Haryana's Withdrawal of Extended Retirement Age for Disabled Employees Does Not Violate RPwD Act, Rules Punjab and Haryana HC

A Division Bench dismissed a challenge to Haryana's February 2026 notification that removed the 60-year retirement age for differently-abled employees, holding the amendment does not discriminate against a homogenous class under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.

The High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, in a judgment delivered on 22 April 2026, dismissed a writ petition filed by Madan Kumar, an employee of the Department of Elementary Education, Haryana, who suffers from bipolar affective disorder to the extent of 50%. The petitioner challenged a State notification dated 3 February 2026 that omitted clause (i) and Note 3 from sub-rule (1) of Rule 143 of the Haryana Civil Services (General) Rules, 2016, thereby withdrawing the benefit of retirement at 60 years that had previously been available to differently-abled employees with a minimum disability of 70% or above. The Division Bench, comprising Justice Ashwani Kumar Mishra and Justice Rohit Kapoor, held that the amended rule does not discriminate against persons with disabilities within the meaning of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, and that the State was entitled to prescribe a uniform retirement age for all employees except Group ‘D’ employees and Judicial Officers.

The Dispute Before the Court

Madan Kumar sought two reliefs: a declaration that the notification dated 3 February 2026 was invalid insofar as it omitted clause (i) and Note 3 from Rule 143(1) of the 2016 Rules, and a direction to the State to extend his service until the age of 60 years with all consequential benefits including pay, allowances, continuity of service, and pensionary benefits.

Before the notification, Rule 143(1) fixed the general age of superannuation at 58 years for all groups of employees, with four exceptions entitled to retire at 60 years: differently-abled employees with a minimum disability of 70% or above; blind employees; Group ‘D’ employees; and Judicial Officers. Note 3 to the rule required a Government employee who becomes disabled while in service to notify the Head of Department at least three months before turning 58, undergo examination by a Medical Board, and await a decision from the appointing authority on whether to grant an extension.

The notification of 3 February 2026 omitted clause (i), which covered differently-abled employees with 70% or above disability, clause (ii) covering blind employees, Note 1, and Note 3. Group ‘D’ employees and Judicial Officers retained the benefit of retirement at 60 years.

At the outset, the bench informed petitioner's counsel that the challenge to the same notification had already been rejected by this Court in Surender Singh and another v State of Haryana and others (CWP-4788-2026), dismissed on 17 February 2026, and in Rajnish Kumar and others v State of Haryana and others (CWP-5224-2026), dismissed on 10 March 2026.

The Legal Issue

Petitioner's counsel acknowledged the earlier dismissals but urged that a crucial factor had not been agitated in those matters: the rights of persons with disabilities guaranteed under the RPwD Act and the alleged violation of Articles 14, 16, 19(1)(g), and 21 of the Constitution of India.

The specific argument was that after the omission of clauses (i) and (ii), differently-abled employees who happen to hold Group ‘D’ posts or serve as Judicial Officers would still retire at 60, while all other differently-abled Government employees would be compelled to retire at 58. This, it was contended, creates an impermissible classification within a homogenous class, persons with disabilities, contrary to the principle laid down by this Court in Jora Singh v State of Haryana and others (CWP-2340-2023), decided on 6 November 2025.

In Jora Singh, the Court had found that the selective grant of extended superannuation only to employees with 70% or above disability or to visually impaired employees was in contravention of Article 14, since persons with disability of 40% or above constitute a homogenous class. The petitioner argued that the State, rather than extending the benefit to all eligible differently-abled employees as directed, had instead withdrawn the benefit entirely, misreading the observations in Jora Singh.

The State, through its Additional Advocate General, countered that the decision to omit the clauses was taken to eliminate discrimination and ensure uniformity in the age of retirement for all similarly situated employees. Reliance was placed on the findings in Rajnish Kumar, where the Court had examined the original records and found that the decision was taken after proper deliberation and did not suffer from arbitrariness. The State further argued that it is within its rights to prescribe different retirement ages for different categories of employees based on the nature of work, and that such variance does not violate the RPwD Act unless it results in discrimination between persons with disabilities and their similarly situated able-bodied counterparts.

How the Bench Reasoned

Justice Rohit Kapoor, writing for the bench, held that the arguments of the petitioner could not be accepted. The bench identified the core prohibition under the RPwD Act: Section 3 read with Section 20 prohibits Government establishments from discriminating against any person with disability in matters of employment, and mandates reasonable accommodation and an appropriate barrier-free environment.

The bench drew a clear line between two types of discrimination. What the RPwD Act prohibits is discrimination between disabled employees and their “similarly situated” able-bodied counterparts performing the same nature of work on the same posts. The Act does not prohibit the State from fixing different retirement ages for different categories of employees based on the nature of work and exigencies of public service.

On the argument that the notification creates an intra-class discrimination among differently-abled employees, those on Group ‘D’ posts or as Judicial Officers retaining the 60-year benefit while others do not, the bench held this challenge to be fundamentally flawed. The extended retirement age for Group ‘D’ employees and Judicial Officers was carved out by the State keeping in view the nature of work and exigencies of public service, not on the basis of disability. The RPwD Act would have been violated had the State fixed a different retirement age for differently-abled employees on those posts while granting the extended benefit only to their able-bodied counterparts. That was not what had happened.

The bench observed that the State Government had taken a conscious decision to maintain a uniform retirement age of 58 years for all employees except Group ‘D’ employees and Judicial Officers, and had not discriminated among similarly situated employees. Fixing different retirement ages for different categories based on intelligible differentia cannot be faulted.

On the separate plea that withdrawing the extended superannuation benefit amounted to withdrawing a reasonable accommodation contrary to the RPwD Act, the bench referred to its detailed analysis in Rajnish Kumar, where it had considered several judicial pronouncements including Bishnu Narain Misra v State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1965 SC 1567, and Kashmiri Lal Sharma v Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Limited, 2025 SCC Online SC 1355. In Rajnish Kumar, the bench had concluded that the State's decision does not violate any vested rights of the affected employees, either under the RPwD Act or under the Constitution of India. The bench applied the same conclusion in the present case.

The bench also accepted the legal proposition, common to both Kashmiri Lal Sharma and Jora Singh, that all differently-abled employees constitute a homogenous class under the RPwD Act. However, it held that this proposition does not assist the petitioner because the impugned notification does not discriminate between differently-abled employees and their similarly situated able-bodied counterparts; it applies a uniform retirement age across the board, with the Group ‘D’ and Judicial Officer exceptions resting on the nature of work rather than on disability status.

Outcome

The Division Bench found no merit in the writ petition and dismissed it. Pending applications, if any, were disposed of accordingly. The bench marked the judgment as speaking and reasoned, and indicated it is reportable.