Manipur HC Sets Aside NSA Detention Order for Fixing Three-Week Deadline on Detenu's Right to Represent

The Manipur High Court quashed a preventive detention order under the National Security Act after the detaining authority imposed a three-week time limit on the detenu's right to make representations, holding this a clear violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution.

A Division Bench of the High Court of Manipur, led by Chief Justice M. Sundar and Justice Ahanthem Bimol Singh, on 9 June 2026 allowed a habeas corpus petition filed by Yambem Manichandra Singh, the father of detenu Yambem Lalit Singh @ Tompok, aged 22, who had been held in Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa under a preventive detention order dated 8 March 2026 made under the National Security Act, 1980. The bench set aside the detention order along with its approval and confirmation orders, finding that the detaining authority had unconstitutionally capped the detenu's right to make representations at three weeks from the date of detention. The court directed the detenu's immediate release, if not required in any other case.

The Detention and the Grounds Served

The District Magistrate, Imphal East — the detaining authority — passed the preventive detention order on 8 March 2026 bearing reference No. Cril/NSA/No.1 of 2026/315. The grounds of detention were dated 9 March 2026 and served on the detenu on 11 March 2026 at 6:15 p.m. The State Government, acting as the appropriate Government under the NSA, approved the order on 16 March 2026 under Section 3(4) of the Act and subsequently confirmed it on 8 April 2026 under Section 12(1), both bearing reference No. H-14/3/2026-HD-HD.

The detention was predicated on a single FIR — FIR No. 111(12)2025 registered at Lamlai Police Station on 26 December 2025 — for alleged offences under Sections 109(1), 111(2), 310(6), and 329(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Section 25(1-C) of the Arms Act, and Section 20 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The detenu had been arrested on 26 December 2025 at 8:30 p.m.

Paragraph 10 of the grounds of detention informed the detenu of his right to make representations to the Government of Manipur and the Central Government, but stipulated that such representations “should be submitted within 3 weeks time from the date of detention.” A separate twelve-day window was fixed for representations to the detaining authority itself.

The Sole Ground Pressed Before the Court

Counsel for the writ petitioner, Mr. Ph. Sanajaoba, confined his challenge to one point: the three-week time limit imposed in paragraph 10 of the grounds of detention for making representations to the State Government and the Central Government was a direct infraction of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India.

The petitioner's case was that the detenu, believing he could not make any representation after three weeks had elapsed, did not send any representation to either authority. Three weeks from the date of detention elapsed on 30 March 2026. The detenu remained under the firm belief that the window had closed.

In support, counsel relied on two earlier Division Bench decisions of the same court: Mutum Ranjan Meitei @ Lamjingba v. District Magistrate, Thoubal District & Ors., decided on 11 February 2026 in W.P.(Crl.) No. 34 of 2025, reported at 2026 (1) MNLJ 126 : 2026 Legal Eagle 6; and Smt. Laishram Nilajit Shija v. State of Manipur & Ors., decided on 12 March 2026 in W.P.(Crl.) No. 1 of 2026, reported at 2026:MNHC:43-DB. Both judgments had followed the Supreme Court's ruling in Prem Lata Sharma (Smt.) v. District Magistrate, Mathura & Ors. [(1998) 4 SCC 260].

The Respondents' Defence and the Court's Rejection

The State Government (Respondent 1) and the Union of India (Respondent 3) each deflected the challenge, saying it was for the detaining authority to respond. The detaining authority (Respondent 2) in her affidavit-in-opposition dated 29 May 2026 took the position that the three-week period was the “prescribed timeline as admissible U/S 10 of the said Act” and that the period for submission of representation was “specifically provided under the Act.”

State counsel argued orally that the intention behind paragraph 10 was only to inform the detenu that if he made a representation within three weeks, it would be placed before the Advisory Board — even if the paragraph was not happily worded. Counsel also pressed Union of India v. Paul Manickam & Anr. [(2003) 8 SCC 342], contending that a detenu who makes no representation cannot complain that fixing a time frame infringes Article 22(5).

The bench rejected both arguments with two distinct reasons.

On the first argument, the court pointed out that paragraph 10 of the grounds fixed the three-week limit not only for representations to the State Government but also for representations to the Central Government. If the sole purpose were to ensure the representation reached the Advisory Board in time, the time frame — even if permissible in principle, which the court made clear it was not — would have been fixed only for the State Government. The three-week window in Section 10 of the NSA has no application whatsoever to representations addressed to the Central Government, making the argument a non-starter as regards that limb.

On the second argument, the court read Section 10 of the NSA carefully. That provision requires the appropriate Government to place the grounds of detention before the Advisory Board within three weeks, along with the representation “if any.” The three-week obligation in Section 10 runs against the State Government, not the detenu. If no representation arrives within three weeks, the State Government simply places the grounds alone before the Advisory Board and cannot be faulted. Any representation received after three weeks must still be considered by the State Government under Section 14 of the NSA, which empowers revocation of a detention order at any time.

On Paul Manickam, the bench distinguished the facts entirely. That case arose under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, and turned on a detenu's father having sent a representation to the President of India while the writ petition averred that representations had been sent to the State of Tamil Nadu and the Union of India. The Supreme Court had refused relief because the petitioner had misled the court and adopted a dubious device to deflect the course of justice. The bench, respectfully following the Constitution Bench's declaration in Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) v. State of Tamil Nadu [(2002) 3 SCC 533] that one factual difference can make a world of difference, held that Paul Manickam was clearly distinguishable: there was no allegation of misleading the court or incorrect averments in the present writ petition.

The Constitutional Principle Applied

The bench traced the governing principle to Prem Lata Sharma, where the Supreme Court held that there can be no period of limitation on a detenu's right to make a representation, and that the right — together with the corresponding obligation of the Government to consider it expeditiously — subsists as long as the preventive detention order continues to operate. Prem Lata Sharma itself arose under the NSA and concerned a jail superintendent's refusal to forward a second representation to the Central Government on the ground of extraordinary delay.

The same Division Bench had applied this principle in Mutum Ranjan Meitei and Laishram Nilajit Shija, both of which involved NSA detention orders where the detaining authority had fixed time frames for representations in language closely similar to paragraph 10 of the present grounds. The court noted, without any dispute from State counsel, that in both those cases the State had released the detenus after accepting the court's orders, and both judgments had attained finality.

The bench characterised the present case as one of the detaining authority not applying its mind — specifically, misreading Section 10 of the NSA as imposing a three-week deadline on the detenu rather than on the State Government. This fell within the category of subjective satisfaction being vitiated by a misconception of the statute, one of the seven grounds of justiciability identified in Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana & Ors. [(2023) 9 SCC 587] and followed by this bench in Mutum Ranjan Meitei.

The Default Bail Observation

Before concluding, the bench recorded an additional factual observation. The detenu had been arrested on 26 December 2025. Ninety days from that date elapsed on 5 April 2026. Counsel for the writ petitioner, on instructions, asserted that the State had neither filed a final report (charge sheet) nor applied for extension of time or extension of remand under Section 43D(2) of the UAPA, which permits the prosecution to seek an extension up to 180 days. As of the date of judgment, 9 June 2026, neither step had been taken.

The bench made clear it was not setting aside the detention order on this ground. The observation was recorded only to capture the complete factual picture: the State, having allowed the regular prosecution to lapse by not seeking extension of remand or filing a charge sheet, was detaining the detenu solely on the basis of the preventive detention order that had now been set aside.

Order

The Division Bench allowed W.P.(Crl.) No. 10 of 2026. The preventive detention order dated 8 March 2026 bearing reference No. Cril/NSA/No.1 of 2026/315 made by the District Magistrate, Imphal East, the approval order dated 16 March 2026, and the confirmation order dated 8 April 2026, both bearing reference No. H-14/3/2026-HD-HD made by the State Government, were all set aside. Yambem Lalit Singh @ Tompok, lodged in Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa, was directed to be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other case. No order as to costs was made.