State Cannot Grab Citizens’ Land by Adverse Possession, Punjab & Haryana HC Orders Compensation for Distributary Land Taken Without Acquisition

Punjab & Haryana High Court sets aside two concurrent decrees, holds the State cannot perfect title over private land by adverse possession and directs compensation at fair market price with solatium and interest within three months.

The High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh has held that a welfare State cannot invoke the doctrine of adverse possession to extinguish the ownership rights of its own citizens over land occupied for a public irrigation distributary. Justice Ramesh Kumari, sitting singly, allowed a Regular Second Appeal filed by landowners from Fatehabad district whose 7 Kanals of agricultural land had been used for the Banmandori Distributary since 1960 without any acquisition proceedings or payment of compensation. Both the trial court and the First Appellate Court had dismissed the landowners’ suit for possession, holding that the State had acquired title by adverse possession and that the suit was barred by limitation. The High Court reversed both decrees on 22 May 2026, treating the occupation as a “deemed acquisition” and directing the State to pay fair market price along with all statutory benefits.

The Dispute Before the High Court

The appellants — Ranbir Singh and others — claimed ownership of land measuring 119 Kanals in village Banmandori, Tehsil and District Fatehabad, as recorded in the Jamabandi for the year 2000–2001. The Banmandori Distributary passes through 7 Kanals of that holding, identified in Khasra Nos. 16//24/2, 33//4, 5, 32//1, 2, 3, 4. The distributary was originally a kacha channel but was subsequently brick-lined and cemented. The plaintiffs contended that the cementing was done forcibly and illegally, that the land was never acquired, and that no compensation was ever paid to them.

A demarcation report (Ex. P5) prepared by Field Kanungo Pardeep Kumar confirmed that the defendants were in possession of the suit land. After a legal notice dated 19 May 2004 went unheeded, the plaintiffs filed Civil Suit No. 316-C of 2004 seeking possession of the 7 Kanals.

The State of Haryana, through the Collector, Fatehabad, contested the suit. Its case was that the distributary had been in existence since 1960, was brick-lined in 1981–82, and that no objection was raised by the plaintiffs or their predecessors at any stage. The State argued that its possession was open, continuous, and hostile to the title of the true owners, and that it had therefore become the owner by adverse possession. It also argued that the suit, filed more than 44 years after the distributary was first constructed, was barred by limitation under Article 65 of the Limitation Act.

Concurrent Findings Below

The trial court, by its judgment dated 17 April 2006, dismissed the suit. It held that since the plaintiffs or their predecessors had not objected when the distributary was first carved out, they could not later challenge its cementing. It found the distributary’s existence to be in the general public interest and observed that the plaintiffs’ own witness had admitted the channel had been made pucca for at least 20 years. The trial court held the suit to be barred by limitation and also found it false and frivolous.

The District Judge, Fatehabad, dismissed the first appeal on 18 September 2006. The First Appellate Court found that the State’s possession since 1960 was open, continuous, and hostile to the title of the real owners to their knowledge and to the knowledge of the entire world. It held that the State had become the owner of the suit land by adverse possession and that the suit was not within limitation.

The High Court admitted the second appeal on three substantial questions of law: whether the State could take away the appellants’ land for making the distributary pucca without acquisition and without payment; whether the land could be encroached upon without notice or payment; and whether any period of limitation applies to a suit for possession based on title.

Why the State Cannot Plead Adverse Possession

Justice Ramesh Kumari examined the doctrine of adverse possession through the lens of the Supreme Court’s ruling in T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa, (2006) 7 SCC 570, which requires that adverse possession be hostile, open, continuous, and in express or implied denial of the true owner’s title. The court then turned to the specific question of whether the State, as a welfare State, can invoke this doctrine against its own citizens.

The court relied on State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, 2012(1) RCR (Civil) 17, which held that the right to property is not only a constitutional or statutory right but also a human right. It then applied the Supreme Court’s ruling in Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2020(2) SCC 569, which held that Article 300-A of the Constitution protects the right to property and that the State cannot dispossess a citizen except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, the Supreme Court had observed in Vidya Devi, can be inferred from Article 300-A itself.

The court also drew on the Supreme Court’s recent judgment in State of Haryana v. Amin Lal, 2024 INSC 875, decided on 19 November 2024, where the Apex Court had dismissed the State of Haryana’s appeal in a factually similar case involving land occupied without compensation. In Amin Lal, the Supreme Court had stated: “The State cannot be permitted to perfect its title over the land by invoking the doctrine of adverse possession to grab the property of its own citizens.”

The High Court distinguished the State’s reliance on Narinder Kumar v. State of Haryana (RSA No. 1631-2017, decided 16 March 2020), where this court had held a suit for possession of road land to be barred by limitation. Justice Ramesh Kumari held that Narinder Kumar could not be applied to the present facts in view of the settled position in the catena of Supreme Court judgments taking a contrary view.

The court also noted the Supreme Court’s disapproval in Pradyumna Mukund Kokil v. State of Maharashtra, 2015(6) SCC 406, of permitting a State instrumentality to raise a plea of adverse possession. Taken together, these authorities led the court to conclude that the State, being a welfare State, is expected to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens and cannot be permitted to become a “squatter” over the lawful possessory and ownership rights of its citizens.

On Limitation

Both courts below had held the suit barred under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes a 12-year period for a suit based on title from the date the plaintiff comes to know of adverse possession. The High Court rejected this reasoning. Since the State cannot be permitted to perfect its title by adverse possession in the first place, the premise on which the limitation bar was applied fell away. The court answered the third substantial question of law by holding that no period of limitation applies to a suit for possession based on title when the land is in illegal possession of the State.

Undisputed Ownership and the Demarcation Evidence

Justice Ramesh Kumari recorded that the plaintiffs’ ownership of the suit property was undisputed, as established by the Jamabandi for 2000–2001 (Ex. P2). The demarcation report (Ex. P5) proved by PW2 Pardeep Kumar, Field Kanungo, corroborated that the defendants were in possession of the 7 Kanals. The court accepted the testimony of PW1 Jai Singh, the power of attorney holder and father of the plaintiffs, noting that since he was conversant with the facts and much of the factual matrix was not disputed, his evidence could be read against the defendants.

The court found it undisputed that the suit property was never acquired and that no compensation was paid to the plaintiffs either at the time of the initial carving out of the distributary or at the time of its brick-lining. The fact that the distributary had been serving agriculturists in the area for decades did not, in the court’s view, extinguish the landowners’ right to compensation.

Deemed Acquisition and Directions

Having set aside the judgments of both courts below, Justice Ramesh Kumari acknowledged the practical reality that the distributary had been running over the suit property since 1960 or thereafter and that undoing the physical infrastructure would be contrary to the larger interest of the agriculturists of the area. The court therefore partly allowed the appeal rather than directing restoration of possession.

The State and its officials were directed to pay compensation at the fair market price of the 7 Kanals of land bearing Khasra Nos. 16//24/2, 33//4, 5, 32//1, 2, 3, 4, situated in village Banmandori, Tehsil and District Fatehabad, along with all statutory benefits including solatium and interest. The payment is to be made within three months from 22 May 2026, treating the occupation as a case of “deemed acquisition”. The court directed that a copy of the judgment be forwarded to the quarters concerned.

Outcome

Regular Second Appeal No. 4001 of 2006 is partly allowed. The judgment and decree of the trial court dated 17 April 2006 and the judgment and decree of the District Judge, Fatehabad, dated 18 September 2006 are set aside. The State of Haryana is directed to pay fair market price for 7 Kanals of land in village Banmandori, Fatehabad, along with solatium, interest, and other statutory benefits within three months, treating the matter as a deemed acquisition. The claim for restoration of physical possession was not granted given the distributary’s continued public use.