Justice S. Goel Punjab & Haryana HC BAIL REFUSED Passport surrender ordered as HCrefuses to cancel travel-fraud
[ High Court of Punjab and Haryana ]

Travel Fraud FIR: Punjab & Haryana HC Dismisses Bail Cancellation Plea, Orders Passport Surrender

Justice Sumeet Goel dismissed a petition to cancel regular bail in a travel-services fraud case, holding that seriousness of offence alone cannot justify setting aside a bail order absent any supervening misconduct.

The High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh has dismissed a petition filed by a complainant seeking cancellation of regular bail granted to an accused in a travel-services fraud case. Justice Sumeet Goel, sitting singly, held on 15 September 2026 that the grounds raised — principally the gravity of the alleged offences and the accused's purported foreign connections — were available at the time the bail was originally considered and could not be re-agitated without any supervening circumstance. While declining to cancel the bail, the court directed the accused, respondent No. 2, to surrender her passport to the concerned trial court within seven days.

The FIR and the Dispute Before the High Court

FIR No. 231, dated 10 November 2025, was registered at Police Station Sector 53, Gurugram, Haryana, for offences punishable under Sections 318(4), 3(5), and 316(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS). The complainant, Manan Chugh, alleged that the accused — respondent No. 2 — along with her father and other co-accused persons, operated a travel business. He had paid “an amount of ₹8,90,000/- towards the proposed travel arrangements.” When the date of travel approached, the air tickets and hotel reservations turned out to be forged, cancelled, or otherwise invalid, forcing him to make fresh arrangements at substantially higher cost.

Additional Sessions Judge, Gurugram, granted regular bail to respondent No. 2 on 20 March 2026, subject to furnishing bail bonds of ₹1,00,000 with one surety in the like amount. The Sessions Court noted that the culpability of the accused would have to be established through evidence, which would take considerable time, and left it open to the prosecution to seek cancellation if the accused misused the bail concession.

Manan Chugh challenged that order before the High Court under Section 483(3) read with Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 — the successor provisions to Section 439(2) and Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Petitioner's Case: Perverse Order, Flight Risk, Multiple FIRs

Senior Advocate Sanjay Kaushal, appearing with other counsel for the petitioner, argued that the Sessions Court had committed a serious error by treating the matter as a mere contractual dispute rather than a case of deliberate cheating and forgery from the very inception. He submitted that the Sessions Court's observation about a “thin line between breach of agreement and cheating” was contrary to the material on record.

The petitioner also placed on record details of several other FIRs allegedly showing respondent No. 2's involvement in similar transactions. The senior counsel contended that this material was neither properly taken on record nor considered by the Sessions Court. Despite repeated demands, the accused allegedly adopted evasive tactics to avoid refunding the amount.

A significant flight-risk argument was also pressed: the petitioner alleged that respondent No. 2 had links outside India and had, on an earlier occasion, been intercepted at Indira Gandhi International Airport while allegedly attempting to travel to Dubai. The cumulative weight of multiple FIRs, organised modus operandi, alleged foreign connections, and apprehension of witness-tampering, the senior counsel urged, warranted cancellation of bail.

Respondent's Defence and the State's Position

Advocate Gurfateh Singh Khosa, appearing for respondent No. 2, argued that the petition was an attempt to seek a review of a well-reasoned order, which is impermissible. He contended that power under Section 483(3) read with Section 528 of BNSS is to be exercised only where the accused has misused the bail concession, interfered with justice, or violated bail conditions — none of which was alleged or established. No subsequent event or supervening circumstance after the grant of bail had been placed on record, he submitted.

The State, represented by Senior DAG Ms. Mahima Yashpal Singla, did not oppose the bail on merits but acknowledged that respondent No. 2 had been repeatedly involved in similar offences, reflecting a consistent pattern of conduct.

The Legal Distinction the Court Applied

Justice Goel extensively relied on the court's earlier judgment in Dinesh Madan v. State of Haryana and Another, CRM-M-9029-2023, decided on 17 May 2024, to restate the governing principles. That judgment drew a sharp distinction between two conceptually different reliefs: “cancellation of bail” and “setting-aside of a bail order.”

In a plea for cancellation, the applicant must primarily show supervening circumstances — such as the accused having influenced witnesses, violated bail conditions, committed another offence, or procured bail through fraud or misrepresentation. In a plea for setting aside, the challenge is to the propriety of the bail order itself, on the ground that it is illegal, perverse, or based on irrelevant considerations. The court in Dinesh Madan had described the difference as being “as stark as between chalk and cheese.”

The judgment also clarified the hierarchy of jurisdiction. A plea seeking to set aside an order of a Sessions Court must be filed before the High Court. The High Court, when dealing with such a plea, exercises a jurisdiction akin to appellate jurisdiction and can examine the veracity and propriety of the order from all perspectives — but without substituting its own opinion for that of the court below.

The Dinesh Madan judgment further specified that the degree of proof required in a cancellation plea is one of preponderance of probabilities, not proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Why the Petition Failed

Applying these principles, Justice Goel found that the petition was, in substance, a challenge to the Sessions Court's bail order on the ground of perversity and improper appreciation of material — not a cancellation plea based on post-bail misconduct. Analysed on that basis, the petition still fell short.

The court found that the petitioner had brought no material to show that after the grant of bail, respondent No. 2 had attempted to influence witnesses, tamper with evidence, or violate any bail condition. There was no allegation that she had absconded. The apprehensions expressed about flight risk and witness intimidation were described as “largely speculative and not supported by any cogent material.”

The grounds pressed by the petitioner — the gravity of the allegations, the alleged foreign connections, and the multiplicity of FIRs — were all circumstances available at the time of the bail hearing. They could not be re-agitated in the absence of any supervening development. The court held that mere dissatisfaction with the Sessions Court's reasoning, or the seriousness of the offence, by itself, is not sufficient to recall or set aside the bail order.

Examining the impugned order, the court found it to be a well-reasoned, speaking order that did not suffer from non-application of judicial mind. The Sessions Court had considered the time likely to be taken for the prosecution to lead evidence and the stage of trial, including the presentation of the challan. The High Court found no ground to hold that the Sessions Court had overstepped its jurisdiction or had failed to exercise it correctly.

Outcome

The petition filed under Section 483(3) read with Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 was dismissed. The regular bail granted to respondent No. 2 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Gurugram, on 20 March 2026 stands.

However, the court imposed a condition: respondent No. 2 is directed to surrender her passport to the concerned trial court within seven days from 15 September 2026. The court clarified that nothing in the order amounts to any expression of opinion on the merits of the case. Pending applications, if any, were disposed of.