Rajasthan HC Dismisses CSD Employee's Writ Against Transfer from Jaipur to Mumbai HO, Finds No Mala Fide

A Division Bench held that CSD's transfer policy is a guideline, not an enforceable right, and that administrative exigency alone justified moving an LDC from Jaipur to Mumbai headquarters.

The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur, on 10 June 2026 dismissed a writ petition filed by Chhatrapal Singh Gour, a Lower Division Clerk (Stores) in the Canteen Stores Department (CSD), Ministry of Defence, who challenged his transfer from Jaipur Depot to the Head Office (Secretariat Branch) in Mumbai. A Division Bench of Justice Uma Shanker Vyas and Justice Ashok Kumar Jain, with the judgment authored by Justice Ashok Kumar Jain, affirmed the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jaipur Bench, which had dismissed the petitioner's Original Application. The court held that the CSD's Transfer Policy dated 04.10.2011 confers no legally enforceable right on an employee, that the petitioner had completed his minimum tenure, and that no mala fide intention on the part of the respondents had been established.

The Dispute Before the High Court

Chhatrapal Singh Gour was appointed as LDC (Stores) in the CSD and joined at Bathinda on 14 December 2018. On 27 March 2023, he was transferred to Jaipur Depot on his own request. By order dated 03 February 2025, he was transferred to HO (Secretariat Branch), Mumbai — approximately 1,200 kilometres from Jaipur.

The petitioner filed a representation against the transfer, which was dismissed on 06 May 2025. He then approached the CAT by filing O.A. No. 218/2025, which was disposed of on 13 May 2025. He filed a second application, O.A. No. 230/2025, challenging the dismissal of his representation. The Tribunal quashed the dismissal order and directed the respondents to pass a speaking and reasoned order on the representation.

The respondents complied and passed a speaking order on 30 May 2025. The petitioner challenged that order before the CAT in O.A. No. 307/2025. The Tribunal dismissed the application on 26 May 2026, finding that the petitioner had already completed more than three years at Jaipur Depot, that the longest-stayee norm is not absolute, and that the transfer was made to meet functional requirements at the Mumbai headquarters due to a shortage of LDC (Stores) staff there. The petitioner then filed D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10104/2026 before the High Court.

Arguments Raised by the Petitioner

Counsel for the petitioner advanced several grounds. First, he argued that the appointment letter dated 16 November 2018 appointed the petitioner specifically as LDC (Stores) and did not authorise the respondents to post him at the Head Office or any wing other than Stores. Second, he contended that the Transfer Policy of Group 'C' employees dated 04.10.2011 required the administration to follow the “longest stay and choice station formula” before resorting to an administrative transfer, and that this obligation was not discharged.

Third, the petitioner pointed to a list of 25 persons senior to him and three persons junior to him who were posted at Jaipur and were not considered for transfer, arguing that the longest-stayee norm was selectively ignored. Fourth, he submitted that not a single document on record demonstrated the administrative exigency that necessitated his transfer to Mumbai.

Fifth, and most significantly, counsel argued that the transfer was vindictive. The petitioner had complained about non-payment of bonus for 2022-23, sent an e-mail to the Defence Minister, and filed an RTI application seeking information about the bonus. He also filed a representation on 07 November 2023 about being deployed under a junior employee. Counsel submitted that these acts were the trigger for the transfer, which was designed to suppress the petitioner's voice, even though no disciplinary proceedings had ever been initiated against him.

No one appeared on behalf of the respondents despite service in the office of the learned Additional Solicitor General.

The Legal Framework on Transfer Orders

The Division Bench set out the settled legal position before examining the specific grounds. It reiterated that transfer is an incident of service and that an employee has no vested right to remain posted at a particular station. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, a writ court can interfere with a transfer order only if the petitioner establishes that the order is mala fide or beyond the competence of the issuing authority.

The bench drew on a line of Supreme Court decisions. In Rajendra Roy v. Union of India, reported in (1993) 1 SCC 148, the Supreme Court held that unless a transfer order is passed mala fide or in violation of service rules and guidelines without proper justification, courts and tribunals should not interfere. In State of U.P. v. Siya Ram, reported in (2004) 7 SCC 405, the Supreme Court held that no government servant has any legal right to be posted forever at a place of his choice, and that courts should not interfere with transfer orders as though they were appellate authorities. In State of U.P. v. Gobardhan Lal, reported in (2004) 11 SCC 402, the Supreme Court held that even a transfer made in transgression of administrative guidelines cannot be interfered with unless vitiated by mala fides or in violation of a statutory provision.

The bench also referred to Rajendra Singh v. State of U.P., reported in (2009) 15 SCC 178, and to Union of India v. S.L. Abbas, reported in AIR 1993 SC 2444, where the Supreme Court held that transfer guidelines do not confer upon any government employee a legally enforceable right. The bench further noted a Division Bench decision of the Rajasthan High Court at the Principal Seat, Jodhpur, in Union of India v. Surendra Kumar, D.B. Special Appeal No. 720/2024, decided on 06 September 2024, which held that transfer orders in the Forces are primarily administrative decisions and interference is warranted only in cases of statutory violation or mala fides.

How the Bench Reasoned

On the first ground — that the petitioner's appointment as LDC (Stores) confined him to Stores postings — the bench rejected the argument. The appointment letter dated 16 November 2018 showed that the petitioner's services were governed by the service conditions mentioned therein, including the Conduct Rules. The Head Office of CSD is in Mumbai, and the petitioner was initially posted at Bathinda, which itself demonstrated that he was liable to be posted anywhere under CSD. The bench held that posting an LDC at the administrative wing of the department, rather than at a field store, does not violate any condition in the appointment order. None of the conditions in the appointment letter gave the petitioner a right to remain posted only in Stores or in the field.

On the Transfer Policy, the bench found that the policy itself makes the longest-stayee and choice-station norm explicitly non-absolute. Guideline No. 3(xxvi) of the Transfer Policy dated 04.10.2011 states that while the administration will normally observe those norms, it reserves the right to effect transfer on administrative grounds if a deviation is considered necessary. Para 3(xiv) makes organisational and functional requirement an overriding consideration for posting, and Para 5 gives the General Manager, CSD, as Head of Department, the right to override or relax any provision depending on exigencies of service.

The bench held that the Transfer Policy is not a binding rule enforceable against the employer. It is a guideline to be considered at the time of transfer. The petitioner cannot enforce it by invoking Article 226/227 of the Constitution. Even if a transfer is made in transgression of administrative guidelines, courts ordinarily should not interfere; the affected party should approach higher authorities in the department.

On the longest-stayee argument, the bench noted that the CAT had already examined the list of 25 persons cited by the petitioner and found that 22 of them were not LDC (Stores), the same category as the petitioner. Of the remaining three, one had already been transferred and another had applied for transfer. Only one person holding the same post as the petitioner was still serving at Jaipur. The bench also observed that suitability for a particular post is the sole discretion of the employer, and the court cannot substitute its opinion on who should be transferred where.

On the mala fide ground, the bench examined the petitioner's claims about the RTI application, the e-mail to the Defence Minister, and the complaint about working under a junior. It found that the RTI information about the bonus had been provided to the petitioner on 16 December 2025, and the bonus issue was pending for decision. The transfer order dated 03 February 2025 transferred three persons simultaneously, all posted to HO (Secretariat Branch), meaning the petitioner's transfer was not passed in isolation. The speaking order dated 30 May 2025 clearly stated that the transfer was made to meet functional requirements at the Mumbai headquarters due to a shortage of staff.

The bench held that the issues raised by the petitioner — non-payment of bonus and working under a junior — had not turned into a personal conflict sufficient to presume vindictiveness or to suggest that the transfer was a disciplinary measure. There was no evidence of personal vendetta on the part of any respondent. The petitioner had himself been transferred to Jaipur on his own request in March 2023, and by the time the Tribunal's stay was vacated on 26 May 2026, he had remained at Jaipur for more than three years — exceeding the two-to-three-year tenure prescribed in the Transfer Policy.

The bench concluded that when a transfer is made on administrative grounds and the petitioner fails to prove mala fide — whether malice in fact or malice in law — he is not entitled to any relief under Article 226/227 of the Constitution. The Tribunal had committed no error in dismissing the Original Application.

Outcome

The Division Bench dismissed D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10104/2026 along with all pending applications. No order as to costs was made. The judgment was pronounced on 10 June 2026, with arguments having concluded and the judgment reserved on 08 June 2026.