Orissa HC Dismisses PIL Challenging Deputy Chief Minister Designation as Unconstitutional

The Orissa High Court dismissed a PIL filed by an advocate challenging the Deputy Chief Minister designation in Odisha, holding the title purely descriptive and the issue already settled by the Supreme Court.

A Division Bench of the Orissa High Court comprising Chief Justice Harish Tandon and Justice Chittaranjan Dash dismissed a Public Interest Litigation on 7 September 2026 that challenged the designation of Deputy Chief Ministers in Odisha as violative of Articles 163 and 164 of the Constitution of India. The court held that the title “Deputy Chief Minister” is merely descriptive and does not confer any power superior to that of the other members of the Council of Ministers. The bench found the issue conclusively settled by Supreme Court precedent and characterised the petition as a frivolous use of the PIL remedy. Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Srinivas Mohanty and Ms. K. Patra, appeared before the court, while the Advocate General Mr. Pitambar Acharya and Additional Government Advocate Mr. Saswat Das appeared for the State of Odisha.

The Dispute Before the High Court

The petitioner, Eleena Dash, described herself as a public-spirited person and a practising advocate. Her PIL took issue with the State of Odisha designating certain ministers as Deputy Chief Ministers, contending that the designation placed those ministers on a higher pedestal than the rest of the Council of Ministers and extended special privilege in protocol, precedence, and power.

The petition drew heavily on the Odisha Ministers' Salaries and Allowances (Amendment) Bill, 2025, which proposed to revise salaries and emoluments of the Chief Minister and other Council of Ministers. The petitioner argued that even after the Bill was withdrawn, the State continued to treat Deputy Chief Ministers differently from other ministers. Her central argument was that this amounted to the creation of a “Pseudo-Three-Tier” governance model that undermined the constitutional framework under Articles 163 and 164.

The petition also relied on the Warrant of Precedence issued by the President's Secretariat on 26 July 1979 and the Table of Precedence issued by the Government of Odisha on 28 March 1998, both of which place the Deputy Chief Minister above the other Council of Ministers. The petitioner argued this formal hierarchical placement translated into substantive superior privilege and power, violating constitutional equality among ministers.

Significantly, the petitioner herself admitted during proceedings that the post of Deputy Chief Minister is merely descriptive and ornamental, yet pressed the argument that the designation aimed to create a superior protocol status over other ministers.

The Legal Questions

Two questions confronted the bench. First, whether the designation “Deputy Chief Minister” confers any power, authority, or privilege beyond that of an ordinary member of the Council of Ministers under Articles 163 and 164. Second, whether the placement of the Deputy Chief Minister in a higher rank under the Tables of Precedence issued by the Centre and the State creates any substantive constitutional infirmity.

How the Bench Reasoned

The bench opened its analysis by invoking the Supreme Court's judgment in K.M. Sharma v. Shri Devi Lal and others, AIR 1990 SC 528. That decision held that the post of Deputy Chief Minister is akin to that of a member of the Council of Ministers and does not confer any power of the Chief Minister. The Supreme Court had further drawn a distinction between the descriptive part of an oath and its substantive part, holding that a mere description does not vitiate the oath as long as the substantive constitutional requirement is met.

The bench also referred to the Karnataka High Court's decision in Dr. Sekhar S. Iyer v. Chief Secretary, Government of Karnataka and others, ILR 2019 KAR 01, where an identical PIL was dismissed as frivolous. The Karnataka court had observed that “mere description of any Minister in the Council of Ministers as Deputy Chief Minister does not confer the person concerned with any powers of the Chief Minister and does not result in any unconstitutionality.”

On the Tables of Precedence, the bench traced the origin of such instruments to the colonial era, where they were devised to streamline ceremonial interactions. After independence, the republican framework adopted the Warrant of Precedence for ceremonial purposes to maintain administrative familiarity. The bench was clear that these instruments do not create any distinction in the exercise of powers or substantive hierarchy in decision-making; their scope is limited to ceremonial occasions. The bench found this conclusion fortified by the preambles to the relevant Tables of Precedence themselves.

The bench stated that the Table of Precedence or the Warrant of Precedence “has nothing to do with the governance by exercising powers superior to the Council of Ministers, but only in order to ensure the smooth running of the ceremonial functions organised by the Centre and the State.”

Having found the substantive question beyond doubt, the court turned to the character of the PIL itself. It observed that PILs of this nature must be handled with great caution to curb oblique motives, personal gain, private malice, vested interest, and publicity-seeking. The bench reminded itself that the PIL remedy exists as a constitutional tool for protecting the fundamental rights of disadvantaged persons whose rights have been interfered with by the executive, and that courts act as sentinels to protect the oppressed and the economically stricken. The attractive brand name of the PIL, the court noted, cannot be used as a tool for mischief, and the process of courts must not be misused.

Warning to the Petitioner-Advocate

The bench recorded that the petition was filed on specious grounds and amounted to a sheer waste of the special PIL remedy, which would ordinarily invite imposition of costs. However, bearing in mind that the petitioner is a practising advocate, the court declined to impose costs at this stage. Instead, it left her with an observation: she should henceforth raise genuine causes for disadvantaged persons whose fundamental or constitutional rights are infringed, and refrain from indulging in frivolous litigation.

The court prefaced its judgment with a quotation from the Supreme Court's decision in Tehseen Poonawalla v. Union of India, (2018) 6 SCC 72: “It is a travesty of justice for the resources of the legal system to be consumed by an avalanche of misdirected petitions” that, upon scrutiny, are found to promote a personal, business, or political agenda.

Outcome

W.P.(C) No. 19554 of 2026 was dismissed. The bench made no order as to costs, choosing instead to caution the petitioner-advocate against filing similar frivolous litigation in the future.