Justice M. Batra Punjab & Haryana HC PROCEEDING QUASHED Surety cannot be penalised forparolee's acts beyond their
[ Punjab and Haryana High Court ]

Punjab & Haryana HC Cuts Parole Surety Forfeiture from Rs 2 Lakh to Rs 50,000, Faults DM's Mechanical Order

Without any finding of connivance or wilful default by the sureties, the District Magistrate could not mechanically recover the entire Rs 2,00,000 surety bond amount, Justice Manisha Batra held.

The Punjab and Haryana High Court has partly allowed a petition challenging the forfeiture of surety bonds executed for a convict who was granted parole, reducing the recoverable amount from Rs 2,00,000 to Rs 50,000 against each petitioner. Justice Manisha Batra, sitting singly at Chandigarh, held that while a District Magistrate is entitled to initiate forfeiture proceedings when parole conditions are breached, recovery of the maximum bond amount without recording any finding of wilful default, connivance, or facilitating conduct on the part of the sureties is disproportionate and not consistent with the judicial discretion recognised by the Supreme Court. The order dated 23 February 2022 passed by the District Magistrate, Rohtak was accordingly modified.

Parole, a Fresh FIR, and Forfeiture Proceedings

Convict Sandeep was serving sentence in FIR No. 350 of 2014 registered under Sections 506, 376-D and 366 of the Indian Penal Code. He was granted parole for three weeks by order dated 6 April 2020 so that he could meet his family. The petitioners, Shamsher Singh and another, stood surety for his temporary release, each furnishing a surety bond of Rs 2,00,000 before the competent authority.

The parole warrant required the prisoner to maintain peace, observe the conditions of release, and surrender before the jail authorities on expiry of the parole period. During the parole period itself, the convict was allegedly involved in a fresh criminal case. FIR No. 99 dated 26 May 2020 was registered against him under Sections 148, 149, 323, 302, 506 and 120-B IPC and Section 25 of the Arms Act at Police Station Bahu Akbarpur, District Rohtak. The convict was taken into custody during the parole period in connection with this case.

The Jail Superintendent informed the District Magistrate that the convict had violated the conditions of parole by indulging in criminal activities during his temporary release and requested initiation of proceedings under Section 10(2)(c) of the Haryana Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 1988. Show cause notices were issued to the petitioners. After hearing them, the District Magistrate passed the order dated 23 February 2022 directing forfeiture of the entire surety amount of Rs 2,00,000 from each petitioner and ordered its recovery. Recovery proceedings, including issuance of proclamation for sale of the petitioners' property, followed.

The petitioners approached the High Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking quashing of the forfeiture order and all consequential proceedings.

The Surety's Obligation Under the 1988 Act

The Haryana Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 1988 governs the temporary release of prisoners on parole and the conditions attached to such release. Section 10(2)(c) of the Act permits initiation of proceedings against sureties when the parolee violates the conditions of his temporary release. The State argued that the District Magistrate had followed the prescribed procedure, issued show cause notices, afforded the petitioners an opportunity of hearing, and passed the forfeiture order in accordance with the Act and Rules framed thereunder. The State maintained that there was no violation of the principles of natural justice.

The petitioners countered that the order was passed mechanically, without proper application of mind or a meaningful inquiry. Their counsel, Mr. Dharamvir Sharma, argued that no finding had been recorded that the petitioners had wilfully breached any condition of the bond. He pressed that mere registration of an FIR against the convict — allegations yet to be adjudicated by a competent court — could not automatically trigger full forfeiture. He further argued that a surety's liability is limited and does not extend to controlling or supervising the personal conduct of an adult parolee throughout the parole period. Critically, the convict had already been taken into custody during the parole period itself, meaning the primary object of the surety — ensuring the prisoner's availability before authorities — had substantially been fulfilled.

The Court's Reasoning on Proportionality and Judicial Discretion

Justice Batra began by affirming that a surety bond under the 1988 Act is not an empty formality. A person who voluntarily stands surety for a prisoner's temporary release subjects himself to the statutory consequences of breach. The court accepted that the petitioners' non-involvement in the alleged criminal occurrence would not completely absolve them of liability under the bonds they had executed.

The court then turned to the extent of that liability. It drew on the Supreme Court's decision in Mohammed Kunju v. State of Karnataka, (1999) 8 SCC 660, which itself relied on the earlier decision in Ram Lal v. State of U.P., AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1498. Those decisions hold that the surety's undertaking is independent and enforceable according to the terms of the bond, but that where a bond stands forfeited, the competent authority is not bound to recover the entire amount in every case. The authority possesses discretion to remit or reduce the penalty depending on the facts and circumstances, provided that discretion is exercised judicially and on sound principles.

Applying that ratio, Justice Batra identified two specific failures in the District Magistrate's order. First, the order contained no finding that the petitioners had facilitated the convict's alleged criminal conduct, had knowledge of it, or had connived with the parolee in any manner. There was equally no finding that the petitioners had intentionally failed to discharge any obligation under the surety bonds. Second, the order did not assign any reasons for why recovery of the maximum amount of Rs 2,00,000 was considered necessary. The conduct of the petitioners, the absence of any allegation of connivance, and any other mitigating circumstance relevant to fixing the extent of liability were entirely absent from the order's reasoning.

The court drew a practical boundary on what a surety can reasonably be expected to do: “a surety is not expected to exercise continuous physical control or surveillance over the movements of an adult parolee.” Once the authority itself grants temporary release, the surety can only ensure compliance to the extent reasonably possible. Unless wilful negligence or active connivance is disclosed, forfeiture of the entire bond amount is not consistent with the principle of proportionality governing this power.

The court also took note of the fact that the convict had been taken into custody during the parole period itself, which meant the sureties' core obligation — ensuring the prisoner's availability — had substantially been achieved through the authorities' own action. Recovering the full bond amount in such circumstances, without any inquiry into the petitioners' actual conduct, rendered the order unduly harsh.

Outcome

Justice Batra partly allowed CRM-M-23119-2026. The impugned order dated 23 February 2022 was modified. The amount recoverable from each petitioner stands reduced from Rs 2,00,000 to Rs 50,000. The court held that this reduction adequately reflects the petitioners' liability consistent with the principles laid down in Mohammed Kunju.

If any amount in excess of Rs 50,000 has already been recovered from either petitioner, the same is to be refunded to them in accordance with law within eight weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order. All coercive recovery proceedings in respect of any amount beyond Rs 50,000 stand curtailed to that extent.