Punjab & Haryana HC Dismisses Challenge to HPSC’s Assistant Professor Selection Process, Refers Conflict on UGC Regulations to Larger Bench

Justice Harpreet Singh Brar dismissed an unsuccessful candidate’s challenge to Haryana’s multi-tier Assistant Professor selection process but referred a conflict between co-ordinate benches to a larger bench.

The High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dismissed a writ petition filed by Renu Kumari Rohal, an Assistant Professor candidate who failed to clear the Subject Knowledge Test conducted by the Haryana Public Service Commission for 123 posts of Assistant Professor (College Cadre) in Chemistry. Justice Harpreet Singh Brar, sitting singly, held that an unsuccessful candidate who participated in the selection process without protest is ordinarily estopped from challenging it afterward. The Court also ruled that the University Grants Commission (Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and other Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education) Regulations, 2018 set a minimum baseline, not an upper limit, so that a State government may prescribe more rigorous qualifications without violating the regulatory framework. Recognising an apparent conflict between its decision and an earlier co-ordinate bench ruling in Asha Rani and others v. State of Haryana and others (CWP No. 661 of 2026, decided 12.05.2026), the Court referred two questions to a larger bench.

The Dispute Before the Court

The Haryana Public Service Commission (HPSC) issued advertisement No. 43 of 2024 dated 2 August 2024, notifying recruitment to 123 posts of Assistant Professor (College Cadre) for Chemistry. The advertisement prescribed a three-stage selection process: a Screening Test of qualifying nature with a minimum cut-off of 25 per cent, a Subject Knowledge Test carrying 87.5 per cent weightage in the final merit list with a minimum cut-off of 35 per cent, and an interview carrying 12.5 per cent weightage.

Renu Kumari Rohal, a dependent of an ex-serviceman, held a JRF and NET certificate dated 22 December 2016. She cleared the Screening Test held on 29 May 2025 and appeared for the Subject Knowledge Test on 13 July 2025, scoring 52 marks. The qualifying threshold was 52.5 marks (35 per cent of 150), placing her just below the cut-off. She then approached the High Court seeking quashing of the advertisement and the subsequent proceedings, including the selection and appointment of the selected candidates (respondents No. 4 to 126).

Her primary contention was that the HPSC’s selection criteria conflicted with the UGC Regulations, which the State Government had adopted vide memo dated 11 November 2022. The UGC Regulations prescribe shortlisting on the basis of academic scores, research, publications and allied criteria as set out in Appendix II, followed by an interview carrying 100 per cent weightage, with no separate subject knowledge test. The petitioner argued that the State had circumvented this framework and that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Mandeep Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others 2025 INSC 834 made the UGC Regulations binding on state governments.

The State, through its counsel, countered that Mandeep Singh involved Punjab’s exclusion of Assistant Professor posts from the Punjab Public Service Commission and the dilution of UGC standards — a materially different situation. The State also argued that the petitioner had not challenged the memo dated 11 November 2022 by which the UGC Regulations were adopted with modifications, and that her challenge was plainly motivated by her failure to qualify.

Four Issues Framed for Adjudication

Justice Brar identified four issues: whether a challenge by an unsuccessful candidate was maintainable; whether the petitioner’s prayer could be considered without a challenge to the 11 November 2022 memo; whether conducting a Screening Test or Subject Knowledge Test violated the UGC Regulations; and whether the State Government was empowered to prescribe higher qualifications than those in the UGC Regulations.

Maintainability: Participation Without Protest Amounts to Acquiescence

On the first issue, the Court held the challenge not maintainable. It applied the settled principle that a candidate who participates in a selection process with full knowledge of its procedure and terms, and only challenges it after an adverse result, is deemed to have acquiesced and cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate.

The petitioner relied on Dr. (Major) Meeta Sahai v. State of Bihar and others (2019) 20 SCC 17 to argue that an unsuccessful candidate’s challenge remains maintainable where the selection body adopted an illegal procedure. The Court examined this argument in light of a two-Judge bench ruling in Mohit Kumar v. State of U.P. 2025 SCC Online SC 1125, in which the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Dipankar Datta, read Meeta Sahai narrowly. That ruling held that where illegality in a procedure could not reasonably have been foreseen before the result, a challenge cannot be rejected on the ground of participation alone — but where the illegality was foreseeable at the stage of the advertisement itself, a candidate who participated without demur ordinarily cannot challenge later.

The Court applied this reasoning directly. The petitioner, described as a well-qualified academic who claimed to satisfy all UGC Regulation prerequisites, had both the knowledge and the opportunity to challenge the advertisement when it was issued. No objection was raised through the Screening Test, which she cleared. She moved the Court only after failing the Subject Knowledge Test. The alleged illegality was not unforeseeable. The Court also drew on a two-Judge bench ruling in Rekha Sharma v. The Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur and another 2024 INSC 615, and a string of earlier Supreme Court decisions including Ranjan Kumar v. State of Bihar and others (2014) 16 SCC 187, Union of India and others v. S. Vinodh Kumar and others (2007) 8 SCC 100 and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Karunesh Kumar and others 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1706.

The first issue was answered in the negative: a challenge to the impugned advertisement by unsuccessful candidates is not maintainable.

The Unchallenged Memo of 11 November 2022

On the second issue, the Court noted that the State had adopted the UGC Regulations vide memo dated 11 November 2022 with modifications — specifically to Clause 5.1(v) and Clause 6.0 — vesting the power to frame selection criteria in the HPSC rather than a selection committee. The petitioner argued that this circumvented the mandatory requirement of a selection committee under the UGC Regulations. However, the validity of the 11 November 2022 memo had not been challenged in the writ petition.

Relying on a Division Bench ruling of the Court in Dhani Ram Chaudhary v. State of Haryana and another 2005 (1) SCT 571, Justice Brar held that when a rule or order is not impugned, the petitioner is presumed to have accepted it in its present state. The Supreme Court’s ruling in State of Rajasthan v. Sanyam Lodha (2011) 13 SCC 262, holding that a court ought not to read down a rule in the absence of any challenge to its validity, reinforced this conclusion. The second issue was accordingly answered in the negative.

UGC Regulations as a Floor, Not a Ceiling

The third and fourth issues were addressed together and yielded the most detailed analysis. The Court traced the constitutional framework: the UGC Act, 1956 is anchored in Entry 66 of List I (co-ordination and determination of standards in higher education), while Entry 25 of List III (Concurrent List) permits states to legislate on education subject to Entry 66. The UGC Regulations are framed under Section 26 of the UGC Act and form part of central legislation.

The Court held that the full title of the UGC Regulations — prescribing “minimum qualifications” for appointment of teachers — discloses their purpose: to set a mandatory baseline, not an exhaustive ceiling. A State that goes beyond the baseline by adding more rigorous scrutiny does not violate Entry 66; it falls foul of Entry 66 only if it dilutes or substitutes the prescribed standards.

The Court distinguished the present situation from Mandeep Singh 2025 INSC 834, where the State of Punjab had departed from the UGC Regulations by diluting standards, making the departure fatal to the selection process. Here, Haryana had added layers — the Screening Test and the Subject Knowledge Test — without removing or diminishing any UGC-prescribed criterion. The interview process had not been dispensed with, and the impugned advertisement did not reduce eligibility requirements.

A Constitution Bench ruling in Dr. Preeti Srivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1997) 7 SCC 120, speaking through Justice Sujata V. Manohar, was applied: a State may prescribe qualifications in addition to those under Entry 66 so long as those additions do not lower the norms laid down by the Union. A two-Judge bench ruling in State of Tamil Nadu and another v. Adhiyaman Education & Research Institute and others (1995) 4 SCC 104 was also applied, which held that when there are more applicants than available posts, the State is not prevented from laying down higher standards than those prescribed by the Centre in order to short-list applicants.

On the practical dimension, the Court invoked Madhya Pradesh Public Service Commission v. Navnit Kumar Potdar 1994 INSC 398, in which the Supreme Court recognised that conducting meaningful interviews for a very large applicant pool is not always feasible, and that short-listing by written or screening tests is a rational part of the selection process. The more recent ruling of the Supreme Court in Allahabad University v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) etc. 2025 AIR SC 195, speaking through Justice Dipankar Datta, reaffirmed that recruiting authorities may prescribe enhanced norms to restrict the zone of consideration for interview, provided those enhanced norms are not arbitrary or contrary to governing statutory provisions.

The Court recorded that the petitioner did not argue that the advertisement’s criteria diluted UGC standards or lacked a rational nexus with the object of the selection. Her argument was that since she already satisfied UGC Regulation prerequisites, she should not face additional scrutiny — a contention the Court declined to accept.

The third and fourth issues were answered accordingly: conducting a Screening Test or Subject Knowledge Test does not violate the UGC Regulations, and the State Government is empowered to prescribe more rigorous qualifications than those in the Regulations so long as the UGC criteria are not diluted.

Reference to a Larger Bench

Despite dismissing the petition, the Court identified an apparent conflict between its reasoning and the co-ordinate bench decision in Asha Rani and others v. State of Haryana and others, CWP No. 661 of 2026 (decided 12 May 2026). That judgment had set aside the 35 per cent minimum cut-off for the Subject Knowledge Test. The present bench took a contrary view on the permissibility of such additional scrutiny.

To resolve the conflict, Justice Brar referred two questions to a larger bench:

(i) Whether the State Government is empowered to prescribe higher qualifications, in addition to those in the UGC Regulations 2018, including stipulation of a Screening Test or Subject Knowledge Test?

(ii) Whether the State Government is legally bound to accept the UGC Regulations 2018 in their entirety without modification?

The Registry was directed to place the matter before the Acting Chief Justice for listing before an appropriate bench.

Order

CWP-19612-2026 was dismissed. The Court directed that the two questions framed above be referred to a larger bench and instructed the Registry to place the matter before the Acting Chief Justice for constituting an appropriate bench to hear the reference.