Patna HC Dismisses PNB Appeal, Holds Disciplinary Authority Failed to Apply Independent Mind Before Removing Clerk

The Patna High Court Division Bench upheld a Single Judge’s order quashing a bank employee’s removal, finding the disciplinary authority had acted under the Chief Vigilance Officer’s dictates rather than its own assessment.

A Division Bench of the Patna High Court, comprising Justice Sudhir Singh and Justice Ranjan Kumar Jha, on 19 June 2026 dismissed a Letters Patent Appeal filed by Punjab National Bank challenging a Single Judge’s order that had quashed the removal of a clerk-cum-cashier from service. The Division Bench found that the disciplinary authority had not exercised its discretion independently and had instead been influenced by the Chief Vigilance Officer when imposing the punishment of removal. The inquiry report itself had been found perverse and based on no evidence. The bank’s appeal failed to demonstrate any patent illegality or jurisdictional error in the Single Judge’s reasoning, and the intra-court appeal was dismissed in its entirety.

The Disciplinary Proceeding Against the Bank Employee

Sanjay Kumar Srivastava was appointed as Clerk-cum-Cashier by Punjab National Bank on 28 April 1994 and was initially posted at the Branch Office, Budha Colony, Patna. From September 1994 he was permanently posted at the Branch Office, Saksohra, District Patna.

On 7 October 1997, a charge-sheet containing various allegations was served on him. He denied the charges. By letter dated 17 February 1998, the disciplinary authority appointed an Inquiry Officer and a Presenting Officer, and a regular departmental proceeding commenced.

The Inquiry Officer submitted his report on 15 January 2000. That report was forwarded to Srivastava on 8/16 February 2000 and he submitted a response pointing out alleged infirmities in it. The bank then issued a second show-cause notice dated 5 August 2000 proposing removal from service. After considering his reply, the disciplinary authority passed the final order dated 6 November 2000 imposing the penalty of removal from service.

Srivastava appealed to the Zonal Manager. The appellate authority dismissed the appeal on 14 August 2003, confirming the removal. He then filed a writ petition before the High Court.

What the Single Judge Found

The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition by order dated 18 May 2018, quashing both the punishment order dated 6 November 2000 and the appellate order dated 14 August 2003.

The Single Judge recorded that the inquiry report of 15 January 2000 contained no material conclusively pointing to the writ petitioner’s guilt. Most charges had not been conclusively proved. The Single Judge characterised the position as “a case of no evidence.”

The Single Judge also noted something significant from the bank’s own records: the disciplinary authority had itself observed in correspondence with the Chief Vigilance Officer that the Inquiry Officer appeared biased to some extent, that the employee’s general conduct had otherwise been good, and that removal would be too harsh — suggesting that stoppage of six future increments would be the proper punishment. Despite this internal assessment, the punishment ultimately imposed was removal from service.

The Single Judge concluded from the bank’s reply dated 6 September 2004 that the punishment of removal was imposed apparently at the direction of the Chief Vigilance Officer, meaning the disciplinary authority had not applied its independent mind. The inquiry report was held perverse, the order of punishment was set aside, and the appellate order fell with it.

Punjab National Bank’s Case in the Letters Patent Appeal

Punjab National Bank, through its Chairman and Managing Director, the Zonal Manager, the Senior Regional Manager, and the Branch Manager at Saksohra, preferred Letters Patent Appeal No. 911 of 2018 before the Division Bench. Mr. Amit Kumar Anand appeared for the bank; Mr. Ajay Kumar Prasad appeared for Srivastava.

The bank argued that the Inquiry Officer’s findings were based on documentary evidence, management exhibits, and oral testimonies, and could not be characterised as perverse. Several charges, it contended, stood proved on the materials available. The Single Judge, it was submitted, had failed to consider the inquiry report in its entirety, and the conclusion of no material connecting the employee with the alleged misconduct ran contrary to the findings actually recorded in the inquiry report.

The bank also contended that the disciplinary proceeding had been conducted in strict compliance with prescribed procedure and the principles of natural justice, and that the disciplinary authority had independently arrived at the conclusion that charges stood proved before imposing removal.

On behalf of Srivastava, it was submitted that the Single Judge had properly appreciated the materials and rightly interfered. The impugned judgment was well-reasoned and contained no infirmity warranting further interference.

How the Division Bench Reasoned

Justice Sudhir Singh, writing for the bench, framed the core question as whether the Single Judge had committed any error warranting interference by finding that the departmental findings were perverse and the decision-making process vitiated.

The bench restated the settled position that judicial review in disciplinary matters goes to the decision-making process, not to the merits of the decision itself. Interference is permissible where findings are perverse, based on no evidence, or where the disciplinary authority’s action is vitiated by arbitrariness, bias, or non-application of mind. The bench relied on B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749, for the proposition that “judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made.”

On the perversity finding, the Division Bench noted that the Single Judge had recorded a specific finding that no material conclusively established the charges and that most had not been conclusively proved. Crucially, even the disciplinary authority itself had observed that the Inquiry Officer appeared biased to some extent. Once that observation came from the disciplinary authority, the Division Bench held, the inquiry findings required closer scrutiny. The bank had not demonstrated before the Division Bench that the Single Judge’s finding was wholly unsupported by the records.

On the question of independent application of mind, the Division Bench found substance in the Single Judge’s reasoning. The correspondence with the Chief Vigilance Officer showed that the disciplinary authority had itself assessed that a lesser punishment was appropriate, yet the punishment imposed was removal from service. This lent credence, the bench said, to the conclusion that the disciplinary authority had been influenced by considerations extraneous to its own independent assessment.

The bench applied Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadeja v. State of Gujarat, reported in (1995) 5 SCC 302, which holds that where power is conferred on a particular authority, that authority alone must exercise it, and any exercise of discretion at the behest of another authority stands vitiated: “If the discretion is exercised under the direction or in compliance with some higher authority’s instruction, then it will be a case of failure to exercise discretion altogether.”

The bench also referred to State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna, reported in (2001) 2 SCC 330, for the proposition that the authority entrusted with disciplinary power must take its decision on the basis of its own consideration of materials on record and that bias or a pre-determined frame of mind vitiates the process.

The Division Bench was clear that the Single Judge had not re-appreciated the evidence as an appellate authority. The interference had been founded on findings of perversity in the inquiry report and on the failure of the disciplinary authority to independently exercise its statutory discretion. Both aspects went to the root of the decision-making process and fell squarely within the permissible parameters of judicial review.

Outcome

The Division Bench found no reason to differ from the view taken by the Single Judge. The bank had failed to point out any patent illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error in the impugned judgment warranting interference in exercise of intra-court appellate jurisdiction.

The issue framed by the bench was answered against the appellants and in favour of the writ petitioner. Letters Patent Appeal No. 911 of 2018 was dismissed. All pending applications, if any, were disposed of.