Patna HC Upholds Tender Disqualification of Contractor Whose Uploaded Affidavit Signatures Did Not Match Original

The Patna High Court dismissed a writ petition by M/s Shubhraj Construction, holding that a signature mismatch between an uploaded and original affidavit was a valid ground for technical disqualification under the NIT, and that the contractor had been given an opportunity to respond but failed to use it.

A Division Bench of the Patna High Court on 25 August 2026 dismissed a writ petition filed by M/s Shubhraj Construction, a Mokama-based proprietorship firm, challenging its technical disqualification from a public works tender floated by Nagar Parishad, Mokama. The Technical Tender Committee had found a discrepancy between the signatures on an affidavit the firm uploaded on the e-procurement portal and those on its original affidavit, and disqualified it under Clause 21(1) of the Notice Inviting Tender. Acting Chief Justice Sudhir Singh, leading the Division Bench along with Justice Rajesh Kumar Verma, held that document authenticity is inseparable from the obligation to furnish a document, that the Committee acted within its remit, and that the petitioner had been offered three days to respond but did not submit its objection in time.

The Tender, the Complaint, and What Happened Next

Nagar Parishad, Mokama issued Revised Short Term Tender Notice No. 03/2025-26 on 30 June 2025 for execution of works under the Nal-Jal Scheme across eight groups. M/s Shubhraj Construction, whose proprietor Raja Kumar was about 25 years old at the time of filing, submitted bids for all eight groups.

During the process, Respondent No. 6, M/s Prarthana Construction, filed a complaint alleging concealment of existing commitments and manipulation of documents by the petitioner. A three-member enquiry committee was constituted. On 24 November 2025, the Executive Officer, Nagar Parishad, Mokama, through Letter No. 1383, recorded that the committee had found the complaint baseless and incorrect, and directed the Executive Engineer to proceed with finalisation of the tender.

The tender remained pending. Bid validity expired in the interim. The Superintending Engineer, Urban Development Circle-02, Patna, then sought bidders' consent for extension. The petitioner gave unconditional consent.

On 15 June 2026, the Technical Tender Committee convened. It compared the affidavit uploaded on the e-procurement portal with the original affidavit submitted by the petitioner and found the signatures on the two documents to be different. The petitioner was declared technically disqualified under Clause 21(1) of the NIT, with the disqualification communicated through Letter No. SE/Urban Development Circle-02/2026-27/504 dated 15 June 2026.

The petitioner submitted a representation on 27 June 2026 before the Executive Officer referring to the earlier enquiry and the finding that the original complaint had been baseless. That representation came after the Committee had already concluded the disqualification process.

What the Writ Petition Asked For

Before the High Court, the petitioner sought certiorari to quash the Technical Tender Committee's proceedings of 15 June 2026, mandamus directing reconsideration of its technical bid after a reasonable opportunity of hearing, an independent enquiry into how the technical bid was handled, and an interim restraint on the tender process in the meantime.

The petitioner's counsel, Senior Advocate Mr. Shekhar Singh, made three arguments. First, Clause 21(1) of the NIT does not list signature mismatch as a ground for technical disqualification. Second, the same signatures and documents had already been verified by the three-member enquiry committee in November 2025 and found unobjectionable, so the Technical Tender Committee could not reopen the question. Third, even if any discrepancy existed, it was at most a curable defect and the petitioner should have been given a chance to rectify or explain it before outright disqualification.

Counsel for the State respondents answered each point. They submitted that documents that are incomplete or non-compliant fall within Clause 21(1), and that a discrepancy in signatures on an uploaded versus an original affidavit makes the document non-compliant. On the opportunity issue, they pointed to the Committee's 15 June 2026 proceedings, which had specifically notified the petitioner of the discrepancy and given three working days to submit a reply, show cause, or objection. The petitioner did not respond within that window and filed its representation only on 27 June 2026.

Reading Clause 21(1) and the Authenticity Question

The bench began with the text of Clause 21(1) of the NIT. The provision, which is in Hindi, states in effect that if any document required under Clause 17 or under any other condition of the tender is absent or incomplete, the bid shall be rejected.

The bench read this as covering not only a wholly absent document but also a document that does not satisfy the prescribed requirements. It then applied that reading to the facts: the question was not simply whether an affidavit had been uploaded, but whether the uploaded affidavit corresponded to and was the same as the original affidavit. A mismatch in signatures between the two directly raised the question of document authenticity.

The bench held: “A material discrepancy in the signature appearing on the uploaded document, when compared with the original document, directly concerns the authenticity and due execution of the document and cannot be treated as a mere technical or insignificant variation.” The obligation to furnish a document necessarily includes the obligation to furnish one that is duly executed and authenticated. The Committee was, the bench found, justified in examining the discrepancy to determine whether the document met tender requirements.

The bench also noted that the petitioner had not placed on record any material to dislodge the Committee's findings.

Judicial Restraint in Tender Matters

The bench drew on two Supreme Court decisions to explain why the Court would not substitute its own view for that of the Committee.

In Central Coalfields Ltd. v. SLL-SML (Joint Venture Consortium), reported in (2016) 8 SCC 622, the Supreme Court held that the employer is entitled to prescribe tender terms and conditions and to take decisions on tenders, and that courts should ordinarily exercise restraint unless the decision suffers from arbitrariness, mala fides, or perversity.

In Silppi Constructions Contractors v. Union of India, reported in (2020) 16 SCC 489, the Supreme Court reiterated that judicial review in contractual matters goes to the decision-making process, not the soundness of the decision, and that interference is warranted only where the decision is arbitrary, irrational, mala fide, or biased. The Supreme Court had warned in that case that courts should not use “a magnifying glass while scanning the tenders and make every small mistake appear like a big blunder.”

Applying these principles, the bench found that the Technical Tender Committee had compared the documents, noticed a discrepancy, and acted on that finding. Nothing on record indicated the Committee had acted on extraneous considerations or adopted a criterion outside the tender conditions. In those circumstances, the Court declined to substitute its own assessment for the Committee's.

Whether Natural Justice Was Satisfied

On the opportunity question, the bench reproduced the relevant portion of the 15 June 2026 proceedings. The Committee's decision recorded that its proceedings would be displayed on the notice board of the Executive Officer, Nagar Parishad, Mokama and on the e-procurement portal for three working days, and that any bidder who wished to submit a claim or objection with comments could do so within that period for the Committee to consider. It further recorded that no claim or objection submitted after the stipulated period would be entertained.

The bench held that the petitioner had been specifically put to notice of the discrepancy and given three days to respond. The petitioner submitted nothing within that window. Its representation of 27 June 2026 came well after the period had expired.

The bench stated the governing principle: once a reasonable opportunity is duly afforded, a person cannot complain of a violation of natural justice merely because he failed to avail it. The subsequent representation did not by itself establish denial of an opportunity. Issue No. (ii) was accordingly answered against the petitioner.

Outcome

The Division Bench found no ground to interfere with the respondents' decision in exercise of writ jurisdiction. The writ application, Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 12120 of 2026, was dismissed. All pending applications in the matter were also disposed of.