Trial Court Cannot Sidestep a High Court Direction to Rule on Maintainability: Orissa HC

Orissa High Court set aside a JMFC order that declined to decide whether a cheque-dishonour case was premature, holding the trial court defied a binding direction from a superior court.

The High Court of Orissa at Cuttack has set aside an order of the Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC), Jajpur Road, that refused to decide the question of maintainability of a Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act complaint. Justice V. Narasingh, sitting singly, held on 30 July 2026 that the trial court had acted in open defiance of a direction issued by the High Court on 2 December 2025, which had specifically required the court below to consider whether the complaint had been filed prematurely — before the statutory notice period under Section 138 had expired. The High Court described the trial court's approach as judicial “harakiri” and directed that the maintainability question must be decided first, before any further proceedings in the case.

The Complaint and the Dispute Over Prematurity

ABLT Products and Projects Private Ltd., through its Managing Director Abhisek Rout, filed I.C.C. Case No.7 of 2025 before the JMFC, Jajpur Road, against Sri Ranjit Sahoo under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act read with sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of Section 318 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, for dishonour of a cheque for Rs.2,50,407/-.

The complainant's position before the trial court was that a demand notice had been sent by registered post to the accused's address on 6 December 2024, and that no acknowledgement was received. The complaint itself was filed on 10 January 2025.

The accused-Petitioner, Sri Ranjit Sahoo, moved the High Court in CRLMC No.5041 of 2025 seeking quashing of the entire proceeding. His central argument was that the complaint had been instituted before the expiry of the notice period stipulated under the proviso to Section 138(b) of the NI Act — that is, the fifteen-day window after receipt of the demand notice within which the drawer must make payment. Relying on the Supreme Court's judgment in Yogendra Pratap Singh v. Savitri Pandey, AIR 2015 SC 157, and a coordinate bench decision in Prafulla Kumar Prusty @ Prafulla Chandra Prusty v. Ramesh Chandra Behera, (2022) 85 OCR–1040, counsel for the Petitioner contended that a complaint filed before the cause of action under Section 138 is complete is premature and not maintainable.

The High Court's Direction of 2 December 2025

While disposing of CRLMC No.5041 of 2025 on 2 December 2025, the High Court declined to quash the proceeding outright but granted liberty to the accused to raise the prematurity ground during trial. Crucially, the order specifically directed the trial court “to consider the aforesaid aspect and such ground raised by the Petitioner, specifically with reference to the judgment relied upon by the Petitioner.”

Acting on that liberty, the accused filed a petition before the JMFC seeking that the proceeding be dropped on maintainability grounds. He placed the operative portion of the High Court's order of 2 December 2025 before the trial court, along with the judgments the High Court itself had referenced.

What the Trial Court Did — and Why the High Court Found It Indefensible

The JMFC, by its order dated 12 January 2026, rejected the petition. The trial court's reasoning was that the case was at the stage of recording the accused's statement and that the accused had enough opportunity to advance his defence at that stage. It held that the petition was “not maintainable” at that stage.

The complainant's counsel before the High Court argued that the impugned order was not illegal because the JMFC had merely granted the accused liberty to raise his defence during the recording of his statement. In other words, the argument was that the accused had not lost any substantive right.

Justice Narasingh rejected that reading. The High Court observed that the trial court was “bound to take up the question of maintainability before proceeding further with the case” once the direction of 2 December 2025 had been issued. Instead, the JMFC had proceeded on a “queer understanding” of that order and rejected the petition altogether. The observation by the trial court that the accused had not raised the objection earlier, and that the defence could be raised only at the stage of examination of the accused, showed that the JMFC had “signally failed to understand the import of the order passed by this Court.”

The High Court characterised this as a “patent breach of judicial discipline” and held that such conduct amounted to judicial “harakiri” that “can never be countenanced.”

On Judicial Hierarchy and Subordinate Court Independence

Justice Narasingh addressed the balance between subordinate court independence and compliance with superior court directions. The judgment acknowledged that there is no bar on subordinate courts exercising their jurisdiction independently in accordance with law, and that such independence is the foundation of the adjudicatory process.

At the same time, the Court held that subordinate courts cannot disregard or act in defiance of a direction issued by a superior court on the manner in which an application is to be considered, “however unpalatable such direction may appear to the subordinate Court.”

The High Court drew on the Supreme Court's judgment in Tirupati Balaji Developers (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (2004) 5 SCC 1, which described India's judicial system as a unified hierarchical structure. The apex court had held in that case that the appellate jurisdiction of a superior forum inherently carries the power to issue corrective directions binding on the forum below, and that failure to carry out such directions “would be destructive of the hierarchical system in administration of justice.” The High Court applied that reasoning directly to the facts before it.

The Prematurity Question Under Section 138

The substantive issue that the JMFC was directed to decide — but did not — is whether the complaint was filed before the cause of action under Section 138 had crystallised. The proviso to Section 138 sets out three cumulative conditions: the cheque must be presented within six months of its date or its validity period, whichever is earlier; the payee must give a written demand notice to the drawer within thirty days of receiving the bank's return memo; and the drawer must fail to make payment within fifteen days of receiving that notice. Only after the drawer fails to pay within those fifteen days does the offence under Section 138 become complete.

The accused's case is that the complainant filed the complaint on 10 January 2025, before the fifteen-day window from the date of the demand notice of 6 December 2024 had elapsed. Whether that argument succeeds or fails on the facts is a question the trial court is yet to decide. The High Court's concern in CRLREV No.155 of 2026 was solely that the trial court refused to decide it at all, contrary to the High Court's express direction.

Order

Justice Narasingh allowed CRLREV No.155 of 2026 and set aside the JMFC's order dated 12 January 2026. The trial court has been directed to first hear the question of maintainability in light of the High Court's order of 2 December 2025, record a specific finding on it, and only thereafter proceed further with I.C.C. Case No.7 of 2025.

To avoid further delay, both parties were directed to appear before the JMFC, Jajpur Road, on 10 August 2026. The trial court has been directed to make an endeavour to pass an order on the maintainability question by the end of August 2026.