Power Grid union leader removed over travel bills loses writ; Patna HC finds no natural justice breach
Justice Ritesh Kumar held that an unsupplied anonymous complaint the inquiry officer never relied on, the refusal of a retired government servant as defence assistant, and a brief appellate affirmation did not vitiate a departmental inquiry that found nine of ten charges proved against a Power Grid Corporation employee in Patna.
The Patna High Court has refused to disturb the removal from service of Chitranjan Singh, a Junior Supervisor at Power Grid Corporation of India Limited’s regional headquarters in Patna and general secretary of its employees’ union, who was dismissed in November 2011 after a departmental inquiry into false travel allowance bills. Justice Ritesh Kumar, sitting as a single judge, held that the corporation had served the charge memo and the documents it relied on, that the anonymous complaint the petitioner kept asking for was never used against him, that the corporation’s rules permit only a serving public servant as defence assistant, and that the petitioner had not shown how any of this prejudiced his defence. The writ, pending since 2013, was dismissed.
From NTPC attendant to union general secretary, then a transfer to Purnia
Singh joined the National Thermal Power Corporation as an Attendant in 1985, became a Junior Assistant (Administration) on 13 February 1991, and was absorbed with continuity on 16 August 1991. When Power Grid was carved out of NTPC, his services went with it. On 25 September 2007 he was posted as Junior Supervisor at the corporation’s Regional Headquarters in Patna, and the same year he was elected general secretary of the Power Grid employees’ union.
The union politics matter to his version of events. In April 2007 he applied to the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) in Patna to have elected union office-bearers declared protected workmen under the Industrial Disputes Act, and on 9 July 2007 the Commissioner wrote to the corporation’s General Manager that Singh and two others be so declared. On 22 December 2009 a letter from the Deputy General Manager (HR), Eastern Region-I, transferred him from Patna to Purnia with effect from 29 December. He went back to the Labour Commissioner, arguing that Sections 9A and 33 of the Act and Rule 61(4) of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 protected him from transfer, and complaining that the corporation had stopped deducting subscriptions for the Power Grid Karamchari Sangh. On 29 December 2009 the Commissioner cancelled the transfer and directed the subscription payments to resume.
The corporation replied on 6 January 2010 that the transfer had been recommended by its Vigilance Department because of misconduct charges at an advanced stage, with a charge-sheet to follow, so there was nothing vindictive about it. The Commissioner rejected that stand because it had not been raised before 29 December. Meanwhile, by an office memo of 9 February 2010 and a reminder of 15 February, Singh was called to the Vigilance Department to record his statement on a written complaint that included the submission of false travel bills. His reply of 18 February 2010 said the management was out to harass him with the Purnia transfer, and that he was ready to face the proceeding.
An inquiry the charged officer would not join
The memorandum of charge came on 23 April 2010 from the DGM (HR), Eastern Region-I, with a list of documents and a list of witnesses. An Inquiry Officer and a Presenting Officer were appointed. Singh asked the Inquiry Officer for the documents on which the inquiry was based and for the anonymous complaint that, on his account, had triggered it. None was supplied, and he was told the management would provide them. On 9 August 2010 he wrote to the Executive Director asking again for the complaint and for permission to engage a defence assistant. The request for the complaint was refused. He then asked the inquiry authority to drop the proceeding altogether, saying the charges carried no allegation supported by evidence, and renewed his demand for the management’s papers.
He did not file a reply. The Inquiry Officer, a former Assistant General Manager (Vigilance) of NTPC, submitted his report on 29 March 2011, finding charges 1 to 9 proved and charge 10 not proved. A notice of 5 April 2011 forwarded the report and gave Singh 15 days to respond; his reply of 29 April 2011 denied every charge and asked the disciplinary authority to reject the findings. By an order of 4/8 November 2011, the Director (Personnel) imposed the major penalty of removal from service. His appeal to the Chairman and Managing Director was rejected on 13/30 April 2012. A second charge memo of 5 May 2011, on similar allegations, had meanwhile set off a parallel proceeding. A representation to the CMD on 21 September 2012 went unanswered.
Singh’s first writ, CWJC No. 14721 of 2013, was withdrawn on 1 August 2013 with liberty to file afresh because of errors in the filing. The present petition sought certiorari against the removal and appellate orders, quashing of what it called an ex parte inquiry report based on the management’s brief, and reinstatement with consequential benefits.
Cryptic orders, a complaint never shown, and a defence assistant refused
Mr P.N. Shahi, Senior Advocate, appearing with Mr Shiv Partap, Ms Priya Kumari and Mr Pushkar Parshant, built the challenge on four grounds. The disciplinary and appellate orders were cryptic, one-line affirmations that showed no independent application of mind; an appellate authority acting quasi-judicially must disclose at least brief reasons, or no one can know whether it applied its mind at all. He cited paragraph 36 of S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594, and paragraph 20 of Divisional Forest Officer, Kothagudem v. Madhusudhan Rao, (2008) 3 SCC 469, which says a delinquent is entitled to know at least the mind of the appellate authority.
Second, documents of substantial relevance were withheld despite repeated requests, crippling his defence and betraying a predisposition against him. Third, the dismissal rested on a written complaint whose copy and author were never disclosed; the inquiry report itself recorded that the charged officer should approach the disciplinary authority for the complainant’s name. He relied on paragraph 43 of Maharana Pratap Singh v. State of Bihar, 2025 INSC 554, which holds that where a charge-sheet rests on a written complaint, the complainant has to be produced. Fourth, his nominee as defence assistant was rejected only because the man was a retired government employee, though the service rules did not say the assistant must be serving, and a Department of Personnel and Training office memorandum of 5 February 2003 permits retired government servants to act as defence assistants subject to conditions. He closed on Article 311: the allegation of fake travel bills for 2004 to 2009 was never brought to his notice, and he was given no chance to cross-examine the hotel staff who testified that they had not issued the bills he submitted, because no notice of their examination reached him.
The corporation: nine charges proved after notices he ignored
Mr J.P. Singh, Senior Advocate, with Mr Arbind Kumar Singh for Power Grid, said the case began with routine scrutiny. While posted in the HR department at Patna, the petitioner had submitted bills for official travel to Jamshedpur, Ranchi and other places. Doubts about some hotel bills led to verification with a hotel in Jamshedpur, which showed them to be false. A detailed investigation followed, and its findings were that the petitioner had misappropriated public money and acted against the corporation’s interests. The charge-sheet of 23 April 2010, with every document relied on, was served on him. A neutral outsider, a former AGM (Vigilance) of NTPC, conducted the inquiry.
On the defence assistant, counsel pointed to Clause 25(6) of the corporation’s Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, which allows only a serving public servant to assist a charged officer, while Clause 25(4) separately permits a retired public servant to be the Inquiry Officer. A delinquent has no right to be represented by an agent of his choice, and the employer’s rules can restrict it: Rajasthan Marudhara Gramin Bank v. Ramesh Chandra Meena, (2022) 3 SCC 44, and Food Corporation of India v. Bant Singh, (1997) 6 SCC 380, where the Supreme Court faulted a High Court for letting a retired employee assist.
On the complaint, counsel said no complaint formed the basis of the charge-sheet, none was cited in the prosecution documents, and the Inquiry Officer had held it irrelevant to the defence while still giving the petitioner time to seek it from the disciplinary authority; the proceedings did not depend on what he called an “imaginary anonymous complaint”. The petition did not say what the complaint was, how it bore on the charges, or what prejudice its absence caused. For the proposition that the delinquent must plead and prove prejudice from non-supply, he cited State Bank of India v. Bidyut Kumar Mitra, (2011) 2 SCC 316, Chandrama Tewari v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 117, Syndicate Bank v. Venkatesh Gururao Kurati, AIR 2006 SC 3542, and the Patna High Court’s own Ram Shinghasan v. Union of India, 2015 SCC OnLine Pat 2180. On reasons, he relied on Boloram Bordoloi v. Lakhimi Gaolia Bank, AIR 2021 SC 872, and State Bank of India v. Ramadhar Sao, 2025 INSC 1010: a disciplinary authority that accepts the inquiry report need not record detailed reasons. Notice of every hearing and every daily order-sheet had been sent and acknowledged, and the points in the petitioner’s written brief were discussed in the report. On the scope of judicial review he cited State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364, and State Bank of India v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, (2021) 2 SCC 612. The victimisation theory, he said, was belied by nine of ten charges being proved.
Prejudice, not procedure, is the test
Justice Kumar put the question narrowly: did the departmental proceeding and the consequent orders suffer from any procedural infirmity or violation of natural justice that warranted interference? On the record, the charge-sheet and the documents relied on in support of the charges had been served, the petitioner had been given several opportunities to participate, and the inquiry had followed the corporation’s rules. The pleadings showed that the alleged anonymous complaint was not relied on by the Inquiry Officer, and that the charges were established on the material considered during the inquiry.
The judge took Bidyut Kumar Mitra as the governing authority on non-supply: it is for the employee alleging non-supply to demonstrate the relevance of the documents sought and the prejudice to his defence. S.K. Sharma added that a procedural irregularity does not automatically vitiate an inquiry; except where notice or a hearing is denied altogether, the court examines the complaint through the lens of prejudice. Measured against that, the petitioner had raised only a general grievance about documents and the complaint. Nothing on record sufficiently established that the non-supply of the complaint, or of any specific document the Inquiry Officer relied on, prejudiced him in meeting the charges. The proceedings could not be held vitiated on that basis.
The defence-assistant plea fared no better. Clause 25(6) of the CDA Rules permits a serving public servant and does not extend to a retired one. Rajasthan Marudhara Gramin Bank holds that a delinquent has no absolute right to be represented by an agent of his choice, that representation may be regulated by the service rules, and that refusing a particular representative is not by itself a breach of natural justice provided a fair opportunity to defend is given. There was no material to show that the refusal deprived Singh of a reasonable opportunity: he was issued the charge memo, received the inquiry report, and filed his representation of 29 April 2011 before the disciplinary authority.
On reasons, the judge accepted the principle in S.N. Mukherjee and Kothagudem that an appellate authority affirming a punishment should indicate at least brief reasons, but set it beside Boloram Bordoloi: where the disciplinary authority accepts the Inquiry Officer’s findings, it need not reproduce the report’s reasoning in the penalty order. The requirement has to be read in the context of the inquiry findings and the nature of the order. The respondents maintained that both authorities had considered the report and the petitioner’s representation, and the mere fact of affirmation did not make the appellate order illegal. The material did not sufficiently establish that either order ignored the petitioner’s defence.
Finally, the judge recalled that the power under Article 226 is “not equivalent to an appellate jurisdiction over the findings recorded in a departmental proceeding”. Under Ajai Kumar Srivastava, review is concerned with the legality of the decision-making process, and interference is warranted where the proceedings offend natural justice, breach the governing rules, are perverse or rest on no evidence. The petitioner disputed the findings and alleged a slanted inquiry. But the Inquiry Officer had found nine charges proved and one not proved, which showed the charges were examined one by one and that “the findings were not uniformly adverse to the petitioner”. The respondents had also stated that the charges about false travel allowance bills were supported by the material examined. Without sufficient material showing the findings to be perverse, unsupported by evidence or tainted by a material irregularity causing prejudice, the court would not substitute its own assessment of the evidence for the disciplinary authority’s. Given the gravity of the allegations and the major penalty, the judge said he had examined the grounds with due care, and found none made out.
Order
The challenge to the removal order of 4/8 November 2011 and the appellate order of 13/30 April 2012 failed. The petitioner had not established that the non-supply of documents, the refusal of a retired government employee as his defence assistant, or the manner of the appellate affirmation amounted to a violation of natural justice warranting interference. CWJC No. 17515 of 2013 was dismissed, and pending applications were disposed of. The judgment was reserved on 17 August 2026 and pronounced on 27 October 2026; it is marked not approved for reporting.