Punjab & Haryana HC Quashes PIT-NDPS Detention Order, Finds It Punitive Device to Nullify Bail
Justice Vinod S. Bhardwaj held that invoking preventive detention immediately after bail was granted, without exhausting ordinary criminal law remedies, rendered the order punitive and constitutionally unsustainable.
The High Court of Punjab & Haryana has quashed a one-year preventive detention order passed against Dishant Goel under the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (PIT-NDPS Act). Justice Vinod S. Bhardwaj, sitting singly at Chandigarh, allowed the habeas corpus petition on three independent grounds: unexplained delay snapping the live and proximate link between the alleged prejudicial activities and the necessity of detention; non-supply of the detention proposal depriving the detenue of an effective representation; and colourable exercise of power, with the detention order functioning as a mechanism to nullify a bail order rather than to prevent any genuine future threat. The judgment, pronounced on 13 May 2026 after being reserved on 4 May 2026, was declared reportable and speaking.
The Detention Order and Its Confirmation
Respondent No. 2, exercising powers under Section 3(1) of the PIT-NDPS Act, issued Detention Order No. U-11011/11/2025-PITNDPS on 2 May 2025, directing the preventive detention of Dishant Goel, son of Praveen. The order was founded on the detaining authority’s subjective satisfaction that Goel’s activities were prejudicial to the prevention of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.
The detention order was subsequently modified by the same authority on 13 May 2025. The modification changed the place of detention from Central Jail, Dibrugarh, Assam to Model Jail, Burail, Chandigarh. The respondents explained this change by pointing to the prevailing war-like situation between India and Pakistan during that period, which had led to closure of Chandigarh Airport and cancellation of flights, making transportation to Dibrugarh impracticable. The modified order was transmitted to Police Station Sector-19 through communication dated 14 May 2025 and received by the police on 16 May 2025. Goel was eventually apprehended and detained on 30 May 2025.
At the time of execution, Goel was served with the detention order, grounds of detention, and all relied-upon documents in both English and Hindi, in the presence of witnesses, within the statutory period under Section 3(3) of the PIT-NDPS Act. He submitted representations before Respondent No. 2 and before the Advisory Board. The Advisory Board conducted hearings on 7 July 2025 and 21 July 2025, and forwarded its opinion dated 8 August 2025. Respondent No. 2 thereafter passed a confirmation order dated 14 August 2025 under Section 9(f) of the PIT-NDPS Act, directing detention for one year from 30 May 2025.
The grounds of detention relied upon seven FIRs registered against Goel under the NDPS Act. Three of those cases had ended in conviction with sentences already undergone in full. Two had ended in acquittals that had attained finality, with the State not having appealed either judgment. One case was pending trial, and one was under investigation. The recoveries across all seven FIRs ranged from 4 grams to 61.45 grams of heroin — quantities the court would later characterise as small or intermediate.
Three Grounds of Challenge
Counsel for Goel pressed three distinct grounds before the court.
Delay snapping the live nexus. The detention proposal had been forwarded as early as 8 January 2025. The detention order was passed only on 2 May 2025, modified on 13 May 2025, and executed on 30 May 2025. Counsel argued that a delay of nearly four months between the proposal and the order, followed by a further gap before execution, remained wholly unexplained on the record. Neither the grounds of detention nor any supplied material offered any justification for this prolonged inaction. Once such immediacy disappears, it was argued, the detention loses its preventive character and becomes punitive — which is constitutionally impermissible.
Non-supply of the detention proposal. The proposal initiating the preventive detention proceedings was never furnished to Goel. Counsel contended that this document was foundational because it disclosed the precise date on which the detention machinery was set in motion, which was directly relevant to demonstrating delay before the Advisory Board. Without it, Goel was deprived of the ability to make a complete and meaningful representation on the ground of delay and non-application of mind. The constitutional guarantee under Article 22(5), it was argued, is not satisfied by ritualistic compliance; it requires supply of every material document that could enable an effective representation.
Colourable exercise of power. Goel had been granted regular bail on 27 December 2024 by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dera Bassi. The grounds of detention contained no allegation that he had misused that liberty — no violation of bail conditions, no attempt to abscond, no tampering with evidence, no witness intimidation, no fresh criminal activity after release. Despite this, the detention machinery was set in motion almost immediately after bail was granted. Counsel argued that ordinary remedies — seeking bail cancellation under Section 483(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, opposing bail, seeking stringent conditions, or proceeding under Section 111 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita if organised crime was genuinely alleged — were neither exhausted nor even considered. The detention order was therefore a punitive device to nullify a judicial order, not a genuine preventive measure.
The respondents countered that the delay was explained by the administrative complexity of processing twenty-four proposals simultaneously, the need to independently verify extensive material including FSL reports, call detail records, financial investigations and disclosure statements, and the fact that the Chandigarh Administration furnished the brief facts required for the Screening Committee only on 10 March 2025. The Screening Committee met on 16 April 2025, its minutes were received on 26 April 2025, and the detention order followed on 2 May 2025. On the proposal, the respondents argued it was merely an inter-departmental communication and not a relied-upon document required to be supplied under Article 22(5). On colourable exercise, they submitted that repeated bail and repeated involvement in narcotic offences demonstrated that ordinary prosecution had failed to deter Goel, justifying recourse to preventive detention.
How the Court Reasoned on Delay
Justice Bhardwaj examined the chronology in detail. The proposal was forwarded on 8 January 2025. The material was physically received in the concerned division on 13 January 2025. The Chandigarh Administration sent the brief facts for the Screening Committee only on 10 March 2025. The Screening Committee met on 16 April 2025. The detention order was passed on 2 May 2025. Execution occurred on 30 May 2025.
The court drew on its earlier judgment in Sadha Ram @ Bhajna Ram v. State of Haryana [2024 2 PLR 612], where it had exhaustively surveyed the governing principles and held that any inordinate or unexplained delay in initiating, passing, or executing a detention order may snap the live and proximate link between the alleged prejudicial activities and the necessity of detention. The court had also held in that case that the existence of a proximate, live and credible link between past conduct and imminent necessity is a sine qua non for sustaining preventive detention.
Applying those principles, Justice Bhardwaj found that the delay between the proposal and the order was not adequately explained. The administrative explanation — that twenty-four proposals were being processed simultaneously and that complete material arrived late from the sponsoring authority — did not, in the court’s view, constitute a satisfactory explanation capable of preserving the live nexus. The court also noted that the most recent FIR relied upon was dated 12 December 2024, and that by the time of execution on 30 May 2025, the material had become stale.
Non-Supply of the Proposal: Article 22(5) Violated
On the second ground, the court held that the proposal was not a mere inter-departmental communication. It was a foundational document because it disclosed the date on which the preventive detention machinery was set in motion against Goel. That date was directly material to the question of delay, which was itself a ground capable of vitiating the detention order. Without the proposal, Goel could not specifically demonstrate before the Advisory Board the gap between initiation and the passing of the order.
The court reiterated that Article 22(5) imposes two inseparable obligations: to communicate all grounds and materials relied upon, and to afford the earliest opportunity of making a representation. The right of representation becomes illusory if foundational documents are withheld. The court found that the non-supply of the proposal caused actual prejudice because it prevented Goel from raising a complete challenge on the ground of delay before the Advisory Board. This constituted a violation of Article 22(5).
Colourable Exercise of Power: Detention as Bail-Nullification
The court’s most pointed findings concerned the third ground. Justice Bhardwaj observed that the grounds of detention mechanically described Goel as an “organiser”, “kingpin” and person involved in “organised trafficking”, yet none of the seven FIRs contained any allegation of participation in an organised syndicate, drug cartel, interstate network, or commercial-scale trafficking operation. All recoveries were of small or intermediate quantities. The exaggerated terminology was unsupported by any corresponding factual material.
The court found that paragraph 4 of the grounds of detention recorded only vague apprehensions that Goel may indulge in similar activities in future, without disclosing any concrete instance, overt act, or credible material indicating that he had misused bail or interfered with the administration of justice in any manner. There was not even a whisper of bail misuse in the grounds of detention.
The sequence of events was telling: bail was granted on 27 December 2024; the detention proposal was forwarded on 8 January 2025. The court held that this sequence lent substance to the contention that the detention order was intended not to prevent future conduct based on any fresh or imminent threat, but to nullify the judicial order granting bail and to secure continued custody through executive action.
The court applied the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu [(2011) 5 SCC 244], which held that preventive detention is not to be used as a substitute for ordinary criminal law and that detention orders passed merely because a person has secured bail amount to a subversion of the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty. It also applied Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana [2023 SCC Online SC 1106], which emphasised proportionality, immediacy and genuine preventive purpose as prerequisites for curtailing liberty without trial.
Justice Bhardwaj held that the respondents had ample remedies available under ordinary criminal law — bail cancellation, stringent bail conditions, accelerated investigation, or invocation of provisions relating to organised crime — and that none of these were pursued with any seriousness before resorting to preventive detention. The absence of any attempt to exhaust ordinary remedies, combined with the absence of any material demonstrating their inadequacy, rendered the detention arbitrary, disproportionate and punitive in character.
Outcome
Justice Vinod S. Bhardwaj allowed CRWP-9307-2025 and quashed Detention Order No. U-11011/11/2025-PITNDPS dated 2 May 2025, along with its confirmation order dated 14 August 2025. The court declared the detention order non est and violative of the fundamental rights of the petitioner under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. All three issues were answered in favour of Goel. The full judgment was pronounced on 13 May 2026 and was declared reportable.