Punjab & Haryana HC Drops Contempt Against Newspapers That Reported Kotkapura FIR Transfer Before Judgment Was Signed

A Division Bench held that news reports of the Kotkapura FIR trial transfer were fair and accurate under Section 4 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, because the judgment had already been pronounced in open court on 9 April 2026 — the absence of a signature did not alter that position.

The High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dismissed a criminal contempt petition on 6 May 2026 that had been initiated suo motu against the Editors-in-Chief, Editors, and Reporters of The Tribune, The Hindustan Times, and The Times of India (Chandigarh editions). The Division Bench of Justice Jasgurpreet Singh Puri and Justice Amarjot Bhatti found that the newspaper reports in question were factually correct and fell squarely within the protection of Section 4 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which shields fair and accurate reporting of judicial proceedings. The central legal question — whether publishing a judgment dictated in open court but not yet signed can constitute contempt — was answered in the negative, drawing on Supreme Court authority stretching back to 1954.

The Newspaper Reports and the Suo Motu Reference

Two transfer petitions, CRM-M-47941-2024 (Charanjit Sharma v. State of Punjab) and CRM-M-17867-2025 (Paramraj Singh Umaranangal v. State of Punjab), were heard together for final disposal on 9 April 2026. Both petitions sought transfer of trial in two FIRs — FIR No. 129 dated 7 August 2018 and FIR No. 192 dated 14 October 2015 — from the Sessions Court, Faridkot to a court of competent jurisdiction at U.T., Chandigarh. A common judgment was dictated in open court on that date, but it had not been signed by the time the hearing concluded.

The following morning, 10 April 2026, all three newspapers published reports stating that the High Court had transferred the trial of the Kotkapura FIR cases to Chandigarh. The learned Single Judge, on 11 April 2026, took note of these publications and recorded a prima facie view that an attempt had been made to overreach the court and interfere with the administration of justice. The Single Judge directed that the matter be treated as a criminal contempt petition against the Editors-in-Chief, Editors, and Reporters of the concerned newspapers, and the case was accordingly listed as CROCP-6-2026 before the Division Bench.

What the Judgment Actually Said

Before addressing the contempt question, the Division Bench examined the common judgment dated 9 April 2026 in the two transfer petitions. That examination was decisive. The bench found that the two FIRs had in fact been transferred from the Sessions Court, Faridkot to the court of competent jurisdiction at U.T., Chandigarh by way of that common order. The newspaper reports had stated precisely that. The bench recorded that it found “no falsehood in the publication.”

This factual finding disposed of the premise on which the Single Judge had initiated the reference. The reporting was not a fabrication or a premature distortion of proceedings; it accurately reflected what had been pronounced in open court.

Section 4 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

The bench then turned to the statutory framework. Section 4 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides that, subject to Section 7, a person shall not be guilty of contempt of court for publishing a fair and accurate report of a judicial proceeding or any stage thereof.

Applying that provision, the bench held that since the reporting was fair and accurate, it would not constitute contempt of court. The protection under Section 4 was available to the newspapers, their editors, and their reporters.

When Does a Judgment Become Operative: The Pronouncement Doctrine

The bench went further and addressed the underlying legal issue: does a judgment dictated in open court but not yet signed have operative force, such that reporting on it is reporting on a judicial proceeding?

The bench drew on three Supreme Court decisions. In Surendra Singh and Others v. State of U.P., 1954 AIR Supreme Court 194, the Supreme Court held that a judgment is the final decision of the court intimated to the parties and to the world at large by formal pronouncement or delivery in open court. The mode or manner of delivery is not of the essence; what matters is that the decision is formally declared in open court with the intention of making it the operative decision. Signing, sealing, and authentication are subsequent steps that can be cured if irregular, but they do not constitute the judgment itself. The Supreme Court had stated in that case that

In Vinod Kumar Singh v. Banaras Hindu University and Others, 1988 AIR Supreme Court 371, the Supreme Court reiterated that as soon as a judgment is delivered it becomes the operative pronouncement of the court, and that operativeness does not await the signing of the judgment.

In Kushalbhai Ratanbhai Rohit v. State of Gujarat, 2014 (9) SCC 124, the Supreme Court, referring to both earlier decisions as well as Iqbal Ismail Sodawala v. State of Maharashtra, 1975 (3) SCC 140, reaffirmed that the judgment is the final decision of the court intimated to the parties and the world at large, and that this position had been consistently maintained.

Applying this line of authority, the Division Bench held that once there is a formal pronouncement in open court, the judgment is operative. The judgment in the Kotkapura FIR transfer petitions had been dictated in open court on 9 April 2026. When the newspapers reported on 10 April 2026 that the trial had been transferred to Chandigarh, they were reporting on an operative judicial pronouncement. The absence of a signature on the judgment did not make the reporting premature or improper.

Outcome

The Division Bench held that the action of the newspapers, their Editors-in-Chief, Editors, and Reporters could not be termed criminal contempt. No further orders were required. The criminal contempt petition CROCP-6-2026 was dismissed on 6 May 2026. All miscellaneous applications, if any, were also disposed of.