Soldier's Death from Cardiac Arrest on Casual Leave Attributable to Military Service, Punjab and Haryana HC Rules

The Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissed the Union of India's challenge, holding that a soldier who died of cardiac arrest on the first day of casual leave was still in service and entitled his widow to special family pension.

A Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, comprising Justice Harsimran Singh Sethi and Justice Amarinder Singh Grewal, on 28 July 2026 dismissed a writ petition filed by the Union of India challenging an Armed Forces Tribunal order that had granted special family pension to the widow of a deceased soldier. The soldier died on 17 January 2017 from cardiac arrest — on the very first day of a period of casual leave that had been sanctioned from 16 January 2017 to 30 January 2017. The Union argued his death could not be attributed to military service because he was not on active duty. The bench rejected that argument on two independent grounds: that cardiac arrest arising from stress and strain of service is treated as service-attributable under the applicable pension regulations, and that a soldier on casual leave remains legally on duty for pensionary purposes.

The Tribunal Order Under Challenge

The Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Chandigarh had passed its order in OA No. 512 of 2021 on 15 December 2022. It directed that Smt. Shakuntla Devi, widow of the deceased soldier, be granted special family pension with effect from 18 January 2017 — the day next to the date of death.

The Union of India and other petitioners filed CWP No. 23181 of 2026 before the High Court, contending that the Tribunal's order was perverse. Their sole argument was that the death occurred while the soldier was on casual leave and therefore outside the scope of active duty. Any fatal event not on active duty, they submitted, could not be treated as attributable to or aggravated by military service. They pointed out that a formal assessment had also concluded the death was not attributable to military service.

Ms. Bhavana Datta, Senior Panel Counsel, appeared for the Union of India.

The Two Issues the Bench Identified

Justice Harsimran Singh Sethi, writing for the bench, distilled the matter into two discrete questions. First, whether the death of the soldier by cardiac arrest could at all be considered attributable to military service. Second, whether the fact that death occurred during casual leave — rather than during active duty — was a bar to treating it as service-attributable for purposes of special family pension.

Both questions were answered against the Union of India.

Cardiac Arrest, Stress, and the Pension Regulations

On the first issue, the bench turned to Appendix II, Para B of the Pension Regulation and Entitlement Rules for Casualty Pensionary Awards, 1982. That provision classifies diseases and identifies stress and strain as a cause of cardiac arrest, among other conditions.

The bench reasoned through the causal chain: stress and strain accumulates during military service from multiple factors including food, area of posting, and the arduous nature of the job. That stress leads to high blood pressure. High blood pressure, in turn, leads to cardiac arrest. Since the soldier was recorded as fit at the time he joined military service, the bench held the entire chain ran back to military service. Under the 1982 Regulations, the death was therefore to be treated as attributable to military service.

The bench noted that the Tribunal had correctly applied this reasoning and that the petitioners had not displaced it with any contrary medical or regulatory basis.

Casual Leave Does Not Break the Service Nexus

On the second issue — the one the Union pressed most strongly — the bench held that the relevant inquiry is not whether the soldier was on active duty at the moment of death, but whether he was still in service at that time. On that question, there was no dispute: the soldier had served for more than 17 years and died on the first day of his casual leave.

The bench stated that as per the rules governing service, a personnel member on casual leave is to be treated as on duty. Critically, the petitioners did not rebut this position either factually or by pointing to any contrary regulation.

The bench relied on a Full Bench judgment of the same court in Union of India through Secretary v. Khushbash Singh, decided on 31 March 2010 in LPA No. 978 of 2009. The Full Bench had laid down that an army personnel on casual leave or annual leave shall be considered to be on duty, subject to a specific exception under Rule 11 of the Leave Rules where the personnel had not actually performed duty in that year. That exception did not arise on the facts of the present case.

The Full Bench in Khushbash Singh had further held that where a disability or death results from natural causes while the personnel is on duty, the question is whether the intervention of army service caused the disability. The bench in the present matter found that the cardiac arrest, tracing back to service-related stress and strain, satisfied this standard.

Why the Perversity Challenge Failed

The Union's writ petition was framed on the ground that the Tribunal's order was perverse — a high threshold in judicial review of Tribunal decisions. The bench found the Tribunal's order consistent with both the applicable pension regulations and the settled legal position on casual leave. There was no perversity either on facts or on law that would have warranted interference.

The bench observed that the argument that death on casual leave cannot be attributed to military service “stands defeated” in light of the conceded position that the soldier was in continuous service for over 17 years and died on the first day of the leave period.

Outcome

The writ petition was dismissed. The order of the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Chandigarh dated 15 December 2022 in OA No. 512 of 2021 was upheld. Smt. Shakuntla Devi remains entitled to special family pension with effect from 18 January 2017. Any pending miscellaneous applications in the writ petition were also disposed of. The judgment was marked as speaking and reasoned, though not reportable.