Rajasthan HC Dismisses Section 482 Petitions After Petitioners Simultaneously Pursued Revision Before Sessions Court
Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand held that pursuing Section 482 CrPC before the High Court and Section 397 revision before the Sessions Court simultaneously for the same grievance amounts to abuse of process.
The Rajasthan High Court, Bench at Jaipur, has disposed of two Section 482 CrPC petitions challenging FIR No. 90/2021 and the consequent criminal proceedings, after finding that the petitioners had simultaneously filed criminal revision petitions before the Sessions Court against the order framing charges in the same matter. Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand, sitting singly, ruled on 22 May 2026 that a litigant cannot pursue two parallel remedies before two different courts for the same cause at the same time. The bench invoked the Latin maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa and held that once the petitioners elected to challenge the charge-framing order before the Revisional Court under Section 397 CrPC, the Section 482 petitions before the High Court became unsustainable. The court also found that the cognizance order had merged into the charge-framing order, leaving no independent grievance to be addressed under Section 482.
The FIR, the Charge-Sheet, and the Petitions
FIR No. 90/2021 was registered at Police Station Mahila Thana (South), Jaipur, for offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 406 and 323 IPC. A charge-sheet was submitted and cognizance was taken by the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate No. 12, Jaipur Metropolitan-I, where the matter was registered as Criminal Case No. 22890/2022.
After cognizance was taken, four of the accused, Anil Prakash Goyal, Shivani Goyal, Jayati Garg and Vishal Garg, all residents of Noida and Delhi, filed S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 7218/2022 before the High Court seeking to quash the FIR and the consequent proceedings. A fifth accused, Amit Goyal, filed a connected petition bearing No. 7586/2022. The High Court passed an interim order on 10 February 2023 directing that no coercive action be taken against the petitioners.
The complainant, Sunayna Tapadiya, was arrayed as the second respondent in both petitions. The petitions remained pending for several years. During that period, the Trial Court framed charges against the petitioners for offences under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC vide order dated 23 April 2025.
Aggrieved by the charge-framing order, the petitioners filed two criminal revision petitions, bearing Nos. 29/2025 and 295/2025, before the Court of Sessions Judge, Jaipur Metropolitan-I. Those revision petitions were transferred to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge No. 2, Jaipur Metropolitan-I, where they remained pending.
Separately, the petitioners approached the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) Diary No. 7155/2026. The Supreme Court, by order dated 27 February 2026, directed the High Court to decide the two pending miscellaneous petitions. Arguments before the High Court concluded on 18 May 2026 and the order was reserved on the same day.
The Preliminary Objection on Maintainability
Mr. V.R.S. Bajwa, Senior Advocate appearing for the complainant-respondent, raised a preliminary objection at the outset. He submitted that charges had already been framed on 23 April 2025 and that the petitioners had themselves challenged that order before the Revisional Court. With two separate proceedings, one before the High Court and one before the Sessions Court, addressing the same underlying cause, the Section 482 petitions were not maintainable and were liable to be rejected on that ground alone.
Mr. Bajwa also pointed out that when the petitioners moved the Supreme Court in SLP Diary No. 7155/2026, they did not disclose to the Apex Court that charges had already been framed against them on 23 April 2025. He submitted that the petitioners obtained the Supreme Court's direction of 27 February 2026 by representing that the trial had not yet commenced and that the petitions would become infructuous if not decided, without bringing the charge-framing order to the court's notice. He characterised this as suppression of a material fact.
Mr. Bajwa further relied on the Supreme Court's judgment in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in 2014 (3) SCC 92, to argue that once charges are framed and trial commences, the Section 482 petitions become infructuous. He also relied on Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra, reported in (1977) 4 SCC 551, for the proposition that the inherent power under Section 482 CrPC cannot be invoked where a specific provision of the Code is available to redress the grievance.
An additional objection was raised regarding the earlier petition filed by the same set of petitioners, S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 380/2022, in which the High Court had declined to entertain the matter on merits and had instead directed the Investigating Officer to conduct a fair, impartial and expeditious investigation. No liberty had been granted to the petitioners to file a successive petition challenging the FIR.
Petitioners' Response on the Scope of Section 482
Mr. A.K. Gupta, Senior Advocate for the petitioners, countered that the inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC are not circumscribed by any stage of the proceedings and can be exercised at any time to prevent abuse of the process of law. He submitted that the scope of Section 482 is wider than the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 CrPC, which is confined to examining the correctness of the Trial Court's order. The filing of a revision petition against the charge-framing order, he argued, did not bar the High Court from exercising its inherent jurisdiction.
The petitioners also submitted that the interim order of 10 February 2023, directing no coercive action, should have restrained the Trial Court from framing charges. Since charges were framed during the pendency of the petitions and without the High Court having heard them, the petitioners were compelled to file revision petitions before the Sessions Court to protect their position.
In support, the petitioners cited G. Sagar Suri v. State of UP, reported in (2000) 2 SCC 636, Chaman Lal Sankhla v. State of Haryana, reported in 2008 SCC OnLine P&H 207, and Prabhu Chawla v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2016) 16 SCC 30.
How the Bench Reasoned
Justice Dhand framed the central question as whether the petitioners could be permitted to avail two parallel remedies for the same relief, quashing of the proceedings or discharge, before two different courts simultaneously.
The bench traced the procedural stages of a criminal case: registration of FIR under Section 154 CrPC, submission of charge-sheet under Section 173 CrPC, taking of cognizance under Section 190 CrPC, and framing of charges. The court noted that an accused may challenge the FIR, charge-sheet and cognizance order before the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, and may challenge the charge-framing order before the Revisional Court under Section 397 CrPC. What an accused cannot do, the bench held, is pursue both remedies simultaneously for the same grievance.
The court held that by filing revision petitions before the Sessions Court against the charge-framing order while the Section 482 petitions remained pending before the High Court, the petitioners were attempting to “sail in two boats”, a practice the bench said could not be permitted. Once a party elects to pursue one remedy, it is bound by that choice and cannot simultaneously pursue another for the same cause.
Justice Dhand invoked the Latin maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa, no man should be vexed twice for the same cause — as a foundational principle supporting the bar on parallel remedies. The bench observed that while multiple remedies might technically exist under the Code, selecting one remedy ordinarily bars the simultaneous initiation of another for the same cause. Such parallel pursuit, the court said, amounts to abuse of the process of law and the court.
On the merger of the cognizance order, the bench held that once a court applies its mind under Section 240 CrPC and frames charges, the earlier order of cognizance under Section 190 CrPC ceases to have an independent existence. The cognizance order merges into the charge-framing order. Accordingly, any challenge to the cognizance order in the Section 482 petitions had become infructuous after 23 April 2025. The only surviving remedy was a challenge to the charge-framing order itself — a remedy the petitioners had already availed before the Sessions Court.
The bench also addressed the interim order of 10 February 2023. It held that the direction of “no coercive action” was vague and did not specifically restrain the Trial Court from framing charges. No order had been passed by the High Court prohibiting the Trial Court from proceeding to the charge-framing stage.
On the concern about docket congestion, the bench observed that if simultaneous pursuit of Section 397 revision before the Sessions Court and Section 482 petitions before the High Court were permitted for the same grievance, it would open the door to a flood of such petitions. The court said this practice was liable to be deprecated.
The bench distinguished the petitioners' reliance on G. Sagar Suri, Chaman Lal Sankhla and Prabhu Chawla without displacing the core principle drawn from Madhu Limaye: that Section 482 powers are not to be resorted to where a specific provision of the Code is available for redressal of the grievance. Since the petitioners had already availed the specific remedy under Section 397 CrPC before the Revisional Court, the Section 482 petitions were not maintainable under the changed circumstances.
Order
Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand disposed of both S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 7218/2022 and S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 7586/2022 on 22 May 2026, granting liberty to the petitioners to pursue their remedy under Section 397 CrPC before the Revisional Court.
The Revisional Court, the Court of Additional Sessions Judge No. 2, Jaipur Metropolitan-I, was directed to hear and decide the pending revision petitions bearing Nos. 29/2025 and 295/2025 against the charge-framing order expeditiously, after providing due opportunity of hearing to all sides.
The stay application and all other pending applications in the two petitions were also disposed of.