Knowing what exists is not the same as holding a copy: P&H HC on un-relied documents before charge

Applying the Supreme Court’s decision in Sarla Gupta, the Court holds an accused has no right to copies of un-relied material at the charge stage, and departs from its own earlier view.

An investigating agency collects far more than it produces. The documents it gathers and then does not rely on sit in its custody, listed but not supplied. On 18 September 2026, in Bhagwan Dass Garg and another v. Central Bureau of Investigation, Justice Manisha Batra of the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that an accused has no right to copies of that material at the stage of framing of charge — and that an earlier decision of the same Court recognising a wider right cannot survive the Supreme Court’s subsequent ruling in Sarla Gupta v. Directorate of Enforcement.

A long procedural road

The prosecution began with a written complaint dated 8 April 2020 by a Deputy Zonal Manager (Recovery) of Bank of India, Ludhiana, alleging fraud in the loan accounts of two related automobile companies causing wrongful loss of about Rs 28.99 crore. The complaint alleged that proper stock and bank account statements were not submitted, that false and fabricated documents were furnished, and that funds were diverted and round-tripped through various accounts and entities. An FIR was registered by the CBI, which filed a charge-sheet under Section 120-B read with Sections 420 and 471 IPC and the substantive offences, before the Special Judicial Magistrate, CBI, at SAS Nagar, Mohali.

After the charge-sheet, the petitioners applied under Section 91 CrPC for production of documents collected during investigation but not relied on by the prosecution — a stock audit report, loan applications, CIBIL reports, inspection reports, a valuation report, sanction letters, an enquiry report and a legal opinion. On 14 July 2023 the Magistrate allowed the application and directed the CBI to furnish copies.

What followed took three years. The CBI filed a revision. While it was pending, the High Court quashed the FIR and consequential proceedings on 27 May 2024, the trial court dropped the case, and the revision was disposed of as infructuous. The Supreme Court set aside the quashing order on 25 April 2025 and directed restoration of the proceedings. The trial court then directed compliance with its 2023 order, and the CBI filed a fresh revision with an application to condone 942 days of delay. The Special Judge condoned the delay, heard the revision and set aside the 2023 order. The petitioners came to the High Court.

Two rights, not one

The Court began with the provision. Section 91 CrPC empowers a court to summon a document where its production is necessary or desirable for the purposes of investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceedings. The power is discretionary, and whether a document is necessary or desirable cannot be judged in isolation: it depends on the stage of the proceedings and the purpose for which it is sought.

The significance of Sarla Gupta, the judgment explains, is that the Supreme Court did not treat an accused’s right to obtain documents as absolute or unrestricted at every stage. It drew a distinction between the right to know of the existence of un-relied material and the right to obtain copies of it before charge. The list of statements, documents, material objects and exhibits not relied on by the investigating officer must be furnished, so that the accused knows what is in the agency’s custody and can seek production at the appropriate stage.

Here the CBI had supplied the relied-upon documents and the list of un-relied documents, a position recorded in the Magistrate’s own order. The petitioners were therefore not being kept in ignorance of what existed. What they sought was copies, to deploy while opposing the framing of charge.

The narrow exception, and what it demands

The petitioners relied on Nitya Dharmananda, which permits production in defined circumstances. The Court held that the exception is not made out merely by showing that the documents were collected during investigation and are in the agency’s custody. The accused must go further and demonstrate that each document sought is of sterling quality and has a crucial bearing on whether the charge should be framed.

The petitioners’ own framing told against them on this point. They sought the documents to establish their innocence, which the Court identified as essentially a defence exercise — and a right to use a document in defence is not the same as a right to insist on its production before charge.

That is also why the order below did not offend the fair trial guarantee. The Special Judge had not permanently denied access: the order specifically preserved the petitioners’ right to summon the documents during trial, including while prosecution witnesses are examined, for cross-examination or at the stage of defence evidence. What the order regulates is the stage, not the entitlement.

An earlier view set aside

The petitioners’ strongest authority was Kalyani Singh, a decision of the same High Court holding that an accused could seek copies of un-relied documents, and could be given them before charge, on the reasoning that such material might assist in establishing innocence and that withholding it could cause prejudice when charge is considered.

The judgment accepts that Kalyani Singh recognised a wider right, and holds that it must now be read in the light of Sarla Gupta. It cannot be read as laying down an absolute proposition that an accused is entitled as a matter of right to copies of all un-relied documents before charge, because that reading would not be consistent with the later and authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court.

Order

The Special Judge had rightly applied the subsequent law and rightly set aside the order of 14 July 2023; the impugned order disclosed no patent illegality or perversity warranting interference. The petition was dismissed. The Court clarified that the dismissal will not stand in the way of the petitioners seeking production or summoning of the documents at the appropriate stage of trial in accordance with law, and that its observations are confined to the prayer for copies at the charge stage and have no bearing on the merits.