Punjab & Haryana HC Dismisses Revision Against Section 138 Conviction, Holds Admitted Signature Triggers Statutory Presumption

Justice Sumeet Goel affirmed concurrent conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, holding that an admitted cheque signature triggers the presumption of liability and a bald security-cheque plea cannot rebut it.

The High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh has dismissed a criminal revision petition filed by Narender Kumar, who had challenged his conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for dishonour of a cheque of Rs. 3,70,000/-. Justice Sumeet Goel, sitting singly, found no perversity or jurisdictional error in the concurrent findings of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Sirsa and the Additional Sessions Judge, Sirsa. The court held that once an accused admits his signature on a cheque, the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Act attaches automatically, and a bare assertion that the cheque was a blank security cheque — unsupported by any evidence — is wholly insufficient to rebut that presumption. The revision was reserved on 4 May 2026 and decided on 25 May 2026.

The Cheque Dishonour and Trial Court Proceedings

The complainant, respondent No. 2, alleged that Narender Kumar — who had worked at his shop from 2007 until August 2015 — approached him in the third week of December 2015 seeking a friendly loan of Rs. 1,50,000/- to meet medical expenses for the delivery of his wife. On account of cordial relations between the parties, the complainant advanced the amount. In the third week of January 2016, the accused returned seeking an additional Rs. 2,20,000/-, stating that his newly born child required medical treatment. The complainant lent that sum as well.

In discharge of the total liability of Rs. 3,70,000/-, the accused issued cheque No. 231216 dated 6 June 2016 drawn on Andhra Bank, Sirsa Branch. The cheque was presented and returned on 7 June 2016 with the remark “Funds insufficient.” A legal notice dated 24 June 2016 was served on the accused demanding repayment. He did not comply, prompting the complainant to file a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act before the trial court.

The trial court summoned the accused on 2 September 2016. Notice of accusation was served on 20 August 2019, and the accused did not plead guilty. The complainant examined the Bank Manager as CW-1 to prove the cheque return memo, Advocate Yogesh Garg as CW-2 to prove the statutory legal notice, and himself as CW-3. The complainant also placed on record a written agreement, marked as Ex. C-3, signed by the accused, acknowledging liability to pay Rs. 3,70,000/-.

In his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused denied any friendly relations with the complainant, stated he had not filled in the particulars of the cheque, denied receiving the legal notice, and claimed he had merely worked at the complainant's shop. He further claimed that the matter had been compromised for Rs. 1,00,000/-, of which he had already paid Rs. 65,000/-. He also alleged that Ex. C-3 was executed on blank papers he had signed.

The trial court convicted the accused and sentenced him. It discarded the denial of the legal notice because no suggestion to that effect was put to CW-2 or the complainant. Relying on the Supreme Court's judgment in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, 2019(2) RCR (Criminal), the trial court held that voluntarily signing and handing over a blank cheque does not invalidate it, and the burden remained on the accused to prove the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt. The compromise plea was rejected because the accused had not mentioned it in his Section 313 statement and no suggestion about it was put to the complainant in cross-examination. The plea that Ex. C-3 was signed on blank papers was rejected because the accused admitted his signature on the agreement but examined no witness to disprove its execution.

Appeal Dismissed; Revision Filed Before the High Court

The accused appealed to the Additional Sessions Judge, Sirsa. The appellate court concurred with the trial court on all counts and dismissed the appeal as devoid of merit. Dissatisfied, the accused filed CRR-1095-2025 before the High Court.

Before the High Court, counsel for the petitioner argued that both courts below had mechanically convicted the accused without appreciating material contradictions in the complainant's version. It was contended that the story of two separate cash loans in December 2015 and January 2016 was highly improbable and unsupported by independent evidence. Counsel placed particular emphasis on the cross-examination of CW-2 Advocate Yogesh Garg, who had allegedly admitted that after the complaint was filed, the parties settled the matter for Rs. 1,00,000/- and that Rs. 65,000/- had already been paid in his presence. It was also argued that Ex. C-3 had not been proved in accordance with law because no attesting witness was examined. The sentence was characterised as harsh and excessive.

Counsel for respondent No. 2 opposed the petition, contending that the petitioner had never disputed his signatures on either the cheque or Ex. C-3, that the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act therefore arose automatically, and that the petitioner had led no reliable evidence to rebut them. It was further submitted that a security-cheque defence unsupported by explanation of how the cheque came into the complainant's possession cannot rebut the presumption, and that even a security cheque constitutes acknowledgment of liability whose dishonour attracts Section 138. The State counsel noted that the dispute was essentially private in nature between the parties.

How the High Court Reasoned

Justice Goel addressed each contention in turn. On the core argument that the cheque was a blank security cheque and the liability of Rs. 3,70,000/- was never proved, the court held that the question is not whether the complainant has proved the necessity for the accused to issue the cheque; rather, it is for the accused to explain and prove the circumstances of issuing it, especially when he admits his signature. No cogent or convincing evidence was led to substantiate the security-cheque plea beyond a bald assertion.

On the argument that the complainant had failed to establish a pre-existing liability as required under Section 139, the court was unpersuaded. Section 139 creates a legal presumption in favour of the holder that the cheque was issued in discharge of a legal liability unless the contrary is proved. The burden therefore lay on the accused to prove the cheque carried no legal liability, and he failed to discharge it.

The petitioner had argued that both courts below selectively relied on his defence — using his non-denial of signature to establish execution of the cheque while rejecting the rest of his defence without adequate reasoning. Justice Goel described this as “much ado about nothing.” Since the accused did not deny his signature in his Section 313 statement or in the cross-examination of the complainant's witnesses, the courts below were bound to treat that as an admission. The accused had utterly failed to identify which crucial portion of his defence had been ignored.

On the testimony of CW-3 that the accused used to work at the complainant's shop and that the complainant knew the accused was going to have a child, the petitioner argued this showed the illness of the child had persisted for two to three months before the complainant became aware of it, casting doubt on the loan story. The court found this argument actually corroborated the complainant's version: it supported the account that the accused took a further loan of Rs. 2,20,000/- because of the ill health of the newborn.

On the settlement plea based on CW-2's cross-examination, the court agreed with both courts below that CW-2 Advocate Yogesh Garg had been examined solely to prove the issuance of the statutory notice under Section 138. He had not uttered anything about a settlement in his examination-in-chief. No evidence of any settlement for a reduced amount was proved on record. No suggestion about the alleged settlement or misuse of the cheque was put to the complainant when he appeared as CW-3. The petitioner could not derive any benefit from such a plea at the revision stage.

On Ex. C-3, the court held that once the accused admitted his signature on the agreement, the argument about the circumstances or necessity for its execution lost significance. The accused had every opportunity to disprove execution by examining witnesses but chose not to do so.

Scope of Revisional Jurisdiction

Justice Goel applied the principle that a revisional court does not, in the absence of perversity, disturb concurrent factual findings. The court cited the Supreme Court's judgment in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025(4) RCR (Criminal) 420, which restated that it is not for the revisional court to re-analyse and re-interpret evidence on record, and that the revisional court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error.

The petitioner had raised only factual grounds and had failed to point out any jurisdictional error or perversity in the findings of either court below. No material illegality or miscarriage of justice was demonstrated that could justify interference within the limited revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.

Order

Finding no merit in the revision petition, Justice Sumeet Goel dismissed it on 25 May 2026. The judgments of conviction and orders of sentence passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Sirsa on 25 July 2022 and affirmed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sirsa on 10 March 2025 were affirmed. All pending applications, if any, were disposed of.