Punjab & Haryana HC Upholds ₹7,500 Maintenance Despite Void Marriage Plea, Applies 2025 Supreme Court Ruling

Justice Mandeep Pannu dismissed a husband's revision after the Family Court, Fatehabad awarded maintenance to his wife and minor son, ruling that an alleged void marriage cannot automatically bar Section 125 Cr.P.C. claims in light of the Supreme Court's January 2025 decision in Smt. N. Usha Rani v. Moodududla Srinivas.

The Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh has dismissed a criminal revision petition filed by a husband challenging a Family Court order directing him to pay maintenance of ₹7,500 per month to his wife and minor son. Justice Mandeep Pannu, sitting singly, held that the petitioner's central argument — that respondent No.1 was disentitled from claiming maintenance because her alleged marriage to him was void due to the subsistence of an earlier marriage — could not be sustained in light of the Supreme Court's 2025 ruling in Smt. N. Usha Rani and another v. Moodududla Srinivas. The court found that the Family Court, Fatehabad had properly considered the evidence and had assigned cogent reasons for granting maintenance, and that no patent illegality or perversity warranted revisional interference.

The Dispute Before the High Court

Respondent No.1, Neelam Rani, claiming to be the legally wedded wife of the petitioner Jagga Ram, filed a petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Fatehabad, along with respondent No.2, her minor son Manpreet. She pleaded that the marriage between the parties was solemnised on 12 December 2015 according to Hindu rites and ceremonies, and that a male child was born out of the wedlock. She alleged that after the marriage she was subjected to cruelty, harassment and demands for dowry, compelling her to leave the matrimonial home. She claimed that the petitioner had sufficient means and had neglected to maintain her and the child, and sought maintenance of ₹30,000 per month.

Jagga Ram filed a detailed reply and raised a preliminary objection: that Neelam Rani had suppressed the fact that her earlier marriage was subsisting on the date of her alleged marriage with him, rendering the subsequent marriage null and void. He also pleaded that she had earlier filed a maintenance petition on the same cause of action, which was dismissed in default, and had deliberately concealed that fact. He further pointed out that a petition under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 seeking a declaration of nullity of marriage was pending before the competent Family Court. He additionally contended that Neelam Rani was an educated woman who had worked as a teacher in a private school and was capable of maintaining herself, and that she had voluntarily left the matrimonial home without sufficient cause.

Both parties adduced oral and documentary evidence. Neelam Rani examined herself and produced documentary exhibits (Ex.P1 to Ex.P-10 and Mark-P1 to P14) relating to the alleged marriage, the birth of the child, and other supporting material. The petitioner produced Ex.R1 to R3 to substantiate his claims regarding her concealed earlier marriage, the earlier dismissed maintenance petition, and the pending nullity proceedings.

The Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Fatehabad, vide judgment dated 27 January 2026, allowed the Section 125 Cr.P.C. petition and directed Jagga Ram to pay maintenance at ₹5,000 per month to Neelam Rani and ₹2,500 per month to the minor child till the child attains majority — a total of ₹7,500 per month. Aggrieved, Jagga Ram filed CRR(F) No.476 of 2026 before the High Court.

The Legal Question: Can a Void Marriage Bar Maintenance Under Section 125 Cr.P.C.?

Before Justice Pannu, counsel for the petitioner argued that the impugned order suffered from patent illegality, having been passed in disregard of the pleadings and evidence. The core submission was that Neelam Rani did not fall within the definition of “wife” under Section 125 Cr.P.C. because her alleged marriage to Jagga Ram was void ab initio — contracted during the subsistence of her earlier marriage without a decree of divorce from her first husband. Counsel relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat and others, (2005) 3 SCC 636, for the proposition that a woman whose marriage is void on account of a subsisting earlier marriage is not entitled to claim maintenance as a “wife” under Section 125 Cr.P.C.

The petitioner's counsel also pressed the argument that Neelam Rani's earlier maintenance petition on the same cause of action had been dismissed in default, and that as an educated woman who had worked as a teacher, she was capable of self-maintenance.

Justice Pannu identified the principal question as whether respondent No.1 could be denied maintenance merely on the ground that her alleged marriage was contracted during the subsistence of an earlier marriage — to be examined against the admitted fact that the parties had lived together as husband and wife for a considerable period and a child was born out of their relationship.

How the Bench Reasoned

Justice Pannu accepted that there was no dispute with the proposition in Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya as rendered on its own facts, but held that the legal position had been significantly developed by the Supreme Court in Smt. N. Usha Rani and another v. Moodududla Srinivas, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 225, decided on 30 January 2025.

In Smt. N. Usha Rani, the Supreme Court had considered the divergence in judicial opinion on whether a woman could claim maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. where the parties had lived together as husband and wife despite an alleged invalidity in the marriage. The Supreme Court noticed the earlier Division Bench ruling in Chanmuniya v. Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha and another, (2011) 1 SCC 141, which had held that the expression “wife” in Section 125 ought to receive a broad and expansive interpretation to include a woman who had lived with a man for a reasonably long period as his wife, and that a man should not be permitted to take advantage of legal technicalities while avoiding the corresponding duties of the relationship. That question had been referred to a larger bench.

The Supreme Court in Smt. N. Usha Rani also considered the earlier decisions in Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav and another, (1988) 1 SCC 530, Bakulabai and another v. Gangaram and another, (1988) 1 SCC 537, and Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya, observing that those decisions were based on a strict interpretation of “wife” and that Savitaben had followed the same line. Having considered the divergence of opinion and the beneficial purpose of Section 125, the Supreme Court ultimately held that a woman could claim maintenance from her second husband under Section 125 Cr.P.C. even where her first marriage had not been dissolved by a decree of divorce, provided she was de facto separated from her first husband and was not deriving any rights or entitlements from the first marriage — particularly where the second husband was aware of the circumstances and had nevertheless entered into the relationship.

Justice Pannu drew from this that Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya cannot be mechanically applied to every case where an objection is raised about the subsistence of an earlier marriage. The subsequent ruling in Smt. N. Usha Rani had specifically considered the earlier line of authorities and explained the circumstances in which a maintenance claim must be examined in light of the beneficial and remedial object of Section 125 Cr.P.C.

Applying this to the facts, Justice Pannu found that the parties had lived together for a considerable period and a child was born from the relationship. The objection based on the alleged subsistence of Neelam Rani's earlier marriage could not, by itself, be treated as sufficient to non-suit her — particularly when the surrounding circumstances and the nature and duration of the relationship were taken into account.

On the contention that an earlier maintenance petition had been dismissed in default, Justice Pannu held that a dismissal in default is fundamentally different from an adjudication on merits. The petitioner had not demonstrated that the earlier proceedings ended in any final determination disentitling Neelam Rani from pursuing her claim. A mere dismissal for non-prosecution, without adjudication of the substantive claim, cannot operate as a bar to fresh proceedings.

On the argument that Neelam Rani was educated and had worked as a teacher, the court held that this alone cannot be a ground for completely denying maintenance. Entitlement to maintenance must be assessed on the basis of the actual means and circumstances of the parties and the statutory parameters under Section 125. The Family Court had, upon appreciation of the evidence, exercised its discretion and awarded only ₹7,500 per month in total. Justice Pannu held that this amount could not, by any reasonable standard, be characterised as excessive or disproportionate, and was instead a modest amount intended to provide basic financial support.

The court also reiterated the limited scope of revisional jurisdiction: interference is warranted only where the order suffers from patent illegality, perversity, gross misappreciation of evidence, or material irregularity resulting in failure of justice. Having gone through the record, the court found no such infirmity in the Family Court's judgment.

Order

Justice Mandeep Pannu dismissed CRR(F) No.476 of 2026 on 6 August 2026. The maintenance awarded by the Family Court, Fatehabad — ₹5,000 per month to Neelam Rani and ₹2,500 per month to the minor child Manpreet till he attains majority — was directed to remain undisturbed. All pending applications were also disposed of.