Jumping From Train in Fire Panic Is Not Self-Inflicted Injury, Punjab and Haryana HC Rules; Awards Rs 8 Lakh to Parents of Deceased Passenger

The Punjab and Haryana High Court set aside a Railway Claims Tribunal order and held that a passenger who jumped from a moving train amid a fire rumour died in an untoward incident under Section 124-A of the Railways Act, entitling his dependent parents to statutory compensation.

The High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh has set aside the order of the Railway Claims Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, which had dismissed a compensation claim filed by the parents of a young man killed after jumping from the Sachkhand Express amid a fire scare. Justice Harkesh Manuja, sitting singly, held on 17 July 2026 that the Tribunal misapplied the statutory provisions of the Railways Act, 1989 by treating the passenger’s instinctive act of self-preservation as a self-inflicted injury and by wrongly concluding that his status as a passenger had ended the moment he stepped off the train. The appellants — the deceased’s dependent parents — are entitled to Rs 8,00,000 in compensation along with interest at 6% per annum from the date of the claim petition.

The Incident and the Claim Before the Tribunal

The deceased, Mayank, had attended a Jagran at Aurangabad and was returning to Karnal by Train No. 12715 Sachkhand Express on a valid railway journey ticket. As the train approached Harsana Kalan Railway Station, a rumour spread inside the compartment that the train had caught fire. Panic broke out among passengers. Several of them, including Mayank, jumped out of the train to save themselves. He was struck by another train moving on the adjacent track and died of the injuries.

His parents, Meena and another, being his dependent parents, filed a claim application before the Railway Claims Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench under Section 124-A of the Railways Act, 1989, seeking statutory compensation for his death as an untoward incident.

The Tribunal found, on evidence, that the deceased was travelling on a valid ticket and was a bona fide passenger. That finding was never challenged by the Railways. However, on the second issue, the Tribunal held that the deceased ceased to be a passenger the moment he stepped off the train after it halted due to alarm chain pulling. It further held that jumping from the train and being struck by another constituted a self-inflicted injury and his own negligent act, invoking the exceptions in clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to Section 124-A. The claim was dismissed by the Tribunal on 14 November 2025.

The Sole Legal Question on Appeal

Before the High Court, only one question fell for consideration: whether the circumstances of the death constituted an “untoward incident” within the meaning of Section 123(c)(2) read with Section 124-A of the Railways Act, or whether the case was excluded by the statutory proviso.

Section 124-A imposes strict liability on the Railway Administration to pay compensation when an untoward incident causes death or injury to a passenger. The proviso carves out exceptions — among them, self-inflicted injury under clause (b) and the passenger’s own criminal act under clause (c). The Railways relied on both these exceptions to resist the claim.

How the Court Reasoned

Passenger Status Does Not End Mid-Journey

Justice Manuja rejected the Tribunal’s conclusion that Mayank ceased to be a passenger the moment he alighted from the halted train. The Court held that the contract of carriage between the Railway Administration and a passenger does not terminate merely because the passenger is compelled to alight midway owing to extraordinary circumstances beyond his control. Mayank had not reached his destination; his journey was incomplete. His status as a passenger continued to subsist at the time of the accident.

The Court further held that the expression “untoward incident” in Section 123(c) must receive a liberal and purposive interpretation given the beneficial nature of the legislation. It relied on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar, (2008) 9 SCC 527, which held that Chapter XIII provisions of the Railways Act are welfare provisions deserving liberal construction so as to advance the object of the enactment. Where two interpretations are possible, the one advancing the remedy and extending the benefit to the victim must be preferred.

Negligence of a Passenger Is Not a Statutory Exception

The Court referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Jameela and Others v. Union of India, (2010) 12 SCC 443, which held that even where a passenger negligently stands near the open door of a running train and accidentally falls, such negligence does not deprive the dependants of statutory compensation. The Supreme Court in that case categorically held that negligence of the passenger is not one of the exceptions carved out under the proviso to Section 124-A.

Justice Manuja also applied the ruling in Union of India v. Rina Devi, (2019) 3 SCC 572, where the Supreme Court held that compensation under Section 124-A is founded on the principle of strict liability and not fault liability. Death or injury sustained in the course of boarding or deboarding a train ordinarily constitutes an untoward incident. The plea of contributory negligence cannot be imported into proceedings under Section 124-A. The burden lies squarely on the Railway Administration to prove that a statutory exception applies.

Panic-Driven Jump Is Not Self-Inflicted Injury

The Court held that the Tribunal committed a patent error in treating the deceased’s act as a self-inflicted injury under clause (b) of the proviso. The expression “self-inflicted injury” contemplates a deliberate or intentional act resulting in injury to oneself. A passenger who, under a genuine apprehension that the train has caught fire, jumps out to save his life cannot be attributed any intention to injure himself. His conduct is an instinctive act of self-preservation, not self-destruction. Equating such conduct with self-inflicted injury is wholly inconsistent with the object of the legislation.

On clause (c) — the deceased’s own criminal act — the Court found there was not even a whisper of evidence that the deceased had committed any criminal offence immediately before the incident. Deboarding a train in a state of panic cannot be elevated to the status of a criminal act. The statutory exclusion applies only where death is the direct consequence of an act amounting to an offence in law, not an act prompted by fear for one’s safety.

The Evidence Was Misread

The Tribunal had discarded the testimony of AW-2 Tinku, a co-passenger who consistently deposed that panic erupted in the compartment after the rumour of fire spread and several persons jumped from the train. His testimony remained substantially unshaken in cross-examination. The Tribunal instead assigned overriding weight to the testimony of RW-1, the Loco Pilot of the train that struck Mayank.

The High Court found this approach erroneous. The Loco Pilot had no occasion to witness what happened inside the Sachkhand Express. His testimony could only establish the circumstances in which he noticed passengers on the track; it could not disprove the existence of panic inside the train. The Tribunal itself had noticed that the train stopped due to alarm chain pulling and that a number of passengers had deboarded. Once those foundational facts stood established, the surrounding circumstances supported the appellants’ version that the deceased acted under a compelling belief that remaining inside the compartment posed a threat to his life.

Justice Manuja observed that human reaction to a perceived emergency is often instinctive, and the law cannot penalise a victim for acting in an attempt to preserve his life. Such conduct cannot be judged with the detachment of hindsight.

Persuasive Support From the Bombay High Court

The Court also drew on the Bombay High Court’s decision in Dhaneshwar Rajak and Another v. Union of India, reported as 2023 (4) AIR BomR 577, as persuasive authority. In that case, passengers had deboarded due to panic arising from smoke and fire inside a train and the resulting death was held to constitute an untoward incident falling outside the exceptions to Section 124-A. The Bombay High Court had held that Section 124-A does not require that a person fall directly from the train to claim compensation, and that the Railway had totally failed to establish that the incident fell within any exception. Justice Manuja expressed agreement with that reasoning.

Taken together, the Railways had failed to discharge the burden of establishing that any of the statutory exceptions applied. The Tribunal, instead of applying the liberal interpretation mandated by the Supreme Court, had imported notions of negligence and fault into a statutory scheme founded on strict liability. The impugned findings on Issue No. 2 could not be sustained.

Order

Justice Harkesh Manuja set aside the judgment dated 14 November 2025 of the Railway Claims Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, and allowed the claim petition filed by the appellants. The appellants are entitled to statutory compensation of Rs 8,00,000, along with interest at 6% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition until realisation. The respondent-Railways were directed to deposit the awarded amount before the Tribunal within eight weeks, after which the Tribunal shall release the same to the appellants in accordance with law. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, were also disposed of.