Magistrate Cannot Become Functus Officio After Ordering Investigation Under Section 156(3): Rajasthan HC
Rajasthan High Court directs trial court to secure a conclusive investigation report within six weeks, holding that Magistrates must actively supervise probes ordered under Section 156(3) CrPC and cannot simply keep adjourning matters while awaiting a report that never arrives.
The Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur has disposed of a criminal writ petition filed by Sumann Mundhara, a resident of Bikaner, who sought a direction compelling the police to complete an investigation that a trial court had already ordered more than a year earlier. Justice Rekha Borana, sitting singly, found that despite a specific direction issued by the trial court on 15 April 2025 — requiring the Circle Officer, Bikaner to file a conclusive investigation report by 22 May 2025 — no such report had been filed. The court held that a Magistrate who orders investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC does not become functus officio thereafter; it retains a continuing duty to supervise and monitor the probe. A six-week deadline was set for the filing of a chargesheet or final report, with liberty to the trial court to pass appropriate orders against the erring officer if the deadline is missed.
The Complaint and the Trial Court's Direction
Sumann Mundhara had filed a complaint that was registered as Criminal Case No. 1934/2024. On 15 April 2025, the trial court examined the documents filed by the complainant and directed the Circle Officer, Bikaner to undertake a thorough investigation and file a conclusive report by 22 May 2025. That deadline passed without compliance.
A specific direction was issued to the concerned Sub-Inspector — the then Station House Officer of Police Station Napasar, District Bikaner — only on 16 October 2025. A factual report was eventually filed on 27 November 2025. Even after that, the matter continued to remain pending before the trial court, awaiting a progress or conclusive report, with no chargesheet or final report in sight by the time the writ petition was heard.
Mundhara approached the High Court seeking a direction to the Superintendent of Police, Bikaner and the Circle Officer, Gangashahar to complete the investigation and submit a report to the trial court as directed by the order of 15 April 2025.
A Pattern the High Court Has Repeatedly Encountered
Justice Borana did not treat this as an isolated lapse. The court recorded that it had come across several writ petitions filed solely because of non-compliance with Magistrate directions for investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC, the equivalent of Section 175(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). In all such matters, despite specific directions to carry out investigation and file a conclusive report, neither was the investigation concluded within a reasonable period nor were progress reports filed for extended stretches of time.
The court observed that in many of these cases, proceedings remained pending before the trial court for years, with the court mechanically fixing repeated dates and calling upon the investigating agency for an effective status report. The practical consequence was that litigants were compelled to approach the High Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction to secure implementation of orders that properly fell within the supervisory domain of the concerned criminal court.
The Legal Framework: Section 156(3), Section 173(1), and the Apex Court's Guidance
The court drew on two Supreme Court decisions to frame the legal position.
The first was Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. & Ors., (2008) 2 SCC 409, where the Supreme Court held that a Magistrate has wide powers not only to direct registration of an FIR but also to ensure a proper investigation, including the power to monitor it. The Supreme Court in that case had also observed that no writ petition or petition under Section 482 CrPC should ordinarily be entertained merely because a person complains that proper investigation is not being done — the remedy lies under Section 156(3) CrPC before the Magistrate, or by filing a criminal complaint under Section 200 CrPC.
Justice Borana acknowledged that principle but distinguished the present facts: the petitioner had already exhausted the Section 156(3) route, the Magistrate had already directed investigation, and still no conclusive report had been filed for over a year. The extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court was therefore properly invoked.
The second decision was the Supreme Court's recent judgment in Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu alias R.L. Chongthu v. State of Bihar, AIROnline 2025 SC 1112, which considered the earlier ruling in Sovaran Singh Prajapati v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 351. The Supreme Court in Chongthu traced the historical development of the concept of prompt investigation from the colonial-era Codes of 1861 and 1872 — which vested extensive autonomy in the police with minimal judicial supervision — through the Codes of 1898 and 1973, which introduced oversight mechanisms through provisions such as Sections 156(3), 167 and 173(1) and 173(2). The BNSS 2023 carries forward similar timelines under Sections 187, 193, 230, 250, 251, 262 and 263.
The Supreme Court in Chongthu held that the concept of speedy trial encompasses all stages of the criminal process, including investigation, and that “process of investigation and trial must be completed with promptitude.” It further held that if a court finds a large gap between the FIR and the culminating chargesheet, it is bound to seek an explanation from the investigating agency and satisfy itself as to the propriety of that explanation.
Critically, the Supreme Court in Chongthu also addressed the remedy available when investigation drags on without adequate justification: “If investigation into a particular offence has continued for a period that appears to be unduly long, that too without adequate justification… the accused or the complainant both, shall be at liberty to approach the High Court under Section 528 BNSS/482 Cr.P.C., seeking an update on the investigation.” The court clarified that delay in completion of investigation would function as one of the grounds, and other grounds would also have to be considered if the High Court decides to entertain such an application.
The Magistrate's Continuing Supervisory Duty
Applying these principles, Justice Borana held that a criminal court does not discharge its obligations merely by sending a matter to the investigating agency under Section 156(3) CrPC. The court is under a continuing duty to supervise and monitor the investigation. It must call for progress reports if it finds that investigation is not being completed within a reasonable time or is being unnecessarily delayed.
The court was direct: investigation cannot be prolonged by the investigating agency for years without any logical conclusion. Such prolongation harms not only the victim or complainant but also the accused. The court added that, as held by the Supreme Court in a series of judgments, an unduly prolonged investigation can even give the accused a right to seek quashing of the FIR and discharge from all alleged offences.
Section 173(1) CrPC, and its BNSS counterpart Section 193(1), require that every investigation be completed without unnecessary delay. The court read this provision alongside the supervisory powers of the Magistrate to conclude that the trial court's role is active, not passive, once an investigation direction has been issued.
Outcome
The High Court disposed of S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 2136/2026 with the following directions:
The trial court was directed to ensure that the Investigation Officer files a conclusive investigation report — whether a chargesheet or a final report — in relation to the complaint or FIR in question, within six weeks from the date of the order, i.e., from 18 May 2026.
If the Investigation Officer fails to file the report within that period, the trial court was granted liberty to pass appropriate orders against the erring officer.
All pending applications, including the stay application, were disposed of.