Patna HC Dismisses JV's Challenge to PHED Tender Disqualification, Holds Eligibility Conditions Cannot Be Treated as Curable Defects

A Bihar joint venture's writ petition challenging technical disqualification from PHED tenders was dismissed, with the court refusing to substitute its assessment for that of the Tender Evaluation Committee.

The High Court of Judicature at Patna has dismissed a writ petition filed by M/s UKS-Lokaditya Construction Pvt. Ltd. (Joint Venture), a Bihar-based contractor, challenging its technical disqualification from multiple tenders floated by the Public Health Engineering Department (PHED), Government of Bihar. A Division Bench of Justice Sudhir Singh and Justice Ranjan Kumar Jha, with the judgment authored by Justice Sudhir Singh, held on 16 June 2026 that eligibility conditions prescribed under a Standard Bidding Document form the foundation of the tender process and cannot be treated as mere procedural or curable defects. The court found no material demonstrating that the Tender Evaluation Committee's decision was arbitrary, mala fide, or patently perverse, and accordingly declined to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

The Tenders and the Disqualification

The petitioner is a Joint Venture comprising Umakant Singh and M/s Lokaditya Construction Pvt. Ltd. It participated in NIT Nos. 08/2024-25, 09/2024-25 and 13/2024-25 issued by PHED, Government of Bihar. The bids were submitted for Group-4 under NIT No. 08/2024-25, Group-1 under NIT No. 09/2024-25, and Groups-1, 2 and 4 under NIT No. 13/2024-25. The tenders related to works in Kishanganj, Forbesganj and Katihar districts, with the respondents including the Chief Engineer-cum-Special Secretary (Headquarters) PHED, the Regional Chief Engineer of the Purnia circle, and the Executive Engineers of the Forbesganj, Kishanganj and Katihar divisions.

The petitioner's technical bids were declared unsuccessful. For NIT No. 08/2024-25, the rejection was on the ground that the Joint Bidding Agreement had not been attested by a First Class Magistrate and for alleged non-compliance with Clauses 4.4(ii) and 4.4.5(i) of the Standard Bidding Document (SBD). For NIT Nos. 09/2024-25 and 13/2024-25, the rejection was on the ground of non-fulfilment of Clauses 4.5A(b) and 4.5A(c) of the SBD, which relate to experience and work-execution criteria.

The petitioner preferred complaints before the departmental authorities. The Departmental Grievance Redressal Committee, by its decision dated 31 July 2025, upheld the rejection of the petitioner's bids.

The Petitioner's Case Before the High Court

Before the Division Bench, counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Pramod Mishra, advanced two principal arguments. First, regarding NIT No. 08/2024-25, he submitted that neither the Notice Inviting Tender nor the SBD required the Joint Venture Agreement to be attested by a First Class Magistrate. Rejection on that ground was therefore arbitrary and unsustainable.

Second, regarding NIT Nos. 09/2024-25 and 13/2024-25, counsel submitted that the experience and work-execution criteria under Clauses 4.5A(b) and 4.5A(c) were required to be assessed collectively for a Joint Venture. The constituent members of the petitioner-JV, taken together, satisfied the prescribed thresholds on the basis of experience certificates furnished with the bids. Requisite affidavits and supporting documents had also been submitted, amounting to substantial compliance.

It was further contended that the Grievance Redressal Committee had mechanically affirmed the Tender Committee's decision without properly considering the documents on record, and that the reasons assigned by the Grievance Committee differed from those in the initial rejection orders — demonstrating arbitrariness in the decision-making process.

The petitioner relied on Kalinga Mining Corporation v. Union of India, reported in (2013) 5 SCC 252, and N.G. Projects Ltd. v. Vinod Kumar Jain, reported in (2022) 6 SCC 127, for the proposition that bids ought not to be rejected on hyper-technical grounds and that State instrumentalities must act fairly and non-arbitrarily in public procurement. The petitioner argued that the impugned action violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

The Respondents' Position and the Enquiry Report

Counsel for the respondents, Mr. Saroj Kumar Sharma, submitted that the petitioner was rightly declared technically disqualified for non-fulfilment of eligibility conditions under Clause 4.5(A) and Clause 4.4.5(iv) of the Instructions to Bidders forming part of the SBD. A Joint Venture, he argued, is required to collectively satisfy the criteria under Clauses 4.2, 4.5(A), 4.5(B), 4.7 and 4.8 of the Instructions to Bidders, and upon scrutiny the petitioner was found ineligible.

The respondents also placed before the court an enquiry report dated 8 September 2025. Following a complaint dated 28 August 2025 alleging irregularities in the tender process, the Department had constituted an Enquiry Committee under the chairmanship of the Chief Engineer, Public Health Zone, Bhagalpur. That committee found that in several tenders, bidders with similar deficiencies had been treated differently during technical evaluation and that bids had not been scrutinised properly. It recommended cancellation of the existing tender process and initiation of a fresh tender process, including for NIT No. 13/2024-25 pertaining to Groups 1, 2, 3 and 4. The respondents submitted that the Department had already taken corrective measures and no further interference was warranted.

How the Bench Reasoned

The court framed the limited issue as whether the petitioner satisfied the eligibility requirements under Clauses 4.5(A) and 4.4.5(iv) of the Instructions to Bidders, and whether the technical disqualification warranted interference under Article 226.

On the enquiry report, the bench observed that a careful reading did not reveal any categorical finding that the petitioner had fulfilled the eligibility requirements under those clauses. The committee's recommendations were directed at rectifying deficiencies in the overall evaluation process. The court held that the recommendation of cancellation and re-tendering did not, by itself, lead to the conclusion that the petitioner was wrongly disqualified or that it satisfied the eligibility criteria.

On the reliance placed on Kalinga Mining Corporation and N.G. Projects Ltd., the bench accepted the general proposition but distinguished its application. The court held that the disqualification in the present case pertained to fulfilment of eligibility criteria under the SBD itself, and that eligibility conditions form the foundation of the tender process and cannot be treated as mere procedural or curable defects.

The bench then surveyed the settled limits of judicial review in tender matters. It quoted from Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa, reported in (2007) 14 SCC 517, where the Supreme Court held that interference is permissible only where the process is mala fide, arbitrary, or intended to favour someone, and not merely because another view is possible. The court in Jagdish Mandal had cautioned that attempts by unsuccessful tenderers to make courts interfere on technical or procedural grounds risk holding up public works for years and increasing project costs.

The bench also drew on Silppi Constructions Contractors v. Union of India, reported in (2020) 16 SCC 489, where the Supreme Court reiterated that the author of the tender document is the best person to understand its requirements, and that if two interpretations are possible, the interpretation of the author must be accepted. Constitutional courts should exercise considerable restraint while reviewing decisions of expert tendering authorities.

From Tata Cellular v. Union of India, reported in (1994) 6 SCC 651, the bench recalled that judicial review is concerned with the decision-making process and not the decision itself, and that courts should not substitute their own opinion for that of the authority entrusted with taking such decisions. The court noted the three grounds of judicial review — illegality, irrationality (Wednesbury unreasonableness), and procedural impropriety — and held that none was made out here.

The bench further referred to Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., reported in (2016) 16 SCC 818, for the proposition that the interpretation of tender conditions by the employer deserves deference and interference is permissible only if the interpretation is shown to be arbitrary, mala fide or irrational. The court quoted: “a mere disagreement with the decision-making process or the decision of the administrative authority is no reason for a constitutional court to interfere.”

Applying these principles, the bench found that the petitioner had not demonstrated that the Tender Evaluation Committee's conclusion regarding non-compliance with Clauses 4.5(A) and 4.4.5(iv) was so arbitrary or perverse as to warrant interference. Mere disagreement with the expert body's assessment of eligibility conditions was not a sufficient ground for the court to undertake a fresh evaluation of the bid documents. In the absence of any material showing mala fides, arbitrariness or patent perversity, the court found no reason to interfere with the technical disqualification.

Order

The Division Bench dismissed Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 13745 of 2025 on 16 June 2026. All pending applications in the matter were also disposed of. The judgment was uploaded on 19 June 2026.