a declaration unreliable if the substratum of the prosecution case is clearly reflected; and the decisive test is not the extent of injuries but whether there is reliable evidence that the declarant was mentally fit.
On the facts, the Bench examined the dying declaration marked as Exhibit P19. The Judicial Magistrate (P.W.11) had recorded his satisfaction that the victim was conscious, oriented, and in a fit state of mind before commencing the recording. The attending doctor had also certified the victim's fitness, and that certification was reflected in the dying declaration itself. The Magistrate further certified that the victim remained conscious and oriented throughout the process. The Bench found the contents of the dying declaration coherent, consistent, and natural, with the victim narrating the penetrative sexual assault, the publication of the offending material on social media, the intimidation, and her decision to commit self-immolation.
The Bench rejected the argument that 100% burn injuries precluded a reliable dying declaration. Relying on Mafabhai Nagarbhai Raval v. State of Gujarat, (1992) 4 SCC 69, State of M.P. v. Dal Singh, (2013) 14 SCC 159, and Vijay Pal v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2015) 4 SCC 749, the Bench held that the percentage of burn injuries is not determinative of admissibility or reliability. The decisive question is whether the declarant was mentally fit at the time of making the statement.
On the medical opinion point, the Bench applied the Constitution Bench ruling in Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 6 SCC 710, which held that a doctor's fitness certificate is a rule of caution, not a legal requirement. Where the Magistrate or an eyewitness has affirmed the declarant's fitness, medical opinion cannot override that affirmation. The Bench also cited Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P., 1988 Supp SCC 152, and Dharmendra Kumar to the same effect.
The tutoring argument was addressed directly. P.W.12 had discontinued recording upon the Magistrate's arrival and resumed only after the dying declaration was complete. The Bench found this sequence natural, reasonable, and in accordance with established procedure. The Sub-Inspector's statement (Exhibit P1) also qualified as a dying declaration in law and substantially corroborated the Magistrate's record. There were no material contradictions between the two statements. The Bench found no circumstances on record indicating tutoring or external influence, and no contra-evidence from the defence.
The Bench also addressed the acquittal under the IT Act. The trial court had discarded the electronic evidence — the forensic report on the accused's recovered mobile phone — for want of a Section 65B(4) certificate. The Bench held this was erroneous. Relying on Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, 2020 (5) CTC 200, the Bench held that where the original electronic device itself is produced and forms primary evidence, the requirement of a Section 65B(4) certificate may not arise. The accused's mobile phone (M.O.6) had been recovered pursuant to his disclosure statement under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, in the presence of the Village Administrative Officer, and sent for forensic examination. The forensic report (Exhibit P34) established that the accused had recorded the penetrative sexual assault, transmitted it to multiple persons, sent it to the victim, and criminally intimidated her. The Bench considered this evidence for the limited purpose of corroborating the dying declaration.
Since the State had not filed an appeal against the acquittal under the IT Act, the Bench did not disturb that acquittal but used the electronic evidence as corroboration. The statutory presumption under the POCSO Act came into operation once the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The accused had adduced no evidence in rebuttal, offered no explanation regarding the recovery of the mobile phone, and did not deny possession of the offending material.
Sentence: No Mitigating Factor Found
The trial court had imposed the maximum punishment of imprisonment for the remainder of the accused's natural life under the amended provisions of the POCSO Act. The Bench found the case grave in nature. The accused had committed penetrative sexual assault upon a minor, secretly recorded the act, disseminated the material, subjected the victim to sustained intimidation, and ultimately drove her to commit self-immolation. The victim, unable to bear the physical and mental agony, ended her life.
In the absence of any appeal by the State or the victim seeking enhancement of sentence, the Bench refrained from considering imposition of a higher punishment. It found no mitigating factor warranting interference with the sentence and held the punishment proportionate to the gravity of the offence.
Order
The Division Bench dismissed Criminal Appeal (MD) No. 698 of 2023. The conviction and sentence imposed by the Sessions Judge, Special Court for Exclusive Trial of Cases under the POCSO Act, Srivilliputhur, in Special Sessions Case No. 23 of 2021, by judgment dated 27 March 2023, were confirmed. The accused M. Vigneshwaran stands convicted under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and sentenced to imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life, along with three years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,000 under Section 363 IPC.