Rajasthan HC Quashes Rejection of Section 311 Application in POCSO Trial Where Prosecutrix's Age Is Disputed Across Three School Records

The Rajasthan High Court held that summoning a school principal and Class-I admission record was essential to determine the prosecutrix's correct date of birth in a POCSO trial, and that rejecting the application on a technical ground was unsustainable.

Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand, sitting singly at the Jaipur Bench of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, on 20 May 2026 quashed an order by which the Special Judge, POCSO Act, Sawai Madhopur had rejected an application filed by the accused under Section 311 read with Section 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The accused, Chetan Mali, is facing trial for offences under Sections 366, 363, 376, 344 and 346 IPC, Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, and Sections 5 and 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The central factual dispute — whether the prosecutrix was a minor on the date of the alleged occurrence, 13 November 2018 — turns entirely on which school record correctly records her date of birth, and three different documents give three different answers.

Three Documents, Three Dates of Birth

The prosecution's case rests on the Class-IV admission form of the prosecutrix, which records her date of birth as 10 February 2001. On that date, she would have been 17 years old on 13 November 2018, placing her squarely within the definition of a child under the POCSO Act.

The petitioner placed on record the Secondary School Certificate issued by the Board of Secondary Education, which records the prosecutrix's date of birth as 10 February 2000. That document would make her 18 years old on the date of the alleged occurrence.

A third document entered the picture when the petitioner claimed that the prosecutrix had studied at Upper Primary Aadarsh Vidhya Mandir, Chhan, and that her Class-I school record at that institution records her date of birth as 5 July 1999. If accurate, she would have been 19 years old on 13 November 2018 — a major by any measure.

It was to produce this third record, along with the school's principal, Chiranjilal son of Kaduram, that the petitioner filed the application under Section 311 read with Section 91 CrPC before the trial court.

Why the Trial Court Rejected the Application

The Special Judge at Sawai Madhopur rejected the application on two grounds. First, the petitioner had not filed affidavits of other persons along with the application. Second, the application was submitted at the stage of final arguments, which the trial court treated as a disqualifying circumstance.

The prosecution and the complainant's counsel supported that rejection before the High Court. They argued that the application was filed at the “fag end of the trial” only to delay disposal, and that the petitioner had not explained how or when he came to know about the Class-I school record at Upper Primary Aadarsh Vidhya Mandir. They also pointed out that during investigation the police had already collected the Class-IV admission form and a certificate from Sharma Shikshan Sansthan Secondary School, Chhan, both of which showed the date of birth as 10 February 2001.

The Court's Reasoning on Section 311 and Age Determination

Justice Dhand examined the scope of Section 311 CrPC by reference to the Supreme Court's judgment in Natasha Singh v Central Bureau of Investigation (State), reported in (2013) 5 SCC 741. The court extracted paragraph 8 of that judgment, which states that Section 311 empowers a court to summon a material witness or examine a person present at any stage of any enquiry, trial, or other proceedings, and that the court may exercise this power even suo motu. The discretion, the Supreme Court had held, must be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily, and the court must satisfy itself that examining the witness is essential to arriving at a just decision.

Justice Dhand then turned to Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, which deals with the presumption and determination of age. Sub-section (2) of Section 94 provides that where there is reasonable ground for doubt regarding age determination, the age is to be determined on the basis of the date of birth certificate from the school or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination board, if available.

The court found that two documents were already on record — the Class-IV admission form showing 10 February 2001 and the Board of Secondary Education certificate showing 10 February 2000 — and that the petitioner was asserting a third date, 5 July 1999, from the Class-I record. With three different dates in play and the entire character of the offence depending on whether the prosecutrix was a minor, the court held that the Class-I school record was essential to a just decision.

On the technical grounds cited by the trial court, Justice Dhand held that the purpose of Section 311 CrPC is

Directions to the Trial Court

The High Court quashed and set aside the impugned order dated 29 July 2024 passed by the Special Judge, POCSO Act, Sawai Madhopur. The trial court was directed to summon Chiranjilal son of Kaduram, Principal of Upper Primary Aadarsh Vidhya Mandir, Chhan, along with the prosecutrix's Class-I school record from that institution.

Justice Dhand further directed the trial court to make all possible endeavours to summon the record and the witness and to record the witness's statement expeditiously. The trial court was also directed not to entertain any unnecessary or unwarranted request by either side to defer the matter, and to conclude the trial as early as possible.

Order

S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 5961/2024 was allowed. The order dated 29 July 2024 passed by the Special Judge, POCSO Act, Sawai Madhopur stands quashed and set aside. The trial court is directed to summon the principal of Upper Primary Aadarsh Vidhya Mandir, Chhan along with the prosecutrix's Class-I school record, record his statement expeditiously, and conclude the trial without unnecessary adjournments. The stay application and all pending applications stand disposed of.